judicial proceedings privilege in Texas

2025Statements made by Vanessa in her affidavits Under the judicial-proceedings privilege, communications made in the due course of a judicial proceeding “will not serve as the basis of a civil action . . . regardless of the negligence or malice with which they are made.” Landry’s, 631 S.W.3d at 46 (quoting James, 637 S.W.2d at 916 ).

2024The judicial proceedings privilege is an absolute privilege that covers any statement made by the judge, jurors, counsel, parties or witnesses, and attaches to all aspects of the proceedings, including statements made in open court, pre-trial hearings, depositions, affidavits and any of the pleadings or other papers in the case.3 Id. (citing James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914 , 916–17 (Tex. 1982) (per 3 Given the facts of this case, we need not here discuss “other ‘well-settled rules of law’” defining the privilege “which may extend in certain cases to communications that are preliminary to—and no

2021Although the judicial-proceedings privilege traditionally applies to “statements made in open court, pre-trial hearings, depositions, affidavits and any of the pleadings or other papers in the case,” James, 637 S.W.2d at 916–17, it can also include statements made “preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding,” Shell Oil, 464 S.W.3d at 654 (quoting Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl.

2021Tex. Feb. 15, 2017) (refusing to apply judicial-proceedings privilege to a party’s tweets). 8 See also Krishnan v. Law Offices of Preston Henrichson, P.C., 83 S.W.3d 295, 302 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, pet. denied) (holding the privilege applies to notice letter delivered to required party in health care liability claim but not otherwise disseminated to public). 9 This result is consistent with our previous decision in Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2015), in which we extended the judicial-proceedings privilege to a report given by Shell to the Department of Justice

2019Analysis “The common law and statutes provide certain defenses and privileges to defamation claims.” Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 62 (Tex. 2013) “Further, the common law has recognized a judicial proceedings privilege since at least 1772 for parties, witnesses, lawyers, judges, and jurors.” Id. (citations omitted).

2019See, e.g., Neely, 418 S.W.3d at 62 (“[T]he common law has recognized a judicial proceedings privilege since at least 1772 for parties, witnesses, lawyers, judges, and jurors.”); Krishnan v. Law Offices of Preston Henrichson, 14 P.C., 83 S.W.3d 295, 302 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied) (“Absolute privilege provides that communications that are made in the due course of a judicial proceeding cannot serve as the basis for a defamation action.”).

2026Deuell v. Texas Right to Life Comm., Inc., 508 S.W.3d 679, 692 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 22 2016, pet. denied); see Steadfast Ins. v. SMX 98, Inc., No. CIV.A.

2026Following this authority, we conclude that the judicial-proceedings privilege does not apply to the Powells’ tortious-interference-with-contract counterclaim, a non-defamation cause of action seeking “actual damage or loss as a result of [their] lost sale” and “all damages for the economic injury they have suffered.” See Deuell, 508 S.W.3d at 691-92.

2025See id. at 44 (“Attorneys who make such statements outside a judicial proceeding have many potential defenses to defamation liability, but the judicial-proceedings privilege and attorney immunity are not among them.”); Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 768, 771 (Tex. 1994) (psychologist who examined child for signs of sexual abuse concluded father was the abuser by way of affidavit to the family court; Court held she subjected herself to liability for defamation unless a privilege attached to the form of the communication).

2025We conclude the judicial-proceedings privilege applies to torts other than defamation, including claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, “when the essence of the [tortious] claim is that injury occurred as the result of allegedly false statements made during a 27 judicial proceeding.” de Mino v. Sheridan, No. 14-05-00210-CV, 2006 WL 1026933 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 20, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 771–72); see also Crain v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. of the Sup. Ct. of Texas, 11 S.W.3d 328, 335 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist

2025We conclude the judicial-proceedings privilege applies to torts other than defamation, including claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, “when the essence of the [tortious] claim is that injury occurred as the result of allegedly false statements made during a 27 judicial proceeding.” de Mino v. Sheridan, No. 14-05-00210-CV, 2006 WL 1026933 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 20, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 771–72); see also Crain v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. of the Sup. Ct. of Texas, 11 S.W.3d 328, 335 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist

2022Servs., No. 14-13-00111-CV, 2014 WL 3002400 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“The judicial proceedings privilege is ‘tantamount to immunity’; where there is an absolute privilege, no civil action in damages for oral or written communications will lie, ‘even though the language is false and uttered or published with express malice.’”) (quoting Hernandez v. Hayes, 931 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied).

