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5 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ariasgreen1 sentence2023In the State’s initial and rebuttal closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the defense expert being “censured,” “disciplined,” “punished,” and “biased.” ¶40 “Because attorneys are given wide latitude in closing arguments and may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence,” Arias, 248 Ariz. at 563, ¶ 67 (citation omitted), the prosecutor’s characterization of the defense expert here was permissible. | 1 | 1 |
State of Arizona v. Shawn Patrick Lynchred1 sentence2017See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 96, ¶ 29 (2015) (citations omitted) (finding prosecutor’s repeated suggestions that defense theories were not credible was not misconduct), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 171 (1990) (finding the characterization of defense as “outrageous” and a “smoke screen” permissible); Ramos, 235 Ariz. at 237 - 38, ¶¶ 24-25 (holding there was no misconduct where prosecutor suggested defense counsel was attempting to divert jurors by raising distractions or “red herrings”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Amaya-Ruizgreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 96, ¶ 29 (2015) (citations omitted) (finding prosecutor’s repeated suggestions that defense theories were not credible was not misconduct), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 171 (1990) (finding the characterization of defense as “outrageous” and a “smoke screen” permissible); Ramos, 235 Ariz. at 237 - 38, ¶¶ 24-25 (holding there was no misconduct where prosecutor suggested defense counsel was attempting to divert jurors by raising distractions or “red herrings”). | 1 | 1 |
Lynch v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 96, ¶ 29 (2015) (citations omitted) (finding prosecutor’s repeated suggestions that defense theories were not credible was not misconduct), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 171 (1990) (finding the characterization of defense as “outrageous” and a “smoke screen” permissible); Ramos, 235 Ariz. at 237 - 38, ¶¶ 24-25 (holding there was no misconduct where prosecutor suggested defense counsel was attempting to divert jurors by raising distractions or “red herrings”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ramos
green
1 sentence2017See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 96, ¶ 29 (2015) (citations omitted) (finding prosecutor’s repeated suggestions that defense theories were not credible was not misconduct), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 171 (1990) (finding the characterization of defense as “outrageous” and a “smoke screen” permissible); Ramos, 235 Ariz. at 237 - 38, ¶¶ 24-25 (holding there was no misconduct where prosecutor suggested defense counsel was attempting to divert jurors by raising distractions or “red herrings”). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Sheppard v. Interbay Funding, LLC
green
1 sentence2016Moreover, Restatement § 7.6 cmt. e specifically explains that “[t]he result [of replacement] is analogous to subrogation, and under this Restatement the requirements are essentially similar to those for subrogation.” See also Sheppard v. Interbay Funding, LLC, 305 S.W.3d 102 , 108 n.6 (Tex. App. 2009) (noting that under the Restatement, the characterization of a claim as one for equitable subrogation versus one for replacement is “without significant consequence”). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Donald
green
2 sentences2006In her view, “ordering the prosecution to offer a particular plea agreement transgresses too deeply into the prosecutorial realm and usurps too great a portion of the function of the executive to comport with separation of powers principles.” Id. at 418-19, ¶ 48 , 10 P.3d at 1205-06 . ¶ 9 Before considering the County Attorney’s argument that Donald was wrongly decided, we first address the trial court’s characterization of defense counsel’s failure to communicate the plea offer to Reynaga as “excusable neglect.” We presume the trial court borrowed this concept from Arizona Rule of Civil Proce 2006In her view, "ordering the prosecution to offer a particular plea agreement transgresses too deeply into the prosecutorial realm and usurps too great a portion of the function of the executive to comport with separation of powers principles." Id. at 418-19, ¶ 48 , 10 P.3d at 1205-06 . ¶ 9 Before considering the County Attorney's argument that Donald was wrongly decided, we first address the trial court's characterization of defense counsel's failure to communicate the plea offer to Reynaga as "excusable neglect." We presume the trial court borrowed this concept from Arizona Rule of Civil Proce | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Belcher
green
2 sentences1980Cf. State v. Belcher, 108 Ariz. 290 , 496 P.2d 590 (1972); Vaughn v. State, 13 Ariz.App. 15 , 473 P.2d 817 (1970). 1980Cf. State v. Belcher, 108 Ariz. 290 , 496 P.2d 590 (1972); Vaughn v. State, 13 Ariz.App. 15 , 473 P.2d 817 (1970). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Vaughn v. State
neutral
2 sentences1980Cf. State v. Belcher, 108 Ariz. 290 , 496 P.2d 590 (1972); Vaughn v. State, 13 Ariz.App. 15 , 473 P.2d 817 (1970). 1980Cf. State v. Belcher, 108 Ariz. 290 , 496 P.2d 590 (1972); Vaughn v. State, 13 Ariz.App. 15 , 473 P.2d 817 (1970). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.