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45 Florida opinions name it 1 courts 1994–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2006While the CCP instruction given to the jury "violated the requirements recently established in Jackson v. State, [ 648 So.2d 85 (Fla.1994)]," id., and Walls properly preserved the issue for appeal, we concluded that the error in instructing the jury was "harmless because all four elements of this aggravator would exist under any definition." Id. at 389. 2006While the CCP instruction given to the jury "violated the requirements recently established in Jackson v. State, [ 648 So.2d 85 (Fla.1994)]," id., and Walls properly preserved the issue for appeal, we concluded that the error in instructing the jury was "harmless because all four elements of this aggravator would exist under any definition." Id. at 389. | 6 | 19 |
Pope v. Stategreen2 sentences2005In 1997, we reiterated that to preserve a claim that a CCP instruction is unconstitutionally vague, the objection "must attack the instruction itself, either by submitting a limiting instruction or making an objection to the instruction as worded." Pope v. State, 702 So.2d 221, 223-24 (Fla.1997). 2004In 1997, this Court reiterated that to preserve a claim that a CCP instruction is unconstitutionally vague, the objection "must attack the instruction itself, either by submitting a limiting instruction or making an objection to the instruction as worded." Pope v. State, 702 So.2d 221, 223 (Fla.1997). *712 In this case, the issue was not properly preserved because trial counsel did not specifically object to the instruction as worded, nor did he submit an alternative instruction. | 6 | 7 |
Downs v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See Downs v. State, 740 So.2d 506 , 518 *1276 (Fla.1999) (holding that because the CCP instruction given at the resentencing was approved by this Court as the proper standard jury instruction, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object). 2007See Downs v. State, 740 So.2d 506 , 518 *1276 (Fla.1999) (holding that because the CCP instruction given at the resentencing was approved by this Court as the proper standard jury instruction, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object). | 3 | 3 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See id. 2005See id. | 3 | 3 |
Gore v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See Gore, 706 So.2d at 1334 . 2002See, e.g., Arbelaez v. State, 775 So.2d 909, 915 (Fla.2000) (explaining that even if counsel were deficient for failing to object to aggravator instructions, there would be no prejudice because evidence established that circumstance existed); Gore v. State, 706 So.2d 1328, 1334 (Fla.1997) (holding that even if CCP instruction was inadequate, the error was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of CCP). | 2 | 2 |
Waterhouse v. Stategreen2 sentences2002P. 3.811(c). [14] See, e.g., Waterhouse v. State, 792 So.2d 1176, 1196 (Fla.2001) (holding that even though the CCP instruction given at the penalty phase was the same instruction which was invalidated in Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85 (Fla.1994), the claim that the CCP aggravator was vague or overbroad must be denied because it was not properly preserved). [15] See, e.g., State v. Heathcoat, 442 So.2d 955, 955-56 (Fla.1983) (finding that defense counsel sufficiently preserved his jury instruction issue for review despite the fact that he did not object after instructions because the record cl 2002P. 3.811(c). [14] See, e.g., Waterhouse v. State, 792 So.2d 1176, 1196 (Fla.2001) (holding that even though the CCP instruction given at the penalty phase was the same instruction which was invalidated in Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85 (Fla.1994), the claim that the CCP aggravator was vague or overbroad must be denied because it was not properly preserved). [15] See, e.g., State v. Heathcoat, 442 So.2d 955, 955-56 (Fla.1983) (finding that defense counsel sufficiently preserved his jury instruction issue for review despite the fact that he did not object after instructions because the record cl | 2 | 2 |
Crump v. Stategreen2 sentences1996As this Court explained in Crump v. State, 654 So.2d 545, 548 (Fla.1995): Although the trial court gave the jury in 1989 the CCP instruction that has since been found unconstitutionally vague, see Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85 (Fla.1994), this claim is procedurally barred. 1996As this Court explained in Crump v. State, 654 So.2d 545, 548 (Fla.1995): Although the trial court gave the jury in 1989 the CCP instruction that has since been found unconstitutionally vague, see Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85 (Fla.1994), this claim is procedurally barred. | 2 | 2 |
Kearse v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677 (Fla.1995) (remanding for new sentencing phase before a jury when avoid arrest and murder of a law enforcement officer aggravators were improperly doubled, CCP instruction was unconstitutionally vague, HAC was improperly applied, and the jury recommendation of death was eleven to one); Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691 (Fla.1990) (remanding to trial court for resentencing with a jury following trial court’s erroneous finding of an aggravating circumstance). 2010See Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677 (Fla.1995) (remanding for new sentencing phase before a jury when avoid arrest and murder of a law enforcement officer aggravators were improperly doubled, CCP instruction was unconstitutionally vague, HAC was improperly applied, and the jury recommendation of death was eleven to one); Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691 (Fla.1990) (remanding to trial court for resentencing with a jury following trial court's erroneous finding of an aggravating circumstance). | 1 | 2 |
Walls v. Stategreen2 sentences2000We followed Jackson with Walls v. State, 641 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1994), in which we held in respect to Jackson constitutional error as to the CCP instruction: To preserve the error for appellate review, it is necessary both to make a specific objection or request an alternative instruction at trial, and to raise the issue on appeal. 2000We followed Jackson with Walls v. State, 641 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1994), in which we held in respect to Jackson constitutional error as to the CCP instruction: To preserve the error for appellate review, it is necessary both to make a specific objection or request an alternative instruction at trial, and to raise the issue on appeal. | 1 | 2 |