2021Tex. Feb. 15, 2017) (refusing to apply judicial-proceedings privilege to a party’s tweets). 8 See also Krishnan v. Law Offices of Preston Henrichson, P.C., 83 S.W.3d 295, 302 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, pet. denied) (holding the privilege applies to notice letter delivered to required party in health care liability claim but not otherwise disseminated to public). 9 This result is consistent with our previous decision in Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2015), in which we extended the judicial-proceedings privilege to a report given by Shell to the Department of Justice

2019See, e.g., Neely, 418 S.W.3d at 62 (“[T]he common law has recognized a judicial proceedings privilege since at least 1772 for parties, witnesses, lawyers, judges, and jurors.”); Krishnan v. Law Offices of Preston Henrichson, 14 P.C., 83 S.W.3d 295, 302 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied) (“Absolute privilege provides that communications that are made in the due course of a judicial proceeding cannot serve as the basis for a defamation action.”).

2015Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434 , 160 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. 1942); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 560 (1977).

2015Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434 , 160 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. 1942); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 560 (1977).

2015The Charalambopoulus court noted that the judicial proceedings privilege is "tantamount to immunity," and, where there is an absolute privilege, no civil action in damages for oral or written communications will lie, "even though the language is false and uttered or published with express malice." Id.

2015The Charalambopoulus court noted that the judicial proceedings privilege is "tantamount to immunity," and, where there is an absolute privilege, no civil action in damages for oral or written communications will lie, "even though the language is false and uttered or published with express malice." Id.

2023Relying on Hurlbut v. Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co., 749 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. 1987), Black maintains Woodrick is not shielded from liability under the judicial proceedings privilege because he did not provide any evidence he testified as a witness in a judicial proceeding.

2021Servs., No. 14-13-00111-CV, 2014 WL 3002400 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2014, pet. denied) (“The judicial proceedings privilege is tantamount to immunity; where there is an absolute privilege, no civil action in damages for oral or written communications will lie, even though the language is false and uttered or published with express malice.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Tex. 1987)).

2023Second, the judicial-proceedings privilege “furthers public policy by promoting a ‘complete and unbridled development of evidence in the settlement of disputes without fear of reprisals.’” Collins v. Zolnier, No. 09-17-00418-CV, 2019 WL 2292333 , at *3 (Tex. App.— Beaumont May 30, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Saxer v. Nash Phillips-Copus Co. Real Estate, 678 S.W.2d 736, 740 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.)); see also Landry’s, 631 S.W.3d at 46 (“The privilege facilitates the proper administration of justice by promoting ‘full and free disclosure of information . . . by parti

2023Second, the judicial-proceedings privilege “furthers public policy by promoting a ‘complete and unbridled development of evidence in the settlement of disputes without fear of reprisals.’” Collins v. Zolnier, No. 09-17-00418-CV, 2019 WL 2292333 , at *3 (Tex. App.— Beaumont May 30, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Saxer v. Nash Phillips-Copus Co. Real Estate, 678 S.W.2d 736, 740 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.)); see also Landry’s, 631 - 18 - 04-21-00582-CV S.W.3d at 46 (“The privilege facilitates the proper administration of justice by promoting ‘full and free disclosure of info

2023Co., 300 S.W. 118, 122 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1927, no writ)).

2023Co., 300 S.W. 118, 122 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1927, no writ)).

2020“The judicial-proceedings privilege is not limited to statements made in pending cases, but applies ‘to any statement that bears some relation to an existing or proposed judicial proceeding.’” Id. at 58 (quoting Fitzmaurice v. Jones, 417 S.W.3d 627, 633 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.), disapproved on other grounds by In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 , 586 3 In its response to the partial summary judgment motion, Matterhorn argued that adequate time for discovery had not yet passed; that absolute privilege did not apply to Howard’s pre-suit statements; and that there were genuine iss

2018The judicial-proceedings privilege is not limited to statements made in pending cases, but applies “to any statement that bears some relation to an existing or proposed judicial proceeding.” Fitzmaurice v. Jones, 417 S.W.3d 627, 633 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (quoting Daystar Residential, Inc. v. Collmer, 176 S.W.3d 24, 28 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied)), disapproved on other grounds by Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 587, 591 .

