characterization claim in Pennsylvania

1977It is difficult to imagine how any rule or regulation formally adopted in accordance with law could be given a more imperative rendering than this. 6 In the light of these cases, I have no hesitation in saying that the rule before us “establishes a standard of conduct which has the force of law.” Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. F.P.C., 164 U.S.App.D.C. 371 , 506 F.2d 33 , 38 (1974). 7 The Commission argues, however, that this characterization of its rule as an inflexible norm is inaccurate; it asserts that deviations from the 30 percent range definition have in fact been permitted.

1977It is difficult to imagine how any rule or regulation formally adopted in accordance with law could be given a more imperative rendering than this. [6] In the light of these cases, I have no hesitation in saying that the rule before us "establishes a standard of conduct which has the force of law." Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. F.P.C., 164 U.S.App.D.C. 371 , 506 F.2d 33 , 38 (1974). [7] The Commission argues, however, that this characterization of its rule as an inflexible norm is inaccurate; it asserts that deviations from the 30 percent range definition have in fact been permitted.

1977It is difficult to imagine how any rule or regulation formally adopted in accordance with law could be given a more imperative rendering than this. 6 In the light of these cases, I have no hesitation in saying that the rule before us “establishes a standard of conduct which has the force of law.” Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. F.P.C., 164 U.S.App.D.C. 371 , 506 F.2d 33 , 38 (1974). 7 The Commission argues, however, that this characterization of its rule as an inflexible norm is inaccurate; it asserts that deviations from the 30 percent range definition have in fact been permitted.

1977It is difficult to imagine how any rule or regulation formally adopted in accordance with law could be given a more imperative rendering than this. [6] In the light of these cases, I have no hesitation in saying that the rule before us "establishes a standard of conduct which has the force of law." Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. F.P.C., 164 U.S.App.D.C. 371 , 506 F.2d 33 , 38 (1974). [7] The Commission argues, however, that this characterization of its rule as an inflexible norm is inaccurate; it asserts that deviations from the 30 percent range definition have in fact been permitted.

2026Notwithstanding this latitude, however, we find no reason to overrule ____________________________________________ 2 Despite the High Court’s finding in Schmidt that the trial court did not err with respect to the content of the jury instruction on the product line exception, as well as the fact that the Court could not reach the question of whether the application of the product line exception should be decided by the judge or the jury, the Schmidt Court nevertheless commented in a footnote that the appellees’ characterization of the exception as “‘an equitable remedy’ suggests that it might

2026The High Court further observed that the “‘philosophical origin’ and the looseness engrafted on the exception by Dawejko, encompassing the task of balancing a litany of factors (as contrasted with deciding factual matters in the context of a clearly articulated framework), also appears to militate in favor of allocating the decision to a judge.” Id. - 15 - J-E01004-25 Dawejko or displace the product line exception as part of the established jurisprudence in this Commonwealth.

2002We found that although this issue was “phrased in terms of jurisdiction, the real issue is whether our Court had the authority to impose the sanction of disbarment under the circumstances of this case.” Id. at 422 (citing Riedel).

2002We found that although this issue was "phrased in terms of jurisdiction, the real issue is whether our Court had the authority to impose the sanction of disbarment under the circumstances of this case." Id. at 422 (citing Riedel ).

1991The requirement that a court determine the true foundation of a plaintiff’s cause of action is further illustrated in the leading case of Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 , 99 S.Ct. 318 , 58 L.Ed.2d 323 (1978).

1991The requirement that a court determine the true foundation of a plaintiff’s cause of action is further illustrated in the leading case of Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 , 99 S.Ct. 318 , 58 L.Ed.2d 323 (1978).

1991The requirement that a court determine the true foundation of a plaintiff’s cause of action is further illustrated in the leading case of Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 , 99 S.Ct. 318 , 58 L.Ed.2d 323 (1978).

1980Petitioner bases its first claim of due process denial on the ground that the hearing examiner improperly ruled the hearing a “trial de novo.” Undoubtedly the hearing examiner was relying upon this Court’s characterization of the hearing in Pennsylvania Associated Builders, supra, where we said that “[t]he situation is not identical but is somewhat analogous to a Judge who grants a new trial after having made a decision at the first trial.” Id. at 100, 51 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 249 .

1980Petitioner bases its first claim of due process denial on the ground that the hearing examiner improperly ruled the hearing a “trial de novo.” Undoubtedly the hearing examiner was relying upon this Court’s characterization of the hearing in Pennsylvania Associated Builders, supra, where we said that “[t]he situation is not identical but is somewhat analogous to a Judge who grants a new trial after having made a decision at the first trial.” Id. at 100, 51 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 249 .