Guardado v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Regarding the finding of CCP, “[t]he standard of review this Court applies to a claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support an aggravating circumstance is that of competent, substantial evidence.” Guardado v. State, 965 So. 2d 108, 115 (Fla. 2007). 2019Regarding the finding of CCP, “[t]he standard of review this Court applies to a claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support an aggravating circumstance is that of competent, substantial evidence.” Guardado v. State, 965 So. 2d 108, 115 (Fla. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Hunter v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244, 252 (Fla. 1995). 2017See Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244, 252 (Fla. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Although we do not specifically determine whether the CCP instruction was properly administered in this case, we do note that the standard for giving an instruction on an aggravating circumstance is much lower than the standard for finding that circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: Although an aggravating factor must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774, 779 (Fla. 1983), a jury instruction on aggravators need only be supported by credible and competent evidence. 2017Although we do not specifically determine whether the CCP instruction was properly administered in this case, we do note that the standard for giving an instruction on an aggravating circumstance is much lower than the standard for finding that circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: Although an aggravating factor must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774, 779 (Fla. 1983), a jury instruction on aggravators need only be supported by credible and competent evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen2 sentences2008In addition, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to present a Jackson claim because it was not preserved. 9 See Davis v. State, 928 So.2d 1089, 1132-83 (Fla.2005) (holding that appellate counsel was not ineffective because defense counsel did not specifically object to the CCP instruction as worded, nor did he request or submit alternative or limiting instruction, thus failing to preserve the claim for appellate review). 2008In addition, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to present a Jackson claim because it was not preserved. 9 See Davis v. State, 928 So.2d 1089, 1132-83 (Fla.2005) (holding that appellate counsel was not ineffective because defense counsel did not specifically object to the CCP instruction as worded, nor did he request or submit alternative or limiting instruction, thus failing to preserve the claim for appellate review). | 1 | 1 |
Cherry v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Since Jackson was decided, we have "consistently held that trial counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to anticipate changes in the law." Cherry v. State, 781 So.2d 1040, 1053 (Fla.2000). 2005Since Jackson was decided, we have "consistently held that trial counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to anticipate changes in the law." Cherry v. State, 781 So.2d 1040, 1053 (Fla.2000). | 1 | 1 |
Vining v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Vining v. State, 827 So.2d 201, 214 (Fla.2002) (concluding that the defendant could not establish prejudice from trial counsel's failure to object to the CCP instruction where the Court held that the trial court's error in finding CCP was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 2004See Vining v. State, 827 So.2d 201, 214 (Fla.2002) (concluding that the defendant could not establish prejudice from trial counsel's failure to object to the CCP instruction where the Court held that the trial court's error in finding CCP was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). | 1 | 1 |
| Wike v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Huff v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rutherford v. Mooregreen | 1 | 1 |
Franqui v. Stategreen2 sentences2002P. 3.811(c). [14] See, e.g., Waterhouse v. State, 792 So.2d 1176, 1196 (Fla.2001) (holding that even though the CCP instruction given at the penalty phase was the same instruction which was invalidated in Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85 (Fla.1994), the claim that the CCP aggravator was vague or overbroad must be denied because it was not properly preserved). [15] See, e.g., State v. Heathcoat, 442 So.2d 955, 955-56 (Fla.1983) (finding that defense counsel sufficiently preserved his jury instruction issue for review despite the fact that he did not object after instructions because the record cl 2002P. 3.811(c). [14] See, e.g., Waterhouse v. State, 792 So.2d 1176, 1196 (Fla.2001) (holding that even though the CCP instruction given at the penalty phase was the same instruction which was invalidated in Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85 (Fla.1994), the claim that the CCP aggravator was vague or overbroad must be denied because it was not properly preserved). [15] See, e.g., State v. Heathcoat, 442 So.2d 955, 955-56 (Fla.1983) (finding that defense counsel sufficiently preserved his jury instruction issue for review despite the fact that he did not object after instructions because the record cl | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arbelaez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Valle v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Heathcoatgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Steinhorst v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Monlyn v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Statered | 1 | 1 |
| Myles v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mills v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Larzelere v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cook v. Louisianagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (95-2)green | 1 | 1 |
