intolerable rule in Pennsylvania

1984As was said by the superior court in McGarry v. McGarry, 9 Pa.Super. 71 : `It would be an intolerable rule if it were to be held that the rights of clients could be divested by loose expressions of their attorneys.' Under the circumstances here shown, the declarations of the attorney should not have been received.' (emphasis added).

1984As was said by the superior court in McGarry v. McGarry, 9 Pa.Super. 71 : ‘It would be an intolerable rule if it were to be held that the rights of clients could be divested by loose expressions of their attorneys.’ Under the circumstances here shown, the declarations of the attorney should not have been received.’ (emphasis added).

1942President Judge Rice in McGarry v. McGarry, 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 71, 77 , thus expressed the principle: “It would be an intolerable rule if it were to be held that the rights of clients could be divested by loose expressions of their attorneys.” See also Mahler v. Singer, 285 Pa. 540, 545 , 132 A. 718 ; Nesbitt v. Turner, 155 Pa. 429, 440 , 26 A. 750 ; Plummer v. H.

1942President Judge Rice in McGarry v. McGarry, 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 71, 77 , thus expressed the principle: “It would be an intolerable rule if it were to be held that the rights of clients could be divested by loose expressions of their attorneys.” See also Mahler v. Singer, 285 Pa. 540, 545 , 132 A. 718 ; Nesbitt v. Turner, 155 Pa. 429, 440 , 26 A. 750 ; Plummer v. H.

1967While an attorney has power to bind his client by his admissions and acts in the course of suit, or in management of the regular course of litigation, his statements or admissions out of court and not made in the conduct of litigation are generally not binding upon his client in the absence of express authority.” See also Malone v. Marano, 326 Pa. 316 , 192 A. 254 (1937); Harrington v. Stivanson, 210 Pa. 10 , 59 A. 268 (1904).

1938Casket Co., 101 Pa. Superior Ct. 207 ; Wilson v. Young, 9 Pa. 101 . 7 See McGarry v. McGarry, 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 71 , where the court refused to admit in evidence a letter of defendant’s counsel containing expressions inconsistent with his client’s ease, stating at page 77: “It would be an intolerable rule if it were to be held that the rights of clients could be divested by loose expressions of *565 their attorneys made under the circumstances disclosed in the evidence in this case.” See also: Malone v. Marano, 326 Pa. 316 ; Mahler, to use, v. Singer, 285 Pa. 540 ; Harrington v. Stivanson, 21

1967While an attorney has power to bind his client by his admissions and acts in the course of suit, or in management of the regular course of litigation, his statements or admissions out of court and not made in the conduct of litigation are generally not binding upon his client in the absence of express authority.” See also Malone v. Marano, 326 Pa. 316 , 192 A. 254 (1937); Harrington v. Stivanson, 210 Pa. 10 , 59 A. 268 (1904).

1938Casket Co., 101 Pa. Superior Ct. 207 ; Wilson v. Young, 9 Pa. 101 . 7 See McGarry v. McGarry, 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 71 , where the court refused to admit in evidence a letter of defendant’s counsel containing expressions inconsistent with his client’s ease, stating at page 77: “It would be an intolerable rule if it were to be held that the rights of clients could be divested by loose expressions of *565 their attorneys made under the circumstances disclosed in the evidence in this case.” See also: Malone v. Marano, 326 Pa. 316 ; Mahler, to use, v. Singer, 285 Pa. 540 ; Harrington v. Stivanson, 21

1984Geesey v. Albee Pennsylvania Homes, Inc., 211 Pa.Super. 215, 221-22 , 235 A.2d 176, 179-80 (1967). [4] The opinion by Spaeth, J. in Carswell v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 259 Pa.Super. 167 , 393 A.2d 770 (1978), is not binding precedent as two judges did not participate in that decision, and the remaining four judges concurred only in the result. [5] Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) provides that a statement offered against a party will not be hearsay if it is "(D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment

1984Geesey v. Albee Pennsylvania Homes, Inc., 211 Pa.Super. 215, 221-22 , 235 A.2d 176, 179-80 (1967). [4] The opinion by Spaeth, J. in Carswell v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 259 Pa.Super. 167 , 393 A.2d 770 (1978), is not binding precedent as two judges did not participate in that decision, and the remaining four judges concurred only in the result. [5] Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) provides that a statement offered against a party will not be hearsay if it is "(D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment

1967As was said by the Superior Court in McGarry v. McGarry, 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 71 , ‘It would be an intolerable rule if if were to be held that the rights of clients could be divested by loose expressions of their attorneys.’ Under the cir cumstances here shown, the declarations of the attorney should not have been received.” Similarly in Conrad’s Estate, 333 Pa. 561 , 3 A. 2d 697 (1938), the Supreme Court stated: “The letter of the attorney, without proof of his authority, is neither competent nor adequate to show failure of consideration.

