privacy clause in Illinois

2025A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 409-10. ¶ 57 We note that subsequently, in People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 316-17 (2006), the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.

2025A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 409-10. - 13 - ¶ 56 We note that subsequently, in People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 316-17 (2006), the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.

2017The Illinois Supreme Court has observed that “the Illinois Constitution goes beyond federal constitutional guarantees by expressly recognizing a zone of personal privacy, and *** the protection of that privacy is stated broadly and without restrictions.” Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d at 537 (citing In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d 381, 391 (1992)). ¶ 34 The constitutional right embodied in the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution arose from the desire to safeguard against the collection and exploitation of intimate personal information.

2017In short, under the privacy clause, “a person has a reasonable expectation that he will not be forced to submit to a close scrutiny of his personal characteristics, unless for a valid reason.” In re Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d at 391-92 . ¶ 35 These constitutional provisions do not forbid all invasions of privacy, only those that are unreasonable.

2006Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d at 197 , 290 Ill.Dec. 237 , 821 N.E.2d 288 , quoting People v. Logan, 302 Ill.App.3d 319, 334 , 235 Ill.Dec. 539 , 705 N.E.2d 152 (1998).

2006Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d at 197 , quoting People v. Logan, 302 Ill.

2019Flores, 2013 IL 112673, ¶ 42 (“The privacy clause is unique to the Illinois Constitution, there - 14 - 1-16-0640 being no cognate provision in the federal constitution.

2019Flores, 2013 IL 112673, ¶ 42 (“The privacy clause is unique to the Illinois Constitution, there - 14 - being no cognate provision in the federal constitution.

2020“The constitutional right embodied in the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution arose from the desire to safeguard against the collection and exploitation of intimate personal information.” Id. ¶ 34; see also Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d at 538-39 (broad sweep disclosing confidential information unrelated to litigation is unconstitutional and unreasonable); People v. Lurie, 39 Ill. 2d 331, 335 (1968) (unreasonably broad subpoena seeking irrelevant material is unconstitutional); People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 330-31 (2006) (privacy clause intended to protect violation of personal privacy). ¶

2020“The constitutional right embodied in the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution arose from the desire to safeguard against the collection and exploitation of intimate personal information.” Id. ¶ 34; see also Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d at 538-39 (broad sweep disclosing confidential information unrelated to litigation is 24 unconstitutional and unreasonable); People v. Lurie, 39 Ill. 2d 331, 335 (1968) (unreasonably broad subpoena seeking irrelevant material is unconstitutional); People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 330-31 (2006) (privacy clause intended to protect violation of personal privacy)

2020“The constitutional right embodied in the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution arose from the desire to safeguard against the collection and exploitation of intimate personal information.” Id. ¶ 34; see also Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d at 538-39 (broad sweep disclosing confidential information unrelated to litigation is unconstitutional and unreasonable); People v. Lurie, 39 Ill. 2d 331, 335 (1968) (unreasonably broad subpoena seeking irrelevant material is unconstitutional); People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 330-31 (2006) (privacy clause intended to protect violation of personal privacy). ¶

2020“The constitutional right embodied in the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution arose from the desire to safeguard against the collection and exploitation of intimate personal information.” Id. ¶ 34; see also Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d at 538-39 (broad sweep disclosing confidential information unrelated to litigation is 24 unconstitutional and unreasonable); People v. Lurie, 39 Ill. 2d 331, 335 (1968) (unreasonably broad subpoena seeking irrelevant material is unconstitutional); People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 330-31 (2006) (privacy clause intended to protect violation of personal privacy)

2020See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 , 383 n.7 (1967) (declining to announce categorical rule on whether truthful publication of revelations so intimate as to shock community’s notions of decency could be constitutionally proscribed); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (same); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1989) (same); Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529 (same). ¶ 65 These Supreme Court decisions reflect three consistent themes.

2019See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 , 383 n.7 (1967) (declining to announce categorical rule on whether truthful publication of revelations so intimate as to shock community’s notions of decency could be constitutionally proscribed); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (same); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1989) (same); Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529 (same). ¶ 65 These Supreme Court decisions reflect three consistent themes.

2020See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 , 383 n.7 (1967) (declining to announce categorical rule on whether truthful publication of revelations so intimate as to shock community’s notions of decency could be constitutionally proscribed); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (same); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1989) (same); Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529 (same). ¶ 65 These Supreme Court decisions reflect three consistent themes.

2019See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 , 383 n.7 (1967) (declining to announce categorical rule on whether truthful publication of revelations so intimate as to shock community’s notions of decency could be constitutionally proscribed); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (same); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1989) (same); Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529 (same). ¶ 65 These Supreme Court decisions reflect three consistent themes.

2020See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 , 383 n.7 (1967) (declining to announce categorical rule on whether truthful publication of revelations so intimate as to shock community’s notions of decency could be constitutionally proscribed); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (same); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1989) (same); Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529 (same). ¶ 65 These Supreme Court decisions reflect three consistent themes.

