intertwining exception in Texas

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 MBM Financial Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P., 292 S.W.3d 660 (2009) 52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1221 v. Chair *667 King. 29 But in Gill we merely reinstated bankruptcy and appellate fees; we did not address the court of appeals' award of fees for both contract and fraud on the basis that they were inextricably intertwined. 30 We explicitly rejected this intertwining exception in Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa and reiterated that fees are not allowed for torts like fraud. 31 Thus, even if the Woodlands' fraud claim arose from a breach of contra

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 MBM Financial Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P., 292 S.W.3d 660 (2009) 52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1221 v. Chair *667 King. 29 But in Gill we merely reinstated bankruptcy and appellate fees; we did not address the court of appeals' award of fees for both contract and fraud on the basis that they were inextricably intertwined. 30 We explicitly rejected this intertwining exception in Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa and reiterated that fees are not allowed for torts like fraud. 31 Thus, even if the Woodlands' fraud claim arose from a breach of contra

1997While acknowledging the lower court's concern for avoiding bifurcated proceedings and potentially redundant efforts to litigate the same factual questions twice, the Supreme Court held that the "[FAA] requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums." Id. at 217 , 105 S.Ct. at 1241 (emphasis added); see also Girard v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 805 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir.1986).

1997While acknowledging the lower court’s concern for avoiding bifurcated proceedings and potentially redundant efforts to litigate the same factual questions twice, the Supreme Court held that the “[FAA] requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.” Id. at 217 , 105 S.Ct. at 1241 (emphasis added); see also Girard v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 805 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir.1986).

1997While acknowledging the lower court’s concern for avoiding bifurcated proceedings and potentially redundant efforts to litigate the same factual questions twice, the Supreme Court held that the “[FAA] requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.” Id. at 217 , 105 S.Ct. at 1241 (emphasis added); see also Girard v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 805 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir.1986).

1997While acknowledging the lower court’s concern for avoiding bifurcated proceedings and potentially redundant efforts to litigate the same factual questions twice, the Supreme Court held that the “[FAA] requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.” Id. at 217 , 105 S.Ct. at 1241 (emphasis added); see also Girard v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 805 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir.1986).