2020“The judicial-proceedings privilege is not limited to statements made in pending cases, but applies ‘to any statement that bears some relation to an existing or proposed judicial proceeding.’” Id. at 58 (quoting Fitzmaurice v. Jones, 417 S.W.3d 627, 633 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.), disapproved on other grounds by In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 , 586 3 In its response to the partial summary judgment motion, Matterhorn argued that adequate time for discovery had not yet passed; that absolute privilege did not apply to Howard’s pre-suit statements; and that there were genuine iss

2018The judicial-proceedings privilege is not limited to statements made in pending cases, but applies “to any statement that bears some relation to an existing or proposed judicial proceeding.” Fitzmaurice v. Jones, 417 S.W.3d 627, 633 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (quoting Daystar Residential, Inc. v. Collmer, 176 S.W.3d 24, 28 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied)), disapproved on other grounds by Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 587, 591 .

2024He relies on Jenevein v. Friedman, 114 S.W.3d 743, 748 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2003, no pet.), where we concluded that an allegedly defamatory statement must bear “some relation” to the proceeding for the privilege to apply.

2023See Landry’s, 631 S.W.3d at 46; Jenevein, 114 S.W.3d at 745 ; In re Commercial Credit Group, 2021 WL 1884657 , at *6.

2021Specifically, the court of appeals held that the defendants’ statements are privileged because they bear “some relation to an existing or proposed judicial proceeding,” are “related to the proposed litigation,” and the suit was “actually contemplated in good faith” when the statements were made. 566 S.W.3d 41 , 58–60 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018).

2021Tex. Feb. 15, 2017) (refusing to apply judicial-proceedings privilege to a party’s tweets). 8 See also Krishnan v. Law Offices of Preston Henrichson, P.C., 83 S.W.3d 295, 302 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, pet. denied) (holding the privilege applies to notice letter delivered to required party in health care liability claim but not otherwise disseminated to public). 9 This result is consistent with our previous decision in Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2015), in which we extended the judicial-proceedings privilege to a report given by Shell to the Department of Justice

2026See Ellis, 68 S.W.3d at 898 .

2025See Mem’l Hermann Health Sys. v. Gomez, 649 S.W.3d 415 , 426 n.32 (Tex. 2022) (“[I]t is the court’s charge . . . that measures the sufficiency of the evidence when the opposing party fails to object to the charge.”) (citing Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex. 2000) (collecting authorities)); cf. Seger v. Yorkshire Ins.

2025We conclude the judicial-proceedings privilege applies to torts other than defamation, including claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, “when the essence of the [tortious] claim is that injury occurred as the result of allegedly false statements made during a 27 judicial proceeding.” de Mino v. Sheridan, No. 14-05-00210-CV, 2006 WL 1026933 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 20, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 771–72); see also Crain v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. of the Sup. Ct. of Texas, 11 S.W.3d 328, 335 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist

2025See Wackenhut Corp. v. Gutierrez, 453 S.W.3d 917 , 919–20 (Tex. 2015) (“[T]here should be but one test for determining if a party has preserved error in the jury charge, and that is whether the party made the trial court aware of the complaint, timely and plainly, and obtained a ruling.”) (citing State Dep’t of Highways & Pub.

2024This Court has previously posited that employees of CPS exercise quasi-judicial positions “requir[ing] personal deliberation, decision, and judgment,” . . . “such as gathering information in connection with an investigation and making decisions based upon that information.” Gonzalez v. Avalos, 866 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, writ dism’d w.o.j.).

2024Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40 , 46 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477 , 485 n.12 (Tex. 2015) (internal citation omitted)). “[T]he absolute immunity of parties and witnesses from subsequent liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings is well established.” Laub v. Pesikoff, 979 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1983)).

2024See Howard, 628 S.W.3d at 333–34 (applying the judicial-proceedings privilege “to other torts, like business-disparagement and tortious-interference claims, when those claims are predicated on an allegedly defamatory act”); 5-State Helicopters, Inc. v. Cox, 146 S.W.3d 254, 259 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (applying judicial-proceedings privilege to tortious interference with contract claim when the plaintiff sought “defamation-type damages based on the allegedly libelous communications”).

2024Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40 , 46 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477 , 485 n.12 (Tex. 2015) (internal citation omitted)). “[T]he absolute immunity of parties and witnesses from subsequent liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings is well established.” Laub v. Pesikoff, 979 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1983)).