great weight claim in Michigan

2026DISCUSSION This Court must determine a great-weight challenge “by deciding whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” People v Cameron, 291 Mich App 599, 616-617 ; 806 NW2d 371 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2026DISCUSSION This Court must determine a great-weight challenge “by deciding whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” People v Cameron, 291 Mich App 599, 616-617 ; 806 NW2d 371 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2018“When analyzing a great-weight challenge, no court may sit as the 13th juror and reassess the evidence.” People v Bosca, 310 Mich App 1, 13 ; 871 NW2d 307 (2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2018“When analyzing a great-weight challenge, no court may sit as the 13th juror and reassess the evidence.” People v Bosca, 310 Mich App 1, 13 ; 871 NW2d 307 (2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2018Mitchell v Mitchell, 296 Mich App 513, 519 ; 823 NW2d 153 (2012).

2018Mitchell v Mitchell, 296 Mich App 513, 519 ; 823 NW2d 153 (2012).

2018We review a great-weight claim to determine “whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218-219 ; 673 NW2d 800 (2003).

2018We review a great-weight claim to determine “whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218-219 ; 673 NW2d 800 (2003).

2017Under the great weight standard, a trial court’s findings “should be affirmed unless the evidence ‘clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.’ ” Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 879 ; 526 NW2d 889 (1994), quoting Murchie v Standard Oil Co, 355 Mich 550, 558 ; 94 NW2d 799 (1959).

2017Under the great weight standard, a trial court’s findings “should be affirmed unless the evidence ‘clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.’ ” Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 879 ; 526 NW2d 889 (1994), quoting Murchie v Standard Oil Co, 355 Mich 550, 558 ; 94 NW2d 799 (1959).

2017We will affirm the trial court’s factual decisions under the great weight standard “unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the other direction.” Id.

2016“Under the great weight standard, the trial court’s factual determinations will be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the other direction.” Butler v Simmons-Butler, 308 Mich App 195, 200 ; 863 NW2d 677 (2014).

2017In People v Bosca, 310 Mich App 1, 13 ; 871 NW2d 307 (2015), this Court observed as follows regarding a great-weight challenge: To support a new trial, the witness testimony must contradict indisputable physical facts or laws, be patently incredible or defy physical realities, be so inherently implausible that it could not be believed by a reasonable juror, or have been seriously impeached in a case that was marked by uncertainties and discrepancies. [Citation, quotation marks, and alteration brackets omitted.] “The hurdle that a judge must clear in order to overrule a jury and grant a new tri

2017In People v Bosca, 310 Mich App 1, 13 ; 871 NW2d 307 (2015), this Court observed as follows regarding a great-weight challenge: To support a new trial, the witness testimony must contradict indisputable physical facts or laws, be patently incredible or defy physical realities, be so inherently implausible that it could not be believed by a reasonable juror, or have been seriously impeached in a case that was marked by uncertainties and discrepancies. [Citation, quotation marks, and alteration brackets omitted.] “The hurdle that a judge must clear in order to overrule a jury and grant a new tri

2017Under the great weight standard, a trial court’s findings “should be affirmed unless the evidence ‘clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.’ ” Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 879 ; 526 NW2d 889 (1994), quoting Murchie v Standard Oil Co, 355 Mich 550, 558 ; 94 NW2d 799 (1959).

2017Under the great weight standard, a trial court’s findings “should be affirmed unless the evidence ‘clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.’ ” Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 879 ; 526 NW2d 889 (1994), quoting Murchie v Standard Oil Co, 355 Mich 550, 558 ; 94 NW2d 799 (1959).

2026A verdict is against the great weight of evidence only when it is not reasonably supported by evidence and “it was more likely the result of causes outside the record, such as passion, prejudice, sympathy, or some other extraneous influence.” People v Lacalamita, 286 Mich App 467, 469 ; 780 NW3d 311 (2009).

2025Second, he argues that the prosecution abused -5- its power when it charged him with kidnapping rather than parental taking. 3 We disagree that evidence of restraint was lacking, and we conclude that his argument regarding the prosecution’s charging decision is waived, see MCR 7.212(C)(5); People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583 , 604 n 4; 617 NW2d 339 (2000) (An issue not contained in the statement of questions presented is waived on appeal.).4 “To preserve a great-weight claim, a party must move for a new trial in the trial court.” People v Cameron, 291 Mich App 599, 617 ; 806 NW2d 371 (2011).

2025Second, he argues that the prosecution abused -5- its power when it charged him with kidnapping rather than parental taking. 3 We disagree that evidence of restraint was lacking, and we conclude that his argument regarding the prosecution’s charging decision is waived, see MCR 7.212(C)(5); People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583 , 604 n 4; 617 NW2d 339 (2000) (An issue not contained in the statement of questions presented is waived on appeal.).4 “To preserve a great-weight claim, a party must move for a new trial in the trial court.” People v Cameron, 291 Mich App 599, 617 ; 806 NW2d 371 (2011).

