Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1960–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Kiefergreen1 sentence2003Co. v. Kiefer, 984 F.Supp. 988, 996 (E.D.La.1997). 4 If the exclusion clause uses the term “the insured,” application of the separation of insureds clause requires that the term be interpreted as referring only to the insured against whom a claim is being made under the policy. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commercial Standard Insurance Co. v. American General Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2014Co., 455 S.W.2d at 721 ). 2003Effect of a Separation of Insureds Clause on Exclusions This is apparently a case of first impression under Texas law regarding the application of a separation of insureds clause to a policy provision that refers to “ any insured.” However, Texas courts have construed the applicability of a separation of insureds clause to a policy provision that refers to “ the insured.” In Commercial Standard Insurance Co. v. American General Insurance Co ., 455 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1970), the Texas Supreme Court considered the effect of a similar “severability of interests” clause on an employee exclusion for “ | 4 | 2003–2014 |
Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Admiral Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2025Ins., No. 02-17- 00276-CV, 2018 WL 5993445 , at *45 n.25 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 15, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Birdwell, J., dissenting on denial of en banc reconsideration) (“A ‘wasting policy’ is one that deducts from policy limits the litigation fees and expenses incurred, ordinarily by the insurer in defending the insured against a claim.” citing Westchester Fire Ins. v. Admiral Ins., 152 S.W.3d 172 , 192 & n.10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (en banc op. on reh’g)). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Petticrew v. ABB Lummus Global, Inc.
green
1 sentence2014“If the exclusion clause uses the term ‘the insured,’ application of the separation of insureds clause requires that the term be interpreted as referring only to the insured against whom a claim is being made under the policy.” Id. (citing Commercial Standard Ins. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. Transport Insurance Co.
neutral
2 sentences1960The Court of Civil Appeals in its judgment of reversal and rendition for Standard held that Standard, as an “omnibus insured” was entitled to be protected by the automobile liability insurance policy of Transport issued to Transport Company of Texas, and that the exclusion clauses (f) and (g) applied only to an employee of the insured against whom the claim was made, and hence did not exclude Standard from coverage of a claim against it by an employee of the named insured. 324 S.W. 2d 331 . 1960The Court of Civil Appeals in its judgment of reversal and rendition for Standard held that Standard, as an "omnibus insured" was entitled to be protected by the automobile liability insurance policy of Transport issued to Transport Company of Texas, and that the exclusion clauses (f) and (g) applied only to an employee of the insured against whom the claim was made, and hence did not exclude Standard from coverage of a claim against it by an employee of the named insured. 324 S.W.2d 331 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.