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6 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1891–1981 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fleishman v. Meyergreen2 sentences1926J., Section 151 (d), page 647, as follows: “But the entry of a retraxit bars all further proceedings, and therefore it "must be entered by the client personally, or by his attorney in pursuance of special authority conferred upon him for the purpose.” In accordance with this rule it has been held in this state, “that an attorney, by virtue of, a mere retainer, has no implied power to bind his client by a compromise of his claim.” Fleishman v. Meyer, 46 Or. 267, 275 ( 80 Pac. 209 ), and that “an attorney has no authority arising from his employment in that capacity, no implied power, to comprom 1926J., Section 151 (d), page 647, as follows: “But the entry of a retraxit bars all further proceedings, and therefore it "must be entered by the client personally, or by his attorney in pursuance of special authority conferred upon him for the purpose.” In accordance with this rule it has been held in this state, “that an attorney, by virtue of, a mere retainer, has no implied power to bind his client by a compromise of his claim.” Fleishman v. Meyer, 46 Or. 267, 275 ( 80 Pac. 209 ), and that “an attorney has no authority arising from his employment in that capacity, no implied power, to comprom | 1 | 1 |
Seaweard v. De Armondgreen2 sentences1926J., Section 151 (d), page 647, as follows: “But the entry of a retraxit bars all further proceedings, and therefore it "must be entered by the client personally, or by his attorney in pursuance of special authority conferred upon him for the purpose.” In accordance with this rule it has been held in this state, “that an attorney, by virtue of, a mere retainer, has no implied power to bind his client by a compromise of his claim.” Fleishman v. Meyer, 46 Or. 267, 275 ( 80 Pac. 209 ), and that “an attorney has no authority arising from his employment in that capacity, no implied power, to comprom 1926J., Section 151 (d), page 647, as follows: “But the entry of a retraxit bars all further proceedings, and therefore it "must be entered by the client personally, or by his attorney in pursuance of special authority conferred upon him for the purpose.” In accordance with this rule it has been held in this state, “that an attorney, by virtue of, a mere retainer, has no implied power to bind his client by a compromise of his claim.” Fleishman v. Meyer, 46 Or. 267, 275 ( 80 Pac. 209 ), and that “an attorney has no authority arising from his employment in that capacity, no implied power, to comprom | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
White v. . Hoyt
green
2 sentences1917(Stewart v. Ahrenfeldt, 4 Denio, 189 ; Crand v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389 ; White v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 505 ; Griswold v. Wright, 61 Wis. 195 ( 21 N. W. 44 ); Brooks v. Holt, 36 Kan. 697 ( 14 Pac. 236 ); Flanagan v. Kilcome, 58 N. H. 443; Wehrum v. Kuhn, 61 N. Y. 623 .) “Nor is it a defense, that the claim could not have been maintained if suit or action had been brought upon it or that the parties were mistaken as to the law; for if it is, then it would follow that contracts by the parties settling their own disputes, would at least be made to stand or fall, according to the opinion of the court as to 1891(Stewart v. Ahrenfeldt, 4 Denio, 189 ; Crans v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389 ; White v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 505 ; Griswold v. Wright, 61 Wis. 195 ; Brooks Hall, 36 Kan. 697 ; 14 Pac. | 2 | 1891–1917 |
Crans v. . Hunter
green
2 sentences1917(Stewart v. Ahrenfeldt, 4 Denio, 189 ; Crand v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389 ; White v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 505 ; Griswold v. Wright, 61 Wis. 195 ( 21 N. W. 44 ); Brooks v. Holt, 36 Kan. 697 ( 14 Pac. 236 ); Flanagan v. Kilcome, 58 N. H. 443; Wehrum v. Kuhn, 61 N. Y. 623 .) “Nor is it a defense, that the claim could not have been maintained if suit or action had been brought upon it or that the parties were mistaken as to the law; for if it is, then it would follow that contracts by the parties settling their own disputes, would at least be made to stand or fall, according to the opinion of the court as to 1891(Stewart v. Ahrenfeldt, 4 Denio, 189 ; Crans v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389 ; White v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 505 ; Griswold v. Wright, 61 Wis. 195 ; Brooks Hall, 36 Kan. 697 ; 14 Pac. | 2 | 1891–1917 |