| Hodges v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences2025Bell’s issues on direct appeal were: (1) the trial court erred in failing to conduct proper inquiries under Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); (2) the trial court erred in finding the CCP aggravating factor; (3) the trial court gave an erroneous CCP instruction; and (4) the trial court failed to properly consider and find mitigating circumstances. -4- petition for writ of habeas corpus. 2000The court also deferred ruling on several additional claims. [5] Owen raises the following claims: (1) The trial court should have stayed the hearing pending completion of the retrial on the Slattery murder; (2) the court should have conducted a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), when Owen opted not to proceed with the evidentiary hearing; (3) trial counsel was ineffective and suffered a conflict of interest; (4) the HAC instruction was improper under Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 , 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992); (5) | 2 | 2000–2025 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2008Bowles II, 804 So.2d at 1176 . [2] The claims were: (1) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present statutory and nonstatutory mental mitigation, and the trial court erred in finding the two statutory mental mitigators were not proven; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to give the defense's requested jury instructions defining mitigation; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider victim impact evidence; (4) and (5) Florida's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); (6) Ap 2008Bowles II, 804 So.2d at 1176 . [2] The claims were: (1) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present statutory and nonstatutory mental mitigation, and the trial court erred in finding the two statutory mental mitigators were not proven; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to give the defense's requested jury instructions defining mitigation; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider victim impact evidence; (4) and (5) Florida's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); (6) Ap | 2 | 2005–2008 |
Espinosa v. Florida
green
2 sentences2001CCP Instruction In this claim, Waterhouse asserts that the "cold, calculated and premeditated instruction given to jury at the new penalty phase was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad." In Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85 (Fla.1994), this Court held that the then-standard CCP instruction was unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 , 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992) (finding reversible error where either judge or jury considered an invalid aggravating factor in determination of death sentence). [17] We noted, however 2001CCP Instruction In this claim, Waterhouse asserts that the "cold, calculated and premeditated instruction given to jury at the new penalty phase was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad." In Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85 (Fla.1994), this Court held that the then-standard CCP instruction was unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 , 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992) (finding reversible error where either judge or jury considered an invalid aggravating factor in determination of death sentence). [17] We noted, however | 2 | 2000–2001 |
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens
green
2 sentences1997Hodges [ v. Florida, 506 U.S. 803 , 113 S.Ct. 33 , 121 L.Ed.2d 6 (1992)] was not decided by the Supreme Court until October 5, 1992. 1997Hodges [ v. Florida, 506 U.S. 803 , 113 S.Ct. 33 , 121 L.Ed.2d 6 (1992)] was not decided by the Supreme Court until October 5, 1992. | 2 | 1996–1997 |
Hodges v. Florida
green
2 sentences1997Hodges [ v. Florida, 506 U.S. 803 , 113 S.Ct. 33 , 121 L.Ed.2d 6 (1992)] was not decided by the Supreme Court until October 5, 1992. 1997Hodges [ v. Florida, 506 U.S. 803 , 113 S.Ct. 33 , 121 L.Ed.2d 6 (1992)] was not decided by the Supreme Court until October 5, 1992. | 2 | 1996–1997 |
Nelson v. State
green
1 sentence2025Bell’s issues on direct appeal were: (1) the trial court erred in failing to conduct proper inquiries under Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); (2) the trial court erred in finding the CCP aggravating factor; (3) the trial court gave an erroneous CCP instruction; and (4) the trial court failed to properly consider and find mitigating circumstances. -4- petition for writ of habeas corpus. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Gore v. State
green
2 sentences2012With regard to the failure to propose an expanded CCP instruction, we concluded that penalty phase counsel were not deficient because “Gore’s counsel was not even required to initially object to this standard CCP instruction as this jury instruction was considered proper [at the time of Gore’s resentencing proceedings].” Id. at 1275 . 2012With regard to the failure to propose an expanded CCP instruction, we concluded that penalty phase counsel were not deficient because “Gore’s counsel was not even required to initially object to this standard CCP instruction as this jury instruction was considered proper [at the time of Gore’s resentencing proceedings].” Id. at 1275 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Trotter v. State
green
2 sentences2010See Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677 (Fla.1995) (remanding for new sentencing phase before a jury when avoid arrest and murder of a law enforcement officer aggravators were improperly doubled, CCP instruction was unconstitutionally vague, HAC was improperly applied, and the jury recommendation of death was eleven to one); Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691 (Fla.1990) (remanding to trial court for resentencing with a jury following trial court’s erroneous finding of an aggravating circumstance). 2010See Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677 (Fla.1995) (remanding for new sentencing phase before a jury when avoid arrest and murder of a law enforcement officer aggravators were improperly doubled, CCP instruction was unconstitutionally vague, HAC was improperly applied, and the jury recommendation of death was eleven to one); Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691 (Fla.1990) (remanding to trial court for resentencing with a jury following trial court's erroneous finding of an aggravating circumstance). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Bowles v. State
green
