outcry exception in Texas

2015The court of criminal appeals has held that, to fit within the outcry exception to hearsay exclusion, the child’s statement to the adult “must be more than words which give a general allusion that something in the area of child abuse was going on.” Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 91 ; Villanueva v. State, 209 S.W.3d 239, 247 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.).

2011By adding the outcry exception to the statute, the Legislature ―was obviously striking a balance between the general prohibition against hearsay and the specific societal desire to curb the sexual abuse of children.‖ Id. ―[T]he societal interest in curbing child abuse would hardly be served if all that ‗first person‘ had to testify to was a general allegation from the child that something in the area of child abuse was going on at home.‖ Id.

2026See Long v. State, 800 S.W.2d 545 , 547–48 (Tex. Crim.

2004See Long v. State, 800 S.W.2d 545, 546-48 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); see also Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Tex.Crim.

2025We will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is within “the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id. (citing Divine v. State, 122 S.W.3d 414, 420 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d)). 3 A.H. was nineteen by the time of the outcry hearing.

2005The exception permits testimony of multiple outcries if they regard "discrete occurrences" or "discrete events" of abuse. (4) Id. (different times and locations of abuse); Turner v. State , 924 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. App.--Eastland 1996, pet. ref'd) (officer could testify to victim's outcry about penile penetration because victim's previous outcry to counselor was only about digital penetration; indictment alleged penile penetration); see also Divine v. State , 122 S.W.3d 414, 419-20 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2003, pet. ref'd); Josey v. State , 97 S.W.3d 687, 693 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2003, no pet.

2019See Reed v. State, 497 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.) (holding that SANE’s testimony could have been properly admitted under Rule 803(4) and not addressing appellant’s argument regarding the propriety of admitting the SANE nurse’s testimony under the outcry exception).

2018See Reed v. State, 497 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.) (holding that SANE’s testimony could have been properly admitted under rule 803(4) and not addressing appellant’s argument regarding the propriety of admitting the SANE’s testimony under the outcry exception). 18 Furthermore, even if we assumed that the admission of Nurse Carriker’s testimony was erroneous, such error would have been harmless because the same or similar evidence was also offered through the testimony of Allison and Kelly.

2021See Smith v. State, 131 S.W.3d 928, 932 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2004, pet. ref’d) (noting that “a timely hearsay objection at trial gives rise to the requirement that the trial court conduct” article 38.072 “reliability hearing”).

2004See Smith v. State, 131 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex.App.-East-land 2004, pet. ref'd) (affirming that child’s statement to his mother that “[defendant] had been performing oral sex” on him was nothing more than a general allusion to sexual abuse because child did not relay any specific details about the offense); Bradshaw v. State, 65 S.W.3d 232, 239-40 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, no pet.) (determining mother was not outcry witness where child told mother defendant “had been touching her” but offered no details; however, aunt was outcry witness because she asked child where the touching had occurred, and chi

2021See Sanchez, 354 S.W.3d at 88 (“[T]he narrow range of discretion that Article 38.072 allows a trial court means that the credibility of the outcry witness is not a relevant issue at a hearing to determine admissibility of an outcry.”); see also Morin v. State, No. 13- 18-00149-CR, 2020 WL 582157 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 6, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[T]he trial court makes no determination on an outcry witness’s credibility during an outcry hearing. . . .

2019He further argues that the admission of the testimony was harmful to his case. 4 A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Hearsay is an out-of-court statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Sanchez v. State, 354 S.W.3d 476, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011), citing TEX.R.EVID. 801(d).

2015The outcry exception is only available for one witness “unless the child revealed discrete occurrences of the same offense, or revealed different offenses, to separate adults.” Reynolds v. State, 227 S.W.3d 355, 369 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.).

2012The outcry exception is only available for one witness ―unless the child revealed discrete occurrences of the same offense, or revealed different offenses, to separate adults.‖ Reynolds v. State, 227 S.W.3d 355, 369 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.); see Quinones v. State, Nos. 13-10-00140-CR, 13-10-00141-CR, 13-10-00142-CR, 2011 WL 3841586 , at *9 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 25, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[S]o long as separate outcry witnesses testify about separate offenses, the testimony of each is admissible.‖) (citing Broderick v. State, 35 S.W.3d 67

2010See Reyes v. State , 274 S.W.3d 724, 728 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. ref’d).

2010See Reyes v. State, 274 S.W.3d 724, 728 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. ref'd).

2005The exception permits testimony of multiple outcries if they regard "discrete occurrences" or "discrete events" of abuse. (4) Id. (different times and locations of abuse); Turner v. State , 924 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. App.--Eastland 1996, pet. ref'd) (officer could testify to victim's outcry about penile penetration because victim's previous outcry to counselor was only about digital penetration; indictment alleged penile penetration); see also Divine v. State , 122 S.W.3d 414, 419-20 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2003, pet. ref'd); Josey v. State , 97 S.W.3d 687, 693 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2003, no pet.

2005The exception permits testimony of multiple outcries if they regard “discrete occurrences” or “discrete events” of abuse.4 Id. (different times and locations of abuse); Turner v. State, 924 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1996, pet. ref’d) (officer could testify to victim’s outcry about penile penetration because victim’s previous outcry to counselor was only about digital penetration; indictment alleged penile penetration); see also Divine v. State, 122 S.W.3d 414, 419-20 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d); Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687, 693 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.).