1967As was said by the Superior Court in McGarry v. McGarry, 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 71 , ‘It would be an intolerable rule if if were to be held that the rights of clients could be divested by loose expressions of their attorneys.’ Under the cir cumstances here shown, the declarations of the attorney should not have been received.” Similarly in Conrad’s Estate, 333 Pa. 561 , 3 A. 2d 697 (1938), the Supreme Court stated: “The letter of the attorney, without proof of his authority, is neither competent nor adequate to show failure of consideration.

1942President Judge Rice in McGarry v. McGarry, 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 71, 77 , thus expressed the principle: “It would be an intolerable rule if it were to be held that the rights of clients could be divested by loose expressions of their attorneys.” See also Mahler v. Singer, 285 Pa. 540, 545 , 132 A. 718 ; Nesbitt v. Turner, 155 Pa. 429, 440 , 26 A. 750 ; Plummer v. H.

1942President Judge Rice in McGarry v. McGarry, 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 71, 77 , thus expressed the principle: “It would be an intolerable rule if it were to be held that the rights of clients could be divested by loose expressions of their attorneys.” See also Mahler v. Singer, 285 Pa. 540, 545 , 132 A. 718 ; Nesbitt v. Turner, 155 Pa. 429, 440 , 26 A. 750 ; Plummer v. H.

1938R. 374. 8 See Schwoyer’s Estate, 288 Pa. 541, 546 , and Gross’s Estate, 278 Pa. 170, 183-5 . 9 Penrose et al. v. King, 1 Yeates 344 ; Henderson v. Lewis, 9 S. & R. 379; Foulk v. Brown, 2 Watts 209 . 10 See also: Brubaker’s Admr. v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83 ; Moore v. Smith, 81 Pa. 182 ; Briggs’s Appeal, 93 Pa. 485, 488 ; Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. 28, 33 ; Brownell v. Oviatt, 215 Pa. 514, 515 .

1938R. 374. 8 See Schwoyer’s Estate, 288 Pa. 541, 546 , and Gross’s Estate, 278 Pa. 170, 183-5 . 9 Penrose et al. v. King, 1 Yeates 344 ; Henderson v. Lewis, 9 S. & R. 379; Foulk v. Brown, 2 Watts 209 . 10 See also: Brubaker’s Admr. v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83 ; Moore v. Smith, 81 Pa. 182 ; Briggs’s Appeal, 93 Pa. 485, 488 ; Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. 28, 33 ; Brownell v. Oviatt, 215 Pa. 514, 515 .

1938R. 374. 8 See Schwoyer’s Estate, 288 Pa. 541, 546 , and Gross’s Estate, 278 Pa. 170, 183-5 . 9 Penrose et al. v. King, 1 Yeates 344 ; Henderson v. Lewis, 9 S. & R. 379; Foulk v. Brown, 2 Watts 209 . 10 See also: Brubaker’s Admr. v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83 ; Moore v. Smith, 81 Pa. 182 ; Briggs’s Appeal, 93 Pa. 485, 488 ; Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. 28, 33 ; Brownell v. Oviatt, 215 Pa. 514, 515 .

1938Casket Co., 101 Pa. Superior Ct. 207 ; Wilson v. Young, 9 Pa. 101 . 7 See McGarry v. McGarry, 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 71 , where the court refused to admit in evidence a letter of defendant’s counsel containing expressions inconsistent with his client’s ease, stating at page 77: “It would be an intolerable rule if it were to be held that the rights of clients could be divested by loose expressions of *565 their attorneys made under the circumstances disclosed in the evidence in this case.” See also: Malone v. Marano, 326 Pa. 316 ; Mahler, to use, v. Singer, 285 Pa. 540 ; Harrington v. Stivanson, 21

