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10 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Arneja v. Gildargreen2 sentences2022The judicial proceedings privilege protects litigants and their attorneys from “actions in defamation for communications” made in the course of “judicial proceedings.” Arneja v. Gildar, 541 A.2d 621, 623 (D.C. 1989). 2010We said in Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran, “the judicial proceedings privilege is more than a defense to liability,” “[it] is intended to afford an attorney absolute immunity from actions in defamation for communications related to judicial proceedings.” 774 A.2d at 340 (quoting Arneja, 541 A.2d at 623 ). | 4 | 4 |
McNair Builders, Inc. v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2026See McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1140 (explaining that “at least part of the interest sought to be protected by the judicial proceedings privilege[—]immunity from liability—can be vindicated by a post-final order 11 reversal of a judgment”); Taylor v. Cnty. of Pima, 913 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[I]mmunity from liability may be vindicated fully after final judgment, so the collateral-order doctrine does not encompass an interlocutory appeal from a denial of immunity from liability.”). 2026See, e.g., McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1137-39 (concluding first that the judicial proceedings privilege “entails the right to be free from suit” but then concluding that it was not an interest of the “high order” necessary to satisfy the collateral order doctrine); cf. Digit. | 2 | 2 |
Jankovic v. International Crisis Groupgreen2 sentences2021Because we agree that Nadel’s statements could not be understood to have a defamatory meaning, we do not reach these issues. 22 Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis Grp., 494 F.3d 1080, 1089 (D.C. 2021Because we agree that Nadel’s statements could not be understood to have a defamatory meaning, we do not reach these issues. 22 Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis Grp., 494 F.3d 1080, 1089 (D.C. | 2 | 2 |
Sidney Brown v. Dennis Collins, Dennis Collins v. First National Realty Corp.green2 sentences2010The absolute immunity accorded to valid claims of judicial proceedings privilege “reflects a judgment that the need for completely free speech for litigants is dominant, and that this freedom is not to be endangered by subjecting parties to the burden of defending their motives in subsequent slander litigation, or to the risk that juries may misapprehend those motives.” Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran, 774 A.2d at 340 (quoting Brown v. Collins, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 68 , 72, 402 F.2d 209, 213 (1968)). 2001D.C. at 72, 402 F.2d at 213 . 8 From the fact that the judicial proceedings privilege affords an absolute immunity from suit, it follows that the criteria of appealability under the collateral order doctrine are satisfied in this case. | 1 | 2 |
Elisio Atenia Lorenzo v. Matthew G. Whitakergreen1 sentence2026See McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1140 (explaining that “at least part of the interest sought to be protected by the judicial proceedings privilege[—]immunity from liability—can be vindicated by a post-final order 11 reversal of a judgment”); Taