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9 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1993–1995 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Javier Torrez-Floresgreen1 sentence1994See United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776, 782 (7th Cir. 1980) (“court need only be ‘reasonably satisfied’ and need not find by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation has occurred”); United States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[pjrobably evidence rising to the level of substantial evidence is not even required .... | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Frank David Francischinegreen1 sentence1994See United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776, 782 (7th Cir. 1980) (“court need only be ‘reasonably satisfied’ and need not find by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation has occurred”); United States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[pjrobably evidence rising to the level of substantial evidence is not even required .... | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jose Guadarramagreen1 sentence1993In defining the standard of reasonable satisfaction, several courts have observed, “[t]he standard of proof required is that evidence and facts be such as reasonably to satisfy the judge that the probationer’s conduct has not been as required by the conditions of probation.” United States v. Czajak, supra, 22 , quoting United States v. Guadarrama, 742 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 1984). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Vance Smithgreen1 sentence1993United States v. Smith, 571 F.2d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences1994The standard of proof to be applied by the trial court in deciding whether a probationer has violated a condition of probation is the reasonable satisfaction standard, wherein the trial court must have a rational belief that the ‘evidence is adequate or sufficient to prove a violation.’ State v. Davis, 29 Conn. App. 801, 811 , 618 A.2d 557 (1993). ‘[0]ur review is limited to reviewing whether such a finding was clearly erroneous.’ Id., 805 .” State v. Carey, supra, 350 . 1994The standard of proof to be applied by the trial court in deciding whether a probationer has violated a condition of probation is the reasonable satisfaction standard, wherein the trial court must have a rational belief that the ‘evidence is adequate or sufficient to prove a violation.’ State v. Davis, 29 Conn. App. 801, 811 , 618 A.2d 557 (1993). ‘[0]ur review is limited to reviewing whether such a finding was clearly erroneous.’ Id., 805 .” State v. Carey, supra, 350 . | 5 | 1993–1994 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences1994Our Supreme Court in State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285 , 641 A.2d 370 (1994), held that the fair preponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate standard of proof that the state must meet to establish a violation of a condition of probation. 1994Our Supreme Court in State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285 , 641 A.2d 370 (1994), held that the fair preponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate standard of proof that the state must meet to establish a violation of a condition of probation. | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences1995Accordingly, the state filed a motion for articulation, asking that the trial court clarify whether it applied the fair preponderance of the evidence standard in determining that the state had proven a violation of probation. 7 The trial court did issue an articulation indicating that, although at the time of the hearing it believed that a reasonable satisfaction standard applied, there was “very little question” at the time of the hearing that a violation of probation had been established and that the violation of probation was proven “by at least a preponderance of the reliable and probative 1995Accordingly, the state filed a motion for articulation, asking that the trial court clarify whether it applied the fair preponderance of the evidence standard in determining that the state had proven a violation of probation. 7 The trial court did issue an articulation indicating that, although at the time of the hearing it believed that a reasonable satisfaction standard applied, there was “very little question” at the time of the hearing that a violation of probation had been established and that the violation of probation was proven “by at least a preponderance of the reliable and probative | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Payne v. Robinson
green
2 sentences1994Finally, although the Appellate Court applied the reasonable satisfaction standard in State v. Johnson, 11 Conn. App. 251, 258 , 527 A.2d 250 (1987), and Payne v. Robinson, 10 Conn. App. 395, 403 , 523 A.2d 917 (1987), aff'd, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L. 1994Finally, although the Appellate Court applied the reasonable satisfaction standard in State v. Johnson, 11 Conn. App. 251, 258 , 527 A.2d 250 (1987), and Payne v. Robinson, 10 Conn. App. 395, 403 , 523 A.2d 917 (1987), aff'd, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Davis
green
1 sentence1994“The standard of proof to be applied by the trial court in deciding whether a probationer has violated a condition of probation is the reasonable satisfaction standard, wherein the trial court must have a rational belief that the ‘evidence is adequate or sufficient to prove a violation.’ State v. Davis, 29 Conn. App. 801, 811 , 618 A.2d 557 [cert. granted, 225 Conn. 918 , 623 A.2d 1024 ] (1993).” State v. Carey, 30 Conn. App. 346, 350 , 620 A.2d 201 , cert. granted, 225 Conn. 922 , 625 A.2d 823 (1993). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Fortier v. Newington Group, Inc.
green
1 sentence1994“The standard of proof to be applied by the trial court in deciding whether a probationer has violated a condition of probation is the reasonable satisfaction standard, wherein the trial court must have a rational belief that the ‘evidence is adequate or sufficient to prove a violation.’ State v. Davis, 29 Conn. App. 801, 811 , 618 A.2d 557 [cert. granted, 225 Conn. 918 , 623 A.2d 1024 ] (1993).” State v. Carey, 30 Conn. App. 346, 350 , 620 A.2d 201 , cert. granted, 225 Conn. 922 , 625 A.2d 823 (1993). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Metro Bulletins Corp. v. Soboleski
green
1 sentence1994“The standard of proof to be applied by the trial court in deciding whether a probationer has violated a condition of probation is the reasonable satisfaction standard, wherein the trial court must have a rational belief that the ‘evidence is adequate or sufficient to prove a violation.’ State v. Davis, 29 Conn. App. 801, 811 , 618 A.2d 557 [cert. granted, 225 Conn. 918 , 623 A.2d 1024 ] (1993).” State v. Carey, 30 Conn. App. 346, 350 , 620 A.2d 201 , cert. granted, 225 Conn. 922 , 625 A.2d 823 (1993). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Black v. London & Egazarian Associates, Inc.
