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6 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cheng v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2020While “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after the warnings are given,” Miranda does not require “a waiver to be in writing or verbally expressed, nor does it preclude the conclusion that a waiver occurred based on the suspect’s course of conduct.” Id. at 259; see Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 35 (1990) (“Cheng’s decision to talk with Officer Carter, after having been advised of the Miranda rights, constitutes an implied waiver of those rights.”); see also Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 251 (1990) (inferring a waiver of defendant’s right to co 2013While “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after the warnings are given,” Miranda does not require “a waiver to be in writing or verbally expressed, nor does it preclude the conclusion that a waiver occurred based on the suspect’s course of conduct.” Angel, 281 Va. at 259 , 704 S.E.2d at 392 ; see Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 35 , 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990) (“Cheng’s decision to talk with Officer Carter, after having been advised of the Miranda rights, constitutes an implied waiver of those rights.”); see also Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 251 | 2 | 2 |
Eaton v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2020While “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after the warnings are given,” Miranda does not require “a waiver to be in writing or verbally expressed, nor does it preclude the conclusion that a waiver occurred based on the suspect’s course of conduct.” Id. at 259; see Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 35 (1990) (“Cheng’s decision to talk with Officer Carter, after having been advised of the Miranda rights, constitutes an implied waiver of those rights.”); see also Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 251 (1990) (inferring a waiver of defendant’s right to co 2013While “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after the warnings are given,” Miranda does not require “a waiver to be in writing or verbally expressed, nor does it preclude the conclusion that a waiver occurred based on the suspect’s course of conduct.” Angel, 281 Va. at 259 , 704 S.E.2d at 392 ; see Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 35 , 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990) (“Cheng’s decision to talk with Officer Carter, after having been advised of the Miranda rights, constitutes an implied waiver of those rights.”); see also Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 251 | 2 | 2 |
Harrison v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2011Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 582 , 423 S.E.2d 160, 163-4 (1992) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 , 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) for the conclusion that, under Miranda , "mere silence is not enough"). 2011Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 582 , 423 S.E.2d 160, 163-4 (1992) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 , 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) for the conclusion that, under Miranda , "mere silence is not enough"). | 1 | 1 |
White v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1997"Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against a waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." White v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 559, 560 , 203 S.E.2d 443, 444 (1974). "[A] valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 . 1997"Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against a waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." White v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 559, 560 , 203 S.E.2d 443, 444 (1974). "[A] valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2000A. Appellant's Receipt and Waiver of Miranda Rights "[A] valid waiver [of Miranda rights] will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was eventually obtained." [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 , 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1628 , 16 L. 2000A. Appellant's Receipt and Waiver of Miranda Rights "[A] valid waiver [of Miranda rights] will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was eventually obtained." [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 , 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1628 , 16 L. | 3 | 1992–2000 |
Angel v. Com.
green
2 sentences2013While “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after the warnings are given,” Miranda does not require “a waiver to be in writing or verbally expressed, nor does it preclude the conclusion that a waiver occurred based on the suspect’s course of conduct.” Angel, 281 Va. at 259 , 704 S.E.2d at 392 ; see Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 35 , 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990) (“Cheng’s decision to talk with Officer Carter, after having been advised of the Miranda rights, constitutes an implied waiver of those rights.”); see also Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 251 2013While “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after the warnings are given,” Miranda does not require “a waiver to be in writing or verbally expressed, nor does it preclude the conclusion that a waiver occurred based on the suspect’s course of conduct.” Angel, 281 Va. at 259 , 704 S.E.2d at 392 ; see Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 35 , 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990) (“Cheng’s decision to talk with Officer Carter, after having been advised of the Miranda rights, constitutes an implied waiver of those rights.”); see also Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 251 | 1 | 2013–2013 |
North Carolina v. Butler
red
2 sentences2011Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 582 , 423 S.E.2d 160, 163-4 (1992) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 , 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) for the conclusion that, under Miranda , "mere silence is not enough"). 2011Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 582 , 423 S.E.2d 160, 163-4 (1992) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 , 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) for the conclusion that, under Miranda , "mere silence is not enough"). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.