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7 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Revels v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.green2 sentences2008Snipes & Sons, Inc., 306 S.C. 289, 292 , 411 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1991) (listing the three factors of the statutory employee test); Revels v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 301 S.C. 316, 318 , 391 S.E.2d 731, 732 (Ct.App.1990) (finding the test used to determine if one is a statutory employee is “whether or not [the work] being done is or is not a part of the general trade, business or occupation of the owner”). 2008Snipes & Sons, Inc., 306 S.C. 289, 292 , 411 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1991) (listing the three factors of the statutory employee test); Revels v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 301 S.C. 316, 318 , 391 S.E.2d 731, 732 (Ct.App.1990) (finding the test used to determine if one is a statutory employee is “whether or not [the work] being done is or is not a part of the general trade, business or occupation of the owner”). | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. T.H. Snipes & Sons, Inc.green2 sentences2008Snipes & Sons, Inc., 306 S.C. 289, 292 , 411 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1991) (listing the three factors of the statutory employee test); Revels v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 301 S.C. 316, 318 , 391 S.E.2d 731, 732 (Ct.App.1990) (finding the test used to determine if one is a statutory employee is “whether or not [the work] being done is or is not a part of the general trade, business or occupation of the owner”). 2008Snipes & Sons, Inc., 306 S.C. 289, 292 , 411 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1991) (listing the three factors of the statutory employee test); Revels v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 301 S.C. 316, 318 , 391 S.E.2d 731, 732 (Ct.App.1990) (finding the test used to determine if one is a statutory employee is “whether or not [the work] being done is or is not a part of the general trade, business or occupation of the owner”). | 1 | 2 |
Posey v. Proper Mold & Engineering, Inc.green2 sentences2026Code Ann. § 42-5-10 ("Every employer who accepts the compensation provisions of this Title shall secure the payment of compensation to his employees in the manner provided in this chapter."); Keene v. CNA Holdings, LLC, 436 S.C. 1 , 13, 870 S.E.2d 156 , 162 (2021) (emphasizing that the public policy behind the statutory employee doctrine is to ensure coverage for workers, not to provide civil immunity to entities that do not meet the definition of an employer under the Act); Posey v. Proper Mold & Eng'g, Inc., 378 S.C. 210, 224 , 661 S.E.2d 395, 403 (Ct. App. 2008) (reiterating Based on the fo 2026Code Ann. § 42-5-10 ("Every employer who accepts the compensation provisions of this Title shall secure the payment of compensation to his employees in the manner provided in this chapter."); Keene v. CNA Holdings, LLC, 436 S.C. 1 , 13, 870 S.E.2d 156 , 162 (2021) (emphasizing that the public policy behind the statutory employee doctrine is to ensure coverage for workers, not to provide civil immunity to entities that do not meet the definition of an employer under the Act); Posey v. Proper Mold & Eng'g, Inc., 378 S.C. 210, 224 , 661 S.E.2d 395, 403 (Ct. App. 2008) (reiterating Based on the fo | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Smallwoodgreen2 sentences2026Code Ann. § 42-5-10 ("Every employer who accepts the compensation provisions of this Title shall secure the payment of compensation to his employees in the manner provided in this chapter."); Keene v. CNA Holdings, LLC, 436 S.C. 1 , 13, 870 S.E.2d 156 , 162 (2021) (emphasizing that the public policy behind the statutory employee doctrine is to ensure coverage for workers, not to provide civil immunity to entities that do not meet the definition of an employer under the Act); Posey v. Proper Mold & Eng'g, Inc., 378 S.C. 210, 224 , 661 S.E.2d 395, 403 (Ct. App. 2008) (reiterating Based on the fo 2026Code Ann. § 42-5-10 ("Every employer who accepts the compensation provisions of this Title shall secure the payment of compensation to his employees in the manner provided in this chapter."); Keene v. CNA Holdings, LLC, 436 S.C. 1 , 13, 870 S.E.2d 156 , 162 (2021) (emphasizing that the public policy behind the statutory employee doctrine is to ensure coverage for workers, not to provide civil immunity to entities that do not meet the definition of an employer under the Act); Posey v. Proper Mold & Eng'g, Inc., 378 S.C. 210, 224 , 661 S.E.2d 395, 403 (Ct. App. 2008) (reiterating Based on the fo | 1 | 1 |
Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co.green2 sentences2021As we stated on our first review of the statutory employee doctrine in 1939, "It is easily conceivable that [an employer] may let a part of the work to be done to others who are financially irresponsible, and that the employee . . . who is injured while doing the work is left without remedy." Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co., 190 S.C. 336, 363 , 2 S.E.2d 825, 836 (1939). 2021As we stated on our first review of the statutory employee doctrine in 1939, "It is easily conceivable that [an employer] may let a part of the work to be done to others who are financially irresponsible, and that the employee . . . who is injured while doing the work is left without remedy." Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co., 190 S.C. 336, 363 , 2 S.E.2d 825, 836 (1939). | 1 | 1 |
Olmstead v. Shakespearegreen2 sentences2021As the majority notes, in Olmstead, this Court rejected the court of appeals' conclusion that the underlying rationale of favoring workers' compensation coverage for employees "is not as pertinent where the statutory employee definition and exclusive remedy provision are used as a shield to prevent recovery under another theory." Olmstead v. Shakespeare, 348 S.C. 436, 441 , 559 S.E.2d 370, 373 (Ct. App. 2002), aff'd as modified, 354 S.C. 421, 427 , 581 S.E.2d 483, 486 . 2021As the majority notes, in Olmstead, this Court rejected the court of appeals' conclusion that the underlying rationale of favoring workers' compensation coverage for employees "is not as pertinent where the statutory employee definition and exclusive remedy provision are used as a shield to prevent recovery under another theory." Olmstead v. Shakespeare, 348 S.C. 436, 441 , 559 S.E.2d 370, 373 (Ct. App. 2002), aff'd as modified, 354 S.C. 421, 427 , 581 S.E.2d 483, 486 . | 1 | 1 |
Carter v. FLORENTINE CORPORATION, INC.red2 sentences1998Carter v. Florentine Corp., 310 S.C. 228, 230-31 , 423 S.E.2d 112, 113 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Ballenger v. Bowen 313 S.C. 476, 478 , 443 S.E.2d 379, 380 (1994). 1998Carter v. Florentine Corp., 310 S.C. 228, 230-31 , 423 S.E.2d 112, 113 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Ballenger v. Bowen 313 S.C. 476, 478 , 443 S.E.2d 379, 380 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. Williams and Madjanik, Inc.green2 sentences1998Parker v. Williams and Madjanik, Inc., 275 S.C. 65 , 73, 267 S.E.2d 524, 528 (1980); Arthur Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 49.00, at 9-1 (1997) (“[0]ne purpose of these statutes is to prevent evasion of compensation coverage by the subcontracting of the employer’s normal work[.]”) Nevertheless, the statutory employee doctrine is a double-edged sword to the worker who, though included in compensation, is also bound by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. 1998Parker v. Williams and Madjanik, Inc., 275 S.C. 65 , 73, 267 S.E.2d 524, 528 (1980); Arthur Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 49.00, at 9-1 (1997) (“[0]ne purpose of these statutes is to prevent evasion of compensation coverage by the subcontracting of the employer’s normal work[.]”) Nevertheless, the statutory employee doctrine is a double-edged sword to the worker who, though included in compensation, is also bound by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. | 1 | 1 |
Ballenger v. Bowengreen2 sentences1998Carter v. Florentine Corp., 310 S.C. 228, 230-31 , 423 S.E.2d 112, 113 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Ballenger v. Bowen 313 S.C. 476, 478 , 443 S.E.2d 379, 380 (1994). 1998Carter v. Florentine Corp., 310 S.C. 228, 230-31 , 423 S.E.2d 112, 113 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Ballenger v. Bowen 313 S.C. 476, 478 , 443 S.E.2d 379, 380 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Keene v. CNA Holdings, LLC
