Landry motion in Texas

2025As stated above, a “collateral attack is accomplished through initiating a new case under a different cause number that challenges the effect of the original judgment.” Thompson, 569 S.W.3d at 172, 175 (“[B]ecause Landry’s motion to vacate the default judgment was filed in the same lawsuit in which the judgment was signed, the motion was a direct attack, not a collateral attack on the judgment.”); see Travelers, 315 S.W.3d at 863 (“A void order is subject to collateral attack in a new lawsuit . . . .”).

2018See Joachim , 315 S.W.3d at 863 ("A void order is subject to collateral attack in a new lawsuit"); Browning v. Prostok , 165 S.W.3d 336 , 345-46 (Tex. 2005) ("A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid the binding force of a judgment in a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment, but in order to obtain some specific relief which the judgment currently stands as a bar against.").

2025As stated above, a “collateral attack is accomplished through initiating a new case under a different cause number that challenges the effect of the original judgment.” Thompson, 569 S.W.3d at 172, 175 (“[B]ecause Landry’s motion to vacate the default judgment was filed in the same lawsuit in which the judgment was signed, the motion was a direct attack, not a collateral attack on the judgment.”); see Travelers, 315 S.W.3d at 863 (“A void order is subject to collateral attack in a new lawsuit . . . .”).

2023This Court concluded: “Landry’s motion failed to qualify as either a timely direct attack or as a collateral attack [on the default judgment],” and therefore “the trial court lacked authority to entertain the motion to set aside the default judgment.” Id. at 175 . 7 The trial court found that the admitted records showed that Landry and at least five other individuals or entities made real and personal property tax payments in the five years preceding the filing of the delinquent tax suit but were not listed as defendants. 10 Landry files a new lawsuit collaterally attacking the default judgmen

2018See Joachim , 315 S.W.3d at 863 ("A void order is subject to collateral attack in a new lawsuit"); Browning v. Prostok , 165 S.W.3d 336 , 345-46 (Tex. 2005) ("A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid the binding force of a judgment in a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment, but in order to obtain some specific relief which the judgment currently stands as a bar against.").

2018Valdez v. Hollenbeck , 465 S.W.3d 217 , 221 (Tex. 2015) ; PNS Stores, Inc. , 379 S.W.3d at 275 ; see TEX.

2018See PNS Stores, Inc. , 379 S.W.3d at 272 ; see also In re Martinez , 478 S.W.3d 123 , 126 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding) (concluding that even after apparent expiration of plenary power over judgment, trial court still may sign order declaring its prior judgment in case to be void because trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to render judgment).

2018See PNS Stores, Inc. , 379 S.W.3d at 272 ; see also In re Martinez , 478 S.W.3d 123 , 126 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding) (concluding that even after apparent expiration of plenary power over judgment, trial court still may sign order declaring its prior judgment in case to be void because trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to render judgment).

2009See id.

2001See id.; see also Pfeiffer, 29 S.W.3d at 197 (concluding plaintiffs motion for extension was timely under subsection (g), even though not requested until 321 days after the lawsuit was filed).