Stewart v. Ahrenfeldt
neutral
2 sentences1917(Stewart v. Ahrenfeldt, 4 Denio, 189 ; Crand v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389 ; White v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 505 ; Griswold v. Wright, 61 Wis. 195 ( 21 N. W. 44 ); Brooks v. Holt, 36 Kan. 697 ( 14 Pac. 236 ); Flanagan v. Kilcome, 58 N. H. 443; Wehrum v. Kuhn, 61 N. Y. 623 .) “Nor is it a defense, that the claim could not have been maintained if suit or action had been brought upon it or that the parties were mistaken as to the law; for if it is, then it would follow that contracts by the parties settling their own disputes, would at least be made to stand or fall, according to the opinion of the court as to 1891(Stewart v. Ahrenfeldt, 4 Denio, 189 ; Crans v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389 ; White v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 505 ; Griswold v. Wright, 61 Wis. 195 ; Brooks Hall, 36 Kan. 697 ; 14 Pac. | 2 | 1891–1917 |
Brooks v. Hall
neutral
2 sentences1917(Stewart v. Ahrenfeldt, 4 Denio, 189 ; Crand v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389 ; White v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 505 ; Griswold v. Wright, 61 Wis. 195 ( 21 N. W. 44 ); Brooks v. Holt, 36 Kan. 697 ( 14 Pac. 236 ); Flanagan v. Kilcome, 58 N. H. 443; Wehrum v. Kuhn, 61 N. Y. 623 .) “Nor is it a defense, that the claim could not have been maintained if suit or action had been brought upon it or that the parties were mistaken as to the law; for if it is, then it would follow that contracts by the parties settling their own disputes, would at least be made to stand or fall, according to the opinion of the court as to 1891(Stewart v. Ahrenfeldt, 4 Denio, 189 ; Crans v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389 ; White v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 505 ; Griswold v. Wright, 61 Wis. 195 ; Brooks Hall, 36 Kan. 697 ; 14 Pac. | 2 | 1891–1917 |
Griswold v. Wright
green
2 sentences1917(Stewart v. Ahrenfeldt, 4 Denio, 189 ; Crand v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389 ; White v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 505 ; Griswold v. Wright, 61 Wis. 195 ( 21 N. W. 44 ); Brooks v. Holt, 36 Kan. 697 ( 14 Pac. 236 ); Flanagan v. Kilcome, 58 N. H. 443; Wehrum v. Kuhn, 61 N. Y. 623 .) “Nor is it a defense, that the claim could not have been maintained if suit or action had been brought upon it or that the parties were mistaken as to the law; for if it is, then it would follow that contracts by the parties settling their own disputes, would at least be made to stand or fall, according to the opinion of the court as to 1917(Stewart v. Ahrenfeldt, 4 Denio, 189 ; Crand v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389 ; White v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 505 ; Griswold v. Wright, 61 Wis. 195 ( 21 N. W. 44 ); Brooks v. Holt, 36 Kan. 697 ( 14 Pac. 236 ); Flanagan v. Kilcome, 58 N. H. 443; Wehrum v. Kuhn, 61 N. Y. 623 .) “Nor is it a defense, that the claim could not have been maintained if suit or action had been brought upon it or that the parties were mistaken as to the law; for if it is, then it would follow that contracts by the parties settling their own disputes, would at least be made to stand or fall, according to the opinion of the court as to | 2 | 1891–1917 |
Schramm v. Burkhart
green
2 sentences1981Great effort was made by counsel to clarify to the court the pro and con of plaintiff’s theory that the amount paid to the trustees as a result of the settlement should be allowed as a deduction from the estate for state inheritance tax purposes, under ORS 118.070(1) (1975 Replacement Part) as a “claim against the estate.” In deference to counsel, the court’s reasoning is set out in footnote 2 , below. 1 Schramm v. Burkhart, 137 Or 208 , 2 P2d 14 (1931). 