2 sentences2008Bowles II, 804 So.2d at 1176 . [2] The claims were: (1) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present statutory and nonstatutory mental mitigation, and the trial court erred in finding the two statutory mental mitigators were not proven; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to give the defense's requested jury instructions defining mitigation; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider victim impact evidence; (4) and (5) Florida's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); (6) Ap 2008Bowles II, 804 So.2d at 1176 . [2] The claims were: (1) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present statutory and nonstatutory mental mitigation, and the trial court erred in finding the two statutory mental mitigators were not proven; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to give the defense's requested jury instructions defining mitigation; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider victim impact evidence; (4) and (5) Florida's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); (6) Ap | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2008Bowles II, 804 So.2d at 1176 . [2] The claims were: (1) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present statutory and nonstatutory mental mitigation, and the trial court erred in finding the two statutory mental mitigators were not proven; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to give the defense's requested jury instructions defining mitigation; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider victim impact evidence; (4) and (5) Florida's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); (6) Ap 2008Bowles II, 804 So.2d at 1176 . [2] The claims were: (1) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present statutory and nonstatutory mental mitigation, and the trial court erred in finding the two statutory mental mitigators were not proven; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to give the defense's requested jury instructions defining mitigation; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider victim impact evidence; (4) and (5) Florida's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); (6) Ap | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2008For the same reason, we also do not conduct our own sufficiency of the evidence analysis, do not discuss specific evidentiary issues that may not arise again (issues 1, 4, and 6) and only touch on several of the issues that will be helpful in a retrial; specifically issue 3 regarding the suppression of the confession, issue 7 regarding the CCP instruction issue, and issue 8 regarding the photos. [5] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2008For the same reason, we also do not conduct our own sufficiency of the evidence analysis, do not discuss specific evidentiary issues that may not arise again (issues 1, 4, and 6) and only touch on several of the issues that will be helpful in a retrial; specifically issue 3 regarding the suppression of the confession, issue 7 regarding the CCP instruction issue, and issue 8 regarding the photos. [5] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Willacy v. State
green
2 sentences2007As in the CCP analysis above, this Court's task on appeal is "to review the record to determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its finding." Willacy v. State, 696 So.2d at 695 . 2007As in the CCP analysis above, this Court's task on appeal is "to review the record to determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its finding." Willacy v. State, 696 So.2d at 695 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Faloni v. Blum, Yumkas, Mailman, Gutman & Denick, P. A.
green
2 sentences2004In concluding that Pace's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the CCP instruction as unconstitutionally vague, we noted that the issue was not properly preserved for review, that Pace did not assert that the erroneous CCP instruction was fundamental error, and that this Court had previously held that vagueness challenges to the CCP instruction "are procedurally barred unless `[t]he objection at trial [attacks] the instruction itself, either by submitting a limiting instruction or making an objection to the instruction as worded.'" Id. at 181 (quoting Pope v. State, 7 2004In concluding that Pace's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the CCP instruction as unconstitutionally vague, we noted that the issue was not properly preserved for review, that Pace did not assert that the erroneous CCP instruction was fundamental error, and that this Court had previously held that vagueness challenges to the CCP instruction "are procedurally barred unless `[t]he objection at trial [attacks] the instruction itself, either by submitting a limiting instruction or making an objection to the instruction as worded.'" Id. at 181 (quoting Pope v. State, 7 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Thomas v. State
green
2 sentences2003Thomas, 693 So.2d at 951 n. 1. [2] Thomas's claims are summarized in this Court's opinion on direct appeal: 1) The State failed to prove the corpus delicti; 2) the sentencing order is deficient; 3) the CCP instruction was faulty; 4) the prosecutor misinformed the jury about the weighing process; 5) the court improperly informed the jury on the weighing process; 6) the HAC instruction was faulty; 7) the prosecutor made improper comments in closing; 8) the court used the felonies underlying the first-degree murder conviction as an automatic aggravator; 9) the evidence was insufficient to support 2003Thomas, 693 So.2d at 951 n. 1. [2] Thomas's claims are summarized in this Court's opinion on direct appeal: 1) The State failed to prove the corpus delicti; 2) the sentencing order is deficient; 3) the CCP instruction was faulty; 4) the prosecutor misinformed the jury about the weighing process; 5) the court improperly informed the jury on the weighing process; 6) the HAC instruction was faulty; 7) the prosecutor made improper comments in closing; 8) the court used the felonies underlying the first-degree murder conviction as an automatic aggravator; 9) the evidence was insufficient to support | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Caldwell v. Mississippi green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Jones v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Fennie v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Foster v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Williams green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| James v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Hodges v. Florida neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Maynard v. Cartwright green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.