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8 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 2015–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. McDonaldgreen2 sentences2021These requirements, however, do not demand that criminal statutes “meet the unattainable standard of ‘absolute precision.’” Crank, 468 S.W.3d at 23 (quoting State v. McDonald, 534 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tenn. 1976)). 2021Despite the importance of these constitutional protections, this Court has recognized the “inherent vagueness” of statutory language, Pickett, 211 S.W.3d at 704 , and has held that criminal statutes do not have to meet the unattainable standard of “absolute precision,” State v. McDonald, 534 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tenn. 1976); see also State v. Lyons, 802 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tenn. 1990) (“The vagueness doctrine does not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater precision, especially in light of the inherent vagueness of many English words.”). | 8 | 8 |
State v. Lyonsgreen2 sentences2021Despite the importance of these constitutional protections, this Court has recognized the “inherent vagueness” of statutory language, Pickett, 211 S.W.3d at 704 , and has held that criminal statutes do not have to meet the unattainable standard of “absolute precision,” State v. McDonald, 534 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tenn. 1976); see also State v. Lyons, 802 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tenn. 1990) (“The vagueness doctrine does not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater precision, especially in light of the inherent vagueness of many English words.”). 2017Despite the importance of these constitutional protections, this Court has recognized the “inherent vagueness” of statutory language, Pickett, 211 S.W.3d at 704 , and has held that criminal statutes do not have to meet the unattainable standard of “absolute precision,” State v. McDonald, 534 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tenn. 1976); see also State v. Lyons, 802 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tenn. 1990) (“The vagueness doctrine does not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater precision, especially in light of the inherent vagueness of many English words.”). | 7 | 7 |
State of Tennessee v. Jacqueline Crankgreen2 sentences2021These requirements, however, do not demand that criminal statutes “meet the unattainable standard of ‘absolute precision.’” Crank, 468 S.W.3d at 23 (quoting State v. McDonald, 534 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tenn. 1976)). 2020“Despite the importance of these constitutional protections,” our supreme court “has recognized the ‘inherent vagueness’ of statutory language . . . and has held that criminal statutes do not have to meet the unattainable standard of ‘absolute precision.’” Crank, 468 S.W.3d at 23 (quoting Pickett, 211 S.W.3d at 704 ; State v. McDonald, 534 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tenn. 1976)). | 1 | 5 |
Robinson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2021“Many statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for ‘[i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.’” Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50 (1975) (quoting Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 286 (1945)). | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Lockegreen1 sentence2021“Many statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for ‘[i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.’” Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50 (1975) (quoting Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 286 (1945)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Harrissgreen1 sentence2017“The primary purpose of the vagueness doctrine is to ensure that our statutes provide fair warning as to the nature of forbidden conduct so that individuals are not ‘held criminally responsible for conduct which [they] could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’” State v. Crank, 468 S.W.3d 15, 22-23 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)). -7- “Despite the importance of these constitutional protections,” our supreme court “has recognized the ‘inherent vagueness’ of statutory language . . . and has held that criminal statutes do not have to meet the unat | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Pickett
green
2 sentences2021Despite the importance of these constitutional protections, this Court has recognized the “inherent vagueness” of statutory language, Pickett, 211 S.W.3d at 704 , and has held that criminal statutes do not have to meet the unattainable standard of “absolute precision,” State v. McDonald, 534 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tenn. 1976); see also State v. Lyons, 802 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tenn. 1990) (“The vagueness doctrine does not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater precision, especially in light of the inherent vagueness of many English words.”). 2020“Despite the importance of these constitutional protections,” our supreme court “has recognized the ‘inherent vagueness’ of statutory language . . . and has held that criminal statutes do not have to meet the unattainable standard of ‘absolute precision.’” Crank, 468 S.W.3d at 23 (quoting Pickett, 211 S.W.3d at 704 ; State v. McDonald, 534 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tenn. 1976)). | 6 | 2017–2021 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.