nonparty defense in Indiana

2013Co. v. Parmer, in the context of a request by a party defendant, Sida, to name previously-dismissed party defendants as nonparty defendants, this court recently held that a defendant “need only object to a dismissal or claim that a party- defendant should remain for purposes of allocation of fault in order to preserve a nonparty defense” and that “a party-defendant may preserve a defense that a dismissed party-defendant is a nonparty for fault allocation provided that the party-defendant gives sufficient notice by objecting to the trial court’s dismissal.” 958 N.E.2d 802, 807-808 (Ind. Ct. App

1996However, based on the facts before it, the court held that "[bleeause the statutory burden of proof is upon the defendant with respect to the nonparty defense, failure to timely present such an objection waives the defense as to the dismissed parties." Id.

2016Mendenhall, 728 N.E.2d at 144 .

2000At a very minimum, unless TP has already settled at the time D must assert a nonparty defense, the tactical considerations from the defense's point of view are not usually those identified by the majority, 728 N.E.2d at 143-45 , as an assessment of the likely attribution of liability to TP.

2013Co. v. Parmer, in the context of a request by a party defendant, Sida, to name previously-dismissed party defendants as nonparty defendants, this court recently held that a defendant “need only object to a dismissal or claim that a party- defendant should remain for purposes of allocation of fault in order to preserve a nonparty defense” and that “a party-defendant may preserve a defense that a dismissed party-defendant is a nonparty for fault allocation provided that the party-defendant gives sufficient notice by objecting to the trial court’s dismissal.” 958 N.E.2d 802, 807-808 (Ind. Ct. App

1999The court held: “In view of the timely objections and requests [by the defendants] to retain [the dismissed party] as a nonparty, we find that [the defendants] have preserved their right to assert a nonparty defense as to [the dismissed party].” Id. (emphasis added).

2023I.C. § 34-51-2-16; Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Cobb, 754 N.E.2d 905, 913 (Ind. 2001) (interpreting similar provision in Products Liability Act).

2004"The burden of proof of a nonparty defense is upon the defendant, who must affirmatively plead the defense." Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Cobb, 754 N.E.2d 905 (Ind.2001); see also Ind.Code Ann. § 34-51-2-15 (West, PREMISE through 2004 2nd Special Sess.).

2026See Koziol v. Vojvoda, 662 N.E.2d 985, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that trial court did not err in allowing defendant to name former defendant as nonparty because, although the settling defendant’s liability to the plaintiff may have been resolved, the remaining defendant was still permitted to argue that its own share of fault should be reduced if the settling defendant had caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injury).

2026See Templin v. Fobes, 617 N.E.2d 541, 544-45 (Ind. 1993) (trial court should not have allowed defendant to raise nonparty defense because request was untimely; reversal of jury trial verdict was required because jury was erroneously 6 permitted to assign fault among three parties rather than two). [30] Beacon’s final argument on harmless error is that even if the trial court had barred Beacon from naming Spear and Panzica as nonparties, and Beacon had 6 We are unpersuaded by Beacon’s reliance on Koziol, 662 N.E.2d at 992 , where the Court determined that the trial court did not err in giving t

1989Walters v. Dean (1986), Ind.App., 497 N.E.2d 247 .

1988See also, Walters v. Dean (1986), Ind.App., 497 N.E.2d 247, 253 ; and Bayliff, Drafting and Legislative History of the Comparative Fault Act, 17 Ind.L.R. 863, 878.

2026Fault and Nonparty Defenses [19] The Penningtons argue that the trial court erred by granting Beacon’s motion to amend its answer to raise a nonparty defense naming Spear and Panzica, whose lack of fault had already been determined during summary judgment proceedings. [20] Trial courts have “broad discretion in granting or denying amendments to pleadings[.]” In re Estate of Hurwich, 103 N.E.3d 1135, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), aff’d on reh’g, 109 N.E.3d 416 .

2026See Templin v. Fobes, 617 N.E.2d 541, 544-45 (Ind. 1993) (trial court should not have allowed defendant to raise nonparty defense because request was untimely; reversal of jury trial verdict was required because jury was erroneously 6 permitted to assign fault among three parties rather than two). [30] Beacon’s final argument on harmless error is that even if the trial court had barred Beacon from naming Spear and Panzica as nonparties, and Beacon had 6 We are unpersuaded by Beacon’s reliance on Koziol, 662 N.E.2d at 992 , where the Court determined that the trial court did not err in giving t

2024Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). [8] Citing Indiana’s Comparative Fault Act, Hetty asserts that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing Weems to raise a nonparty defense without requiring him to “specifically identify and name” the nonparty.

2024Co. v. Josh’s Lawn & Snow, LLC, 130 N.E.3d 1191, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). [10] Because the present case was brought as a small claims matter, Weems was not required to formally plead a nonparty defense.

2016But the nonparty defense eliminates those problems in Indiana. 772 N.E.2d 987, 989-90 (Ind.2002). [9] The Indiana Supreme Court further explained, elimination of credit requires the comparative fault defendant to pay for its own share, but no more.

2015When service of a complaint occurs more than 150 days before the expiration of the statute of limitations, this statute “strikes a balance between providing a reasonable opportunity to the defendant to discover and assert a nonparty defense and providing a reasonable opportunity to the claimant to join the alleged nonparty before expiration of the statute of limitations.” Kelly v. Bennett, 792 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied.

2013Co. v. Parmer, in the context of a request by a party defendant, Sida, to name previously-dismissed party defendants as nonparty defendants, this court recently held that a defendant “need only object to a dismissal or claim that a party-defendant should remain for purposes of allocation of fault in order to preserve a nonparty defense” and that “a party-defendant may preserve a defense that a dismissed party-defendant is a nonparty for fault allocation provided that the party-defendant gives sufficient notice by objecting to the trial court’s dismissal.” 958 N.E.2d 802, 807-808 (Ind.Ct.

2013Co. v. Parmer, in the context of a request by a party defendant, Sida, to name previously-dismissed party defendants as nonparty defendants, this court recently held that a defendant “need only object to a dismissal or claim that a party- defendant should remain for purposes of allocation of fault in order to preserve a nonparty defense” and that “a party-defendant may preserve a defense that a dismissed party-defendant is a nonparty for fault allocation provided that the party-defendant gives sufficient notice by objecting to the trial court’s dismissal.” 958 N.E.2d 802, 807-808 (Ind. Ct. App

2012Kocher v. Getz, 824 N.E.2d 671, 673 (Ind. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 15 Further, the Act allows a defendant to assert a nonparty defense.

2009See Ind. Code § 34-51-2-14 ; Solnosky v. Goodwell, 892 N.E.2d 174, 185 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (quoting Mendenhall v. Skinner & Broadbent Co., 728 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind.2000)).

2007Mallory & Co., 772 N.E.2d 479, 483-84 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (holding that a nonparty can challenge a trial court’s ruling on a motion if the ruling impacts or injures the nonparty).

1996MacDonald v. Maxwell, 655 N.E.2d 1249, 1250 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), reh'g denied.