green
2 sentences2026Code Ann. § 42-5-10 ("Every employer who accepts the compensation provisions of this Title shall secure the payment of compensation to his employees in the manner provided in this chapter."); Keene v. CNA Holdings, LLC, 436 S.C. 1 , 13, 870 S.E.2d 156 , 162 (2021) (emphasizing that the public policy behind the statutory employee doctrine is to ensure coverage for workers, not to provide civil immunity to entities that do not meet the definition of an employer under the Act); Posey v. Proper Mold & Eng'g, Inc., 378 S.C. 210, 224 , 661 S.E.2d 395, 403 (Ct. App. 2008) (reiterating Based on the fo 2021Addressing the parties' argument over whether this Court intended Abbott and Olmstead to apply outside the transportation context, the court of appeals stated "the logic employed by the court in Abbott and Olmstead brought new clarity to the abundance of case law on this issue and this logic is binding in the present case." Keene, 426 S.C. at 370 , 827 S.E.2d at 190 . | 2 | 2021–2026 |
Glass v. Dow Chemical Co.
green
2 sentences2019"The statutory employee doctrine converts conceded non-employees into employees *189 for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act." Glass , 325 S.C. at 201 n.1, 482 S.E.2d at 50 n.1. 2019"The statutory employee doctrine converts conceded non-employees into employees *189 for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act." Glass , 325 S.C. at 201 n.1, 482 S.E.2d at 50 n.1. | 2 | 2019–2021 |
Olmstead v. Shakespeare
green
2 sentences2021As the majority notes, in Olmstead, this Court rejected the court of appeals' conclusion that the underlying rationale of favoring workers' compensation coverage for employees "is not as pertinent where the statutory employee definition and exclusive remedy provision are used as a shield to prevent recovery under another theory." Olmstead v. Shakespeare, 348 S.C. 436, 441 , 559 S.E.2d 370, 373 (Ct. App. 2002), aff'd as modified, 354 S.C. 421, 427 , 581 S.E.2d 483, 486 . 2021As the majority notes, in Olmstead, this Court rejected the court of appeals' conclusion that the underlying rationale of favoring workers' compensation coverage for employees "is not as pertinent where the statutory employee definition and exclusive remedy provision are used as a shield to prevent recovery under another theory." Olmstead v. Shakespeare, 348 S.C. 436, 441 , 559 S.E.2d 370, 373 (Ct. App. 2002), aff'd as modified, 354 S.C. 421, 427 , 581 S.E.2d 483, 486 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Abbott v. the Limited, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Wilson v. Daniel International Corp.
green
2 sentences2021In its discussion of Wilson, the majority states "our recognition of the importance of [Daniel's] corporate decision making is inescapable." I read Wilson to say what it actually said: under the facts of that case, Winyah's worker was not Daniel's statutory employee because Winyah and Daniel's relationship was that of vendor-vendee and because "Winyah was not engaged in the execution or performance of any part of Daniel's work." 260 S.C. at 554 , 197 S.E.2d at 689 . 2021In its discussion of Wilson, the majority states "our recognition of the importance of [Daniel's] corporate decision making is inescapable." I read Wilson to say what it actually said: under the facts of that case, Winyah's worker was not Daniel's statutory employee because Winyah and Daniel's relationship was that of vendor-vendee and because "Winyah was not engaged in the execution or performance of any part of Daniel's work." 260 S.C. at 554 , 197 S.E.2d at 689 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Collins v. Charlotte
neutral
2 sentences2015Id. at 57 , 732 S.E.2d at 634 . 2015Id. at 57 , 732 S.E.2d at 634 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Fortner v. Thomas M. Evans Construction & Development, LLC
green
1 sentence2015“The statutory employee doctrine converts conceded non-employees into employees for purposes of the [WCA].” Id. at 432, 741 S.E.2d at 544 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.