1938Casket Co., 101 Pa. Superior Ct. 207 ; Wilson v. Young, 9 Pa. 101 . 7 See McGarry v. McGarry, 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 71 , where the court refused to admit in evidence a letter of defendant’s counsel containing expressions inconsistent with his client’s ease, stating at page 77: “It would be an intolerable rule if it were to be held that the rights of clients could be divested by loose expressions of *565 their attorneys made under the circumstances disclosed in the evidence in this case.” See also: Malone v. Marano, 326 Pa. 316 ; Mahler, to use, v. Singer, 285 Pa. 540 ; Harrington v. Stivanson, 21

1938R. 374. 8 See Schwoyer’s Estate, 288 Pa. 541, 546 , and Gross’s Estate, 278 Pa. 170, 183-5 . 9 Penrose et al. v. King, 1 Yeates 344 ; Henderson v. Lewis, 9 S. & R. 379; Foulk v. Brown, 2 Watts 209 . 10 See also: Brubaker’s Admr. v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83 ; Moore v. Smith, 81 Pa. 182 ; Briggs’s Appeal, 93 Pa. 485, 488 ; Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. 28, 33 ; Brownell v. Oviatt, 215 Pa. 514, 515 .

1938R. 374. 8 See Schwoyer’s Estate, 288 Pa. 541, 546 , and Gross’s Estate, 278 Pa. 170, 183-5 . 9 Penrose et al. v. King, 1 Yeates 344 ; Henderson v. Lewis, 9 S. & R. 379; Foulk v. Brown, 2 Watts 209 . 10 See also: Brubaker’s Admr. v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83 ; Moore v. Smith, 81 Pa. 182 ; Briggs’s Appeal, 93 Pa. 485, 488 ; Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. 28, 33 ; Brownell v. Oviatt, 215 Pa. 514, 515 .

1938R. 374. 8 See Schwoyer’s Estate, 288 Pa. 541, 546 , and Gross’s Estate, 278 Pa. 170, 183-5 . 9 Penrose et al. v. King, 1 Yeates 344 ; Henderson v. Lewis, 9 S. & R. 379; Foulk v. Brown, 2 Watts 209 . 10 See also: Brubaker’s Admr. v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83 ; Moore v. Smith, 81 Pa. 182 ; Briggs’s Appeal, 93 Pa. 485, 488 ; Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. 28, 33 ; Brownell v. Oviatt, 215 Pa. 514, 515 .

1938R. 374. 8 See Schwoyer’s Estate, 288 Pa. 541, 546 , and Gross’s Estate, 278 Pa. 170, 183-5 . 9 Penrose et al. v. King, 1 Yeates 344 ; Henderson v. Lewis, 9 S. & R. 379; Foulk v. Brown, 2 Watts 209 . 10 See also: Brubaker’s Admr. v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83 ; Moore v. Smith, 81 Pa. 182 ; Briggs’s Appeal, 93 Pa. 485, 488 ; Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. 28, 33 ; Brownell v. Oviatt, 215 Pa. 514, 515 .

1938R. 374. 8 See Schwoyer’s Estate, 288 Pa. 541, 546 , and Gross’s Estate, 278 Pa. 170, 183-5 . 9 Penrose et al. v. King, 1 Yeates 344 ; Henderson v. Lewis, 9 S. & R. 379; Foulk v. Brown, 2 Watts 209 . 10 See also: Brubaker’s Admr. v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83 ; Moore v. Smith, 81 Pa. 182 ; Briggs’s Appeal, 93 Pa. 485, 488 ; Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. 28, 33 ; Brownell v. Oviatt, 215 Pa. 514, 515 .

1938R. 374. 8 See Schwoyer’s Estate, 288 Pa. 541, 546 , and Gross’s Estate, 278 Pa. 170, 183-5 . 9 Penrose et al. v. King, 1 Yeates 344 ; Henderson v. Lewis, 9 S. & R. 379; Foulk v. Brown, 2 Watts 209 . 10 See also: Brubaker’s Admr. v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83 ; Moore v. Smith, 81 Pa. 182 ; Briggs’s Appeal, 93 Pa. 485, 488 ; Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. 28, 33 ; Brownell v. Oviatt, 215 Pa. 514, 515 .

1926As was said by the Superior Court in McGarry v. McGarry, 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 71 , “It would be an intolerable rule if it were to be held that the rights of clients could be divested by loose expressions of their attorneys.” Under the circumstances here shown, the declarations of the attorney should not have been received: Harrington v. Stivanson, 210 Pa. *546 10; Horseshoe Mining Co. v. Miners’ Ore Sampling Co., 147 Fed. 517 (C.