2022To the extent that defendant challenged the credibility determinations of the jury, “[i]n determining whether sufficient evidence was presented to support a conviction, the reviewing court will not interfere with the fact-finder’s role of deciding the credibility of the witnesses.” People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 180 ; 891 NW2d 255 (2016).

2022To the extent that defendant challenged the credibility determinations of the jury, “[i]n determining whether sufficient evidence was presented to support a conviction, the reviewing court will not interfere with the fact-finder’s role of deciding the credibility of the witnesses.” People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 180 ; 891 NW2d 255 (2016).

2018The test to apply in evaluating a great-weight claim is whether the “evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” People v Anderson, 322 Mich App 622, 632 ; 912 NW2d 607 (2018). -13- Conflicting testimony, even if impeached, is not a sufficient ground to grant a new trial.

2018The test to apply in evaluating a great-weight claim is whether the “evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” People v Anderson, 322 Mich App 622, 632 ; 912 NW2d 607 (2018). -13- Conflicting testimony, even if impeached, is not a sufficient ground to grant a new trial.

2016An abuse of discretion occurs when the result is “ ‘so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it -6- evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.’ ” Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 324 ; 729 NW2d 533 (2006), quoting Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385 ; 94 NW2d 810 (1959).

2016An abuse of discretion occurs when the result is “ ‘so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it -6- evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.’ ” Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 324 ; 729 NW2d 533 (2006), quoting Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385 ; 94 NW2d 810 (1959).

2016An abuse of discretion occurs when the result is “ ‘so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it -6- evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.’ ” Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 324 ; 729 NW2d 533 (2006), quoting Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385 ; 94 NW2d 810 (1959).

2016An abuse of discretion occurs when the result is “ ‘so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it -6- evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.’ ” Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 324 ; 729 NW2d 533 (2006), quoting Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385 ; 94 NW2d 810 (1959).

2016To support a new trial, the witness testimony must contradict[ ] indisputable physical facts or laws, be patently incredible or def[y] physical realities, be so inherently implausible that it could not be believed by a reasonable juror, or have been seriously impeached in a case that was marked by uncertainties and discrepancies. [People v Bosca, 310 Mich App 1, 13 ; 871 NW2d 307 (2015), lv abeyed ___ Mich ____; 872 NW2d 492 (2015) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; alterations by the Bosca Court).] Contrary to defendant’s assertions on appeal, the testimony of Kalyn Ware, an eye

2016Gagnon v Glowacki, 295 Mich App 557, 565 ; 815 NW2d 141 (2012).

2016Gagnon v Glowacki, 295 Mich App 557, 565 ; 815 NW2d 141 (2012).

2015“When analyzing a great-weight challenge, no court may sit as the ‘13th juror’ and reassess the evidence.” People v Galloway, 307 Mich App 151, 167 ; 858 NW2d 520 (2014) (citation omitted). “[I]n general, conflicting testimony or a question as to the credibility of a witness are not sufficient grounds for granting a new trial. . . .” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 643 ; 576 NW2d 129 (1998) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “[Alb-sent exceptional circumstances,” issues of witness credibility are within the exclusive province of the trier of fact.

2015“When analyzing a great-weight challenge, no court may sit as the ‘13th juror’ and reassess the evidence.” People v Galloway, 307 Mich App 151, 167 ; 858 NW2d 520 (2014) (citation omitted). “[I]n general, conflicting testimony or a question as to the credibility of a witness are not sufficient grounds for granting a new trial. . . .” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 643 ; 576 NW2d 129 (1998) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “[Alb-sent exceptional circumstances,” issues of witness credibility are within the exclusive province of the trier of fact.

2014Pierron v Pierron, 486 Mich 81, 85 ; 782 NW2d 480 (2010); Mitchell v Mitchell, 296 Mich App 513, 519 ; 823 NW2d 153 (2012).

2014Pierron v Pierron, 486 Mich 81, 85 ; 782 NW2d 480 (2010); Mitchell v Mitchell, 296 Mich App 513, 519 ; 823 NW2d 153 (2012).

2014When reviewing a waiver of the right to counsel, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has stated that courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.” People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 641 ; 683 NW2d 597 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 1 The prosecution contends that this issue is a great weight challenge, and we likewise find that the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence. -2- Defendant does not challenge the validity of his initial waiver of the right to counsel.2 Instead, he argues that the trial court fa

2014When reviewing a waiver of the right to counsel, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has stated that courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.” People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 641 ; 683 NW2d 597 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 1 The prosecution contends that this issue is a great weight challenge, and we likewise find that the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence. -2- Defendant does not challenge the validity of his initial waiver of the right to counsel.2 Instead, he argues that the trial court fa