2005The exception permits testimony of multiple outcries if they regard "discrete occurrences" or "discrete events" of abuse. (4) Id. (different times and locations of abuse); Turner v. State , 924 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. App.--Eastland 1996, pet. ref'd) (officer could testify to victim's outcry about penile penetration because victim's previous outcry to counselor was only about digital penetration; indictment alleged penile penetration); see also Divine v. State , 122 S.W.3d 414, 419-20 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2003, pet. ref'd); Josey v. State , 97 S.W.3d 687, 693 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2003, no pet.

2005The exception permits testimony of multiple outcries if they regard “discrete occurrences” or “discrete events” of abuse.4 Id. (different times and locations of abuse); Turner v. State, 924 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1996, pet. ref’d) (officer could testify to victim’s outcry about penile penetration because victim’s previous outcry to counselor was only about digital penetration; indictment alleged penile penetration); see also Divine v. State, 122 S.W.3d 414, 419-20 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d); Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687, 693 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.).

2004In Mosley v. State, the State actually responded that the hearsay testimony met the outcry exception. 960 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).

2004In Mosley v. State , the State actually responded that the hearsay testimony met the outcry exception. 960 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex. App. C Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).

2025We will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is within “the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id. (citing Divine v. State, 122 S.W.3d 414, 420 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d)). 3 A.H. was nineteen by the time of the outcry hearing.

2004Weatherred v. State , 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim.

2021Id. at 911 .

2004See Long v. State, 800 S.W.2d 545, 546-48 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); see also Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Tex.Crim.

2015For instance, “[i]f the child victim first described one type of abuse to one outcry witness, and first described a different type of abuse to a second outcry witness, the second witness could testify about the different instance of abuse.” Tear v. State, 74 S.W.3d 555, 559 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet ref’d).

2012For instance, ―[i]f the child victim first described one type of abuse to one outcry witness, and first described a different type of abuse to a second outcry witness, the second witness could testify about the different instance of abuse.‖ Tear, 74 S.W.3d at 559 .

2013Chapman v. State, 150 S.W.3d 809, 812 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d).

2008The trial court could have determined that both Amanda and Holcomb were proper outcry witnesses, bringing their testimony within the outcry exception to the hearsay rule. [7] See Chapman , 150 S.W.3d at 812 .

2004See Smith v. State , 131 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App. C Eastland 2004, pet. ref = d) (affirming that child = s statement to his mother that A [defendant] had been performing oral sex @ on him was nothing more than a general allusion to sexual abuse because child did not relay any specific details about the offense); Bradshaw v. State , 65 S.W.3d 232 , 239 B 40 (Tex. App. C Waco 2001, no pet.) (determining mother was not outcry witness where child told mother defendant A had been touching her @ but offered no details; however, aunt was outcry witness because she asked child where the touching had

2004See Smith v. State, 131 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex.App.-East-land 2004, pet. ref'd) (affirming that child’s statement to his mother that “[defendant] had been performing oral sex” on him was nothing more than a general allusion to sexual abuse because child did not relay any specific details about the offense); Bradshaw v. State, 65 S.W.3d 232, 239-40 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, no pet.) (determining mother was not outcry witness where child told mother defendant “had been touching her” but offered no details; however, aunt was outcry witness because she asked child where the touching had occurred, and chi

2026See Bargas v. State, 252 S.W.3d 876, 894 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, 10 pet. ref’d) (“Such general allusions, in which the complainant does not describe the abuse in a discernible manner, are not within the purview of article 38.072.”).

2020Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim.

2019The statement “must be more than words which give a general allusion that something in the area of child abuse was going on.” Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 91 ; see Michell v. State, 381 S.W.3d 554, 558 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.).

2018See San German-Reyes, 2017 WL 2229873 , at *11–12 (holding that SANE’s testimony was properly admitted but also stating that it was harmless if it was admitted in error); Hanke v. State, No. 09-14-00326-CR, 2015 WL 5604680 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 23, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same). 48 195 S.W.3d at 126 ; see also Hailey v. State, 87 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Tex. Crim.

2015The court of criminal appeals has held that, to fit within the outcry exception to hearsay exclusion, the child’s statement to the adult “must be more than words which give a general allusion that something in the area of child abuse was going on.” Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 91 ; Villanueva v. State, 209 S.W.3d 239, 247 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.).

2014Cf. id. (“[A]n objection to remoteness does not preserve a complaint concerning a trial court’s failure to conduct a hearing [about competence] because those are different complaints.”).

2012We measure a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against the two-prong test established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

2012The outcry exception is only available for one witness ―unless the child revealed discrete occurrences of the same offense, or revealed different offenses, to separate adults.‖ Reynolds v. State, 227 S.W.3d 355, 369 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.); see Quinones v. State, Nos. 13-10-00140-CR, 13-10-00141-CR, 13-10-00142-CR, 2011 WL 3841586 , at *9 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 25, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[S]o long as separate outcry witnesses testify about separate offenses, the testimony of each is admissible.‖) (citing Broderick v. State, 35 S.W.3d 67

2007See Williams v. State , 958 S.W.2d 186, 194 (Tex. Crim.

2003See Hellums , 831 S.W.2d at 547 (holding that the appellant's request to instruct jury to consider the victim's delay in reporting the assault even though victim was exempt from the statute's outcry requirement was properly disallowed as it was an illogical reading of the statute which excluded the victim from the outcry requirement).