green
1 sentence1994“The standard of proof to be applied by the trial court in deciding whether a probationer has violated a condition of probation is the reasonable satisfaction standard, wherein the trial court must have a rational belief that the ‘evidence is adequate or sufficient to prove a violation.’ State v. Davis, 29 Conn. App. 801, 811 , 618 A.2d 557 [cert. granted, 225 Conn. 918 , 623 A.2d 1024 ] (1993).” State v. Carey, 30 Conn. App. 346, 350 , 620 A.2d 201 , cert. granted, 225 Conn. 922 , 625 A.2d 823 (1993). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1994Finally, although the Appellate Court applied the reasonable satisfaction standard in State v. Johnson, 11 Conn. App. 251, 258 , 527 A.2d 250 (1987), and Payne v. Robinson, 10 Conn. App. 395, 403 , 523 A.2d 917 (1987), aff'd, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L. 1994Finally, although the Appellate Court applied the reasonable satisfaction standard in State v. Johnson, 11 Conn. App. 251, 258 , 527 A.2d 250 (1987), and Payne v. Robinson, 10 Conn. App. 395, 403 , 523 A.2d 917 (1987), aff'd, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Payne v. Robinson
green
2 sentences1994Finally, although the Appellate Court applied the reasonable satisfaction standard in State v. Johnson, 11 Conn. App. 251, 258 , 527 A.2d 250 (1987), and Payne v. Robinson, 10 Conn. App. 395, 403 , 523 A.2d 917 (1987), aff'd, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L. 1994Finally, although the Appellate Court applied the reasonable satisfaction standard in State v. Johnson, 11 Conn. App. 251, 258 , 527 A.2d 250 (1987), and Payne v. Robinson, 10 Conn. App. 395, 403 , 523 A.2d 917 (1987), aff'd, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Carey
green
2 sentences1994“The standard of proof to be applied by the trial court in deciding whether a probationer has violated a condition of probation is the reasonable satisfaction standard, wherein the trial court must have a rational belief that the ‘evidence is adequate or sufficient to prove a violation.’ State v. Davis, 29 Conn. App. 801, 811 , 618 A.2d 557 [cert. granted, 225 Conn. 918 , 623 A.2d 1024 ] (1993).” State v. Carey, 30 Conn. App. 346, 350 , 620 A.2d 201 , cert. granted, 225 Conn. 922 , 625 A.2d 823 (1993). 1994“The standard of proof to be applied by the trial court in deciding whether a probationer has violated a condition of probation is the reasonable satisfaction standard, wherein the trial court must have a rational belief that the ‘evidence is adequate or sufficient to prove a violation.’ State v. Davis, 29 Conn. App. 801, 811 , 618 A.2d 557 [cert. granted, 225 Conn. 918 , 623 A.2d 1024 ] (1993).” State v. Carey, 30 Conn. App. 346, 350 , 620 A.2d 201 , cert. granted, 225 Conn. 922 , 625 A.2d 823 (1993). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Daloia v. Rose
green
1 sentence1994Finally, although the Appellate Court applied the reasonable satisfaction standard in State v. Johnson, 11 Conn. App. 251, 258 , 527 A.2d 250 (1987), and Payne v. Robinson, 10 Conn. App. 395, 403 , 523 A.2d 917 (1987), aff'd, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ochoa-Ochoa v. United States
green
1 sentence1994Finally, although the Appellate Court applied the reasonable satisfaction standard in State v. Johnson, 11 Conn. App. 251, 258 , 527 A.2d 250 (1987), and Payne v. Robinson, 10 Conn. App. 395, 403 , 523 A.2d 917 (1987), aff'd, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Plyler v. Evatt
green
1 sentence1994Finally, although the Appellate Court applied the reasonable satisfaction standard in State v. Johnson, 11 Conn. App. 251, 258 , 527 A.2d 250 (1987), and Payne v. Robinson, 10 Conn. App. 395, 403 , 523 A.2d 917 (1987), aff'd, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Schaffer v. Lindy
green
2 sentences1993The axiom that, if a trial court does not state or imply it is using that proper standard of proof, a new trial is necessary; Schaffer v. Lindy, 8 Conn. App. 96, 105 , 511 A.2d 1022 (1986); applies only when the standard of proof that should have been used is higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard. 1993The axiom that, if a trial court does not state or imply it is using that proper standard of proof, a new trial is necessary; Schaffer v. Lindy, 8 Conn. App. 96, 105 , 511 A.2d 1022 (1986); applies only when the standard of proof that should have been used is higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
United States v. Ronald Czajak
green
1 sentence1993In defining the standard of reasonable satisfaction, several courts have observed, “[t]he standard of proof required is that evidence and facts be such as reasonably to satisfy the judge that the probationer’s conduct has not been as required by the conditions of probation.” United States v. Czajak, supra, 22 , quoting United States v. Guadarrama, 742 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 1984). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Gagnon v. Scarpelli
red
2 sentences1993A probation revocation hearing is not a stage of a criminal prosecution; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 , 93 S. Ct. 1756 , 36 L. 1993A probation revocation hearing is not a stage of a criminal prosecution; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 , 93 S. Ct. 1756 , 36 L. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.