2019See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 , 383 n.7 (1967) (declining to announce categorical rule on whether truthful publication of revelations so intimate as to shock community’s notions of decency could be constitutionally proscribed); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (same); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1989) (same); Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529 (same). ¶ 65 These Supreme Court decisions reflect three consistent themes.

2020See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 , 383 n.7 (1967) (declining to announce categorical rule on whether truthful publication of revelations so intimate as to shock community’s notions of decency could be constitutionally proscribed); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (same); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1989) (same); Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529 (same). ¶ 65 These Supreme Court decisions reflect three consistent themes.

2019See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 , 383 n.7 (1967) (declining to announce categorical rule on whether truthful publication of revelations so intimate as to shock community’s notions of decency could be constitutionally proscribed); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (same); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1989) (same); Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529 (same). ¶ 65 These Supreme Court decisions reflect three consistent themes.

2017People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1995) (citing the comments of the drafters of the privacy clause, which was added to the constitution in 1970); see also People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 330-31 (2006) (the drafters of the privacy clause intended to protect against infringements on “the zone of personal privacy,” such as those that “reveal private medical information” or “the contents of diaries or love letters; *** the individual’s choice of reading materials, whether religious, political, or pornographic; *** [or] sexual orientation or marital infidelity”); In re Will County Gran

2016People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1995) (citing the comments of the drafters of the privacy clause, which was added to the constitution in 1970); see also People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 330-31 (2006) (the drafters of the privacy clause intended to protect against infringements on “the zone of personal privacy,” such as those that “reveal private medical information” or “the contents of diaries or love letters; *** the individual’s choice of reading materials, whether religious, political, or pornographic; *** [or] sexual orientation or marital infidelity”); In re Will County Gran

2006See, e.g., Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 396 , 178 Ill.Dec. 406 , 604 N.E.2d 929 , citing with approval People v. Jackson, 116 Ill.App.3d 430, 434-35 , 72 Ill.Dec. 153 , 452 N.E.2d 85 (1983) (article I, section 6, assures citizens of a right of privacy in their bank records).

2006See, e.g., Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d at 396 , citing with approval People v. Jackson, 116 Ill.

2004Defendant “engaged in conduct that lowered the privacy bar *** [as] [h]is acts spawned a criminal prosecution culminating in a public record that contains the challenged information.” People v. Grochocki , 343 Ill.

2004Defendant “engaged in conduct that lowered the privacy bar *** [as] [h]is acts spawned a criminal prosecution culminating in a public record that contains the challenged information.” People v. Grochocki, 343 Ill.

2003People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 426 , 739 N.E.2d 433, 441-42 (2000).

2003People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 426 , 739 N.E.2d 433, 441-42 (2000).

2025See Carlson v. Jerousek, 2016 IL App (2d) 151248, ¶ 35 (“The civil discovery rules adopt two safeguards to ensure that the discovery of private information will be ‘reasonable’ (and hence constitutional): relevance and proportionality.”); see also Shamrock Chicago Corp. v. Wroblewski, 2019 IL App (1st) 182354, ¶ 32 (“But where the pertinent discovery rule provides requirements of relevance and reasonableness and the parties have the benefit of judicial oversight, the rule also complies, by definition, with the fourth amendment and *** the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution.” (Internal

2016People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1995) (citing the comments of the drafters of the privacy clause, which was added to the constitution in 1970); see also People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 330-31 (2006) (the drafters of the privacy clause intended to protect against infringements on “the zone of personal privacy,” such as those that “reveal private medical information” or “the contents of diaries or love letters; *** the individual’s choice of reading materials, whether religious, political, or pornographic; *** [or] sexual orientation or marital infidelity”); In re Will County Gran

2011Then, quoting our state supreme court, the trial court observed that our state’s privacy right includes a woman’s decision whether to terminate a pregnancy. “[C]iting the privacy clause, our Supreme Court stated unequivocally that the ‘fundamental right of privacy which encompasses a woman’s decision of whether to terminate her pregnancy *** was also secured by the drafters of the 1970 Constitution of the State of Illinois.’ ” Hope Clinic v. Adams, No. 09 CH 38661, order at 6 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co. Mar. 29, 2010) (quoting Family Life, 112 Ill. 2d at 454 ).

2011Cook Co. Mar. 29, 2010) (quoting Family Life, 112 Ill.2d at 454 , 98 Ill.Dec. 33 , 493 N.E.2d 1054 ).

2025See Carlson v. Jerousek, 2016 IL App (2d) 151248, ¶ 35 (“The civil discovery rules adopt two safeguards to ensure that the discovery of private information will be ‘reasonable’ (and hence constitutional): relevance and proportionality.”); see also Shamrock Chicago Corp. v. Wroblewski, 2019 IL App (1st) 182354, ¶ 32 (“But where the pertinent discovery rule provides requirements of relevance and reasonableness and the parties have the benefit of judicial oversight, the rule also complies, by definition, with the fourth amendment and *** the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution.” (Internal