2 In support of its argument that the amount paid to the trustees under the compromise is a claim against the estate, plaintiff relies chiefl 1981Great effort was made by counsel to clarify to the court the pro and con of plaintiff’s theory that the amount paid to the trustees as a result of the settlement should be allowed as a deduction from the estate for state inheritance tax purposes, under ORS 118.070(1) (1975 Replacement Part) as a “claim against the estate.” In deference to counsel, the court’s reasoning is set out in footnote 2 , below. 1 Schramm v. Burkhart, 137 Or 208 , 2 P2d 14 (1931). 2 In support of its argument that the amount paid to the trustees under the compromise is a claim against the estate, plaintiff relies chiefl | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Campbell v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
neutral
1 sentence1954Co., supra, was overruled by the case of Pfiffner v. Kroger Grocer & Baking Co., (Mo. App.) 140 SW2d 79 ; and, while the New Hampshire cases seem to be in a state of flux, they seem to hold that if the matter is called to the attention of the court, the trial court must first determine whether the settlement was made with a third person as a compromise of a claim, the validity of which was denied by the defendant, or as an admission of liability, and if the trial court determines the payment was an admission of liability and not the compromise of a denied liability, it becomes admissible. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Wehrum v. . Kuhn
green
1 sentence1917(Stewart v. Ahrenfeldt, 4 Denio, 189 ; Crand v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389 ; White v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 505 ; Griswold v. Wright, 61 Wis. 195 ( 21 N. W. 44 ); Brooks v. Holt, 36 Kan. 697 ( 14 Pac. 236 ); Flanagan v. Kilcome, 58 N. H. 443; Wehrum v. Kuhn, 61 N. Y. 623 .) “Nor is it a defense, that the claim could not have been maintained if suit or action had been brought upon it or that the parties were mistaken as to the law; for if it is, then it would follow that contracts by the parties settling their own disputes, would at least be made to stand or fall, according to the opinion of the court as to | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Wells v. Neff
green
2 sentences1913The rule is well established that a compromise and settlement of a claim, asserted on reasonable grounds and in good faith, which the parties, having equal knowledge of the facts, consider doubtful, constitutes a new and valid agreement which is enforceable although the matter compromised be not in fact doubtful in legal contemplation, and the settlement be not what a court would have adjudged upon the facts involved: Wells v. Neff, 14 Or. 66 ( 12 Pac. 84, 88 ); Smith v. Farra, 21 Or. 395 ( 28 Pac. 241 , 20 L. 1913The rule is well established that a compromise and settlement of a claim, asserted on reasonable grounds and in good faith, which the parties, having equal knowledge of the facts, consider doubtful, constitutes a new and valid agreement which is enforceable although the matter compromised be not in fact doubtful in legal contemplation, and the settlement be not what a court would have adjudged upon the facts involved: Wells v. Neff, 14 Or. 66 ( 12 Pac. 84, 88 ); Smith v. Farra, 21 Or. 395 ( 28 Pac. 241 , 20 L. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Smith v. Farra
green
2 sentences1913The rule is well established that a compromise and settlement of a claim, asserted on reasonable grounds and in good faith, which the parties, having equal knowledge of the facts, consider doubtful, constitutes a new and valid agreement which is enforceable although the matter compromised be not in fact doubtful in legal contemplation, and the settlement be not what a court would have adjudged upon the facts involved: Wells v. Neff, 14 Or. 66 ( 12 Pac. 84, 88 ); Smith v. Farra, 21 Or. 395 ( 28 Pac. 241 , 20 L. 1913The rule is well established that a compromise and settlement of a claim, asserted on reasonable grounds and in good faith, which the parties, having equal knowledge of the facts, consider doubtful, constitutes a new and valid agreement which is enforceable although the matter compromised be not in fact doubtful in legal contemplation, and the settlement be not what a court would have adjudged upon the facts involved: Wells v. Neff, 14 Or. 66 ( 12 Pac. 84, 88 ); Smith v. Farra, 21 Or. 395 ( 28 Pac. 241 , 20 L. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.