stop that meets test in Texas

2021See Icke v. State, 36 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (“A stop that meets the test for reasonable suspicion is lawful even if the facts supporting the stop are ultimately shown to be inaccurate or false.”); see also State v. Garrett, Nos. 03-17-00333-CR, 03-17-00334-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4086 , at *18–19 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin June 7, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Reasonable suspicion does not require certitude that an offense occurred and instead only requires that the investigating officer reasonably believe that ‘a violation w

2015Safety, No. 14-12-01057-CV, 2013 WL 3868447 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 23, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“The Department was not required to show that a traffic offense actually was committed, but only that the officer reasonably believed that a violation was in progress or had occurred.”). 42 Icke v. State, 36 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (“A stop that meets the test for reasonable suspicion is lawful even if the facts supporting the stop are ultimately shown to be inaccurate or false.”); Kelly v. State, 721 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex. App.—Hou

2015Safety, No. 14-12-01057-CV, 2013 WL 3868447 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 23, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“The Department was not required to show that a traffic offense actually was committed, but only that the officer reasonably believed that a violation was in progress or had occurred.”). 42 Icke v. State, 36 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (“A stop that meets the test for reasonable suspicion is lawful even if the facts supporting the stop are ultimately shown to be inaccurate or false.”); Kelly v. State, 721 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex. App.—Hou

2001Kelly v. State, 721 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.) (citing Williams v. State, 621 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tex.Crim.App.1981)).

2021See Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914 (looking to totality of circumstances); see also Warren, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 8296 , at *12–13 (explaining that “appellant was not being tried for speeding, nor was the State required to prove he was speeding in order to meet its burden of showing that [officer] had reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle”).

2021See Icke v. State, 36 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (“A stop that meets the test for reasonable suspicion is lawful even if the facts supporting the stop are ultimately shown to be inaccurate or false.”); see also State v. Garrett, Nos. 03-17-00333-CR, 03-17-00334-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4086 , at *18–19 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin June 7, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Reasonable suspicion does not require certitude that an offense occurred and instead only requires that the investigating officer reasonably believe that ‘a violation w

2015Ortiz’s estimation of Appellant’s speed was incorrect due to equipment problems, a stop that meets the test for reasonable suspicion is lawful, notwithstanding a subsequent determination that the equipment was faulty.”). 43 Gutierrez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 257, 263 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.) (“[T]he radar reading merely confirmed Officer Lewis’s initial observation that Gutierrez appeared to be traveling faster than the posted speed limit.

2015(Appellant’s brief at 13.) However, that requirement was specifically rejected by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Dillard. 76 Jaroszewicz attempts to distinguish Curran v. State, No. 07-10-0078- CR, 2011 WL 446191 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 8, 2011, pet. ref’d) 74 Heredia, No. 08-06-00011-CR, at *3. 75 Id. 76 Dillard, 550 S.W.2d at 53 (“We disagree with appellants’ contention that unless Bragg knew the exact speed which the automobile was traveling, no violation occurred.”). 40 (mem. op., not designated for publication) on the ground that the defendant in that case admitted speeding.

2015(Appellant’s brief at 13.) However, that requirement was specifically rejected by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Dillard. 76 Jaroszewicz attempts to distinguish Curran v. State, No. 07-10-0078- CR, 2011 WL 446191 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 8, 2011, pet. ref’d) 74 Heredia, No. 08-06-00011-CR, at *3. 75 Id. 76 Dillard, 550 S.W.2d at 53 (“We disagree with appellants’ contention that unless Bragg knew the exact speed which the automobile was traveling, no violation occurred.”). 40 (mem. op., not designated for publication) on the ground that the defendant in that case admitted speeding.

2001Kelly v. State, 721 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.) (citing Williams v. State, 621 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tex.Crim.App.1981)).