Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Broyde v. Gotham Tower, Inc.green2 sentences1997Id. 1997See, e.g., Broyde v. Gotham Tower, Inc., 13 F.3d 994 (6th Cir.1994). *645 It is this implied preemption analysis that we must currently apply, for, when enacting the FCA, Congress made no explicit preemption provisions. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick
green
2 sentences2011We then considered whether Congress implicitly intended to preempt such causes of action, citing Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 , 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995), for the following proposition: “the existence of an express preemption clause does not preclude an implied preemption analysis, even though it may support the inference that no implied preemption exists.” Id. 2011We then considered whether Congress implicitly intended to preempt such causes of action, citing Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 , 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995), for the following proposition: “the existence of an express preemption clause does not preclude an implied preemption analysis, even though it may support the inference that no implied preemption exists.” Id. | 2 | 1998–2011 |
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences1996Speaking generally on the subject of preemption, the United States Supreme Court stated in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992): Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Art VI, cl. 2. 1996Speaking generally on the subject of preemption, the United States Supreme Court stated in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992): Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Art VI, cl. 2. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Hernandez-Gomez
green
1 sentence1996The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the decision, and remanded the case “for further consideration in light of” Myrick, supra. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Hemandez-Gomez, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 1819 , 131 L.Ed.2d 742 (1995). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Gingold v. Audi-Nsu-Auto Union, A.G.
green
2 sentences1995Applying this standard to the issue before us, we held that appellant’s common law claims were expressly not preempted. 4 Then, in language presaging Cipollone, 5 we held that “an implied preemption analysis should not be entertained in the face of Congress’s express pronouncement of its intent regarding preemption.” Id. at 356 , 567 A.2d at 327 . 1995Applying this standard to the issue before us, we held that appellant’s common law claims were expressly not preempted. 4 Then, in language presaging Cipollone, 5 we held that “an implied preemption analysis should not be entertained in the face of Congress’s express pronouncement of its intent regarding preemption.” Id. at 356 , 567 A.2d at 327 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Parker v. City of Silverton
neutral
2 sentences1980Again, Parker v. Silverton, 109 Or. 298 , 220 P. 139 , has nothing to do with this case since it involved an attempt by a locality with statutory authority to impose a tax which it did not have authority to levy in the guise of a regulatory license fee. 1980Again, Parker v. Silverton, 109 Or. 298 , 220 P. 139 , has nothing to do with this case since it involved an attempt by a locality with statutory authority to impose a tax which it did not have authority to levy in the guise of a regulatory license fee. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
East Ohio Gas Co. v. City of Akron
green
2 sentences1980Even so, the *559 Court questioned its own "obscure, ambiguous, inconsistent and on occasion almost contradictory" application of the implied preemption doctrine in the state and local tax area and stated that the doctrine's continued vitality in Ohio was based on "the Court's antipathy to `double taxation'" — a policy consideration wholly irrelevant to the instant case. 218 N.E.2d at 610 . 1980Even so, the Court questioned its own “obscure, ambiguous, inconsistent and on occasion almost contradictory” application of the implied preemption doctrine in the state and local tax area and stated that the doctrine’s continued vitality in Ohio was based on “the Court’s antipathy to ‘double taxation’ ” — a policy consideration wholly irrelevant to the instant case. 218 N.E.2d at 610 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.