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6 Rhode Island opinions name it 1 courts 2005–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences2013At such a hearing, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required; rather, “the state is only required to prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the hearing justice that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of the previously imposed probation.” Id. (quoting State v. Anderson, 705 A.2d 996, 997 (R.I.1997) (mem.)). 2013At such a hearing, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required; rather, ―the state is only required to prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the hearing justice that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of the previously imposed probation.‖ Id. (quoting State v. Anderson, 705 A.2d 996, 997 (R.I. 1997) (mem.)). ―The ‗reasonable satisfaction‘ standard should not be employed to determine the question of defendant‘s guilt in regard to any offense which may form the basis of the violation 15 Although not necessary to our interpretation of the Firearms Act in this case, we take | 4 | 4 |
State v. Adrian Hazardgreen1 sentence2015See State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 499 (R.I. 2013). -6- Analysis On appeal, Gibson offers several reasons why, in his view, the trial justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding him to be a probation violator. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Waitegreen2 sentences2013At such a hearing, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required; rather, “the state is only required to prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the hearing justice that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of the previously imposed probation.” Id. (quoting State v. Anderson, 705 A.2d 996, 997 (R.I.1997) (mem.)). 2013At such a hearing, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required; rather, ―the state is only required to prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the hearing justice that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of the previously imposed probation.‖ Id. (quoting State v. Anderson, 705 A.2d 996, 997 (R.I. 1997) (mem.)). ―The ‗reasonable satisfaction‘ standard should not be employed to determine the question of defendant‘s guilt in regard to any offense which may form the basis of the violation 15 Although not necessary to our interpretation of the Firearms Act in this case, we take | 1 | 1 |
State v. Seamansgreen1 sentence2013Our review of a trial justice‘s adjudication of probation violation ―is restricted to considering ‗whether the hearing justice acted arbitrarily or capriciously in finding a violation.‘‖ Gromkiewicz, 43 A.3d at 48 (quoting State v. Seamans, 935 A.2d 618, 621 (R.I. 2007)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Penagreen1 sentence2012“In reviewing an adjudication of violation of probation, only reasonably satisfactory evidence is required, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt as is required in a criminal trial.” State v. Pena, 791 A.2d 484, 485 (R.I.2002) (mem.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sylviagreen1 sentence2011See Sylvia, 871 A.2d at 957 (“[T]he state is only required to prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the hearing justice that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of the previously imposed probation.”) (quoting State v. Anderson, 705 A.2d 996, 997 (R.I.1997) (mem.)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Riouxgreen1 sentence2005In a probation-revocation hearing, instead of establishing proof beyond a reasonable doubt, “the state is only required to prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the hearing justice that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of the previously imposed probation.” State v. Anderson, 705 A.2d 996, 997 (R.I. 1997) (mem.); see also Rioux, 708 A.2d at 897 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gromkiewicz
green
2 sentences2015Challenges to a trial justice’s credibility determinations typically are unavailing in this Court because the assessment of witness credibility “in a probation violation hearing is a function of the [trial] justice, not this Court.” Id. (quoting Gromkiewicz, 43 A.3d at 49 ). 9 Consistent with the sole purpose of a probation violation hearing, the reasonable-satisfaction standard is employed to determine only whether the terms and conditions of probation were violated, not whether defendant is guilty of the offenses that form the basis of the violation allegation. 2015Challenges to a trial justice’s credibility determinations typically are unavailing in this Court because the assessment of witness credibility “in a probation violation hearing is a function of the [trial] justice, not this Court.” Id. (quoting Gromkiewicz, 43 A.3d at 49 ). 9 Consistent with the sole purpose of a probation violation hearing, the reasonable-satisfaction standard is employed to determine only whether the terms and conditions of probation were violated, not whether defendant is guilty of the offenses that form the basis of the violation allegation. | 2 | 2013–2015 |
State v. Wiggs
green
1 sentence2005After hearing testimony, the hearing justice determined that the defendant was a violator on the grounds that his behavior on the night in question “was not good.” Notwithstanding that conclusion, however, the hearing justice inexplicably proffered an additional factual determination regarding Wiggs’s involvement in the alleged breaking and entering, stating “[t]here is not sufficient evidence, it’s true, to prove even beyond a reasonable satisfaction standard that [the defendant] was present at the time the apartment was broken into and enter[e]d by the others[.]” Wiggs, 635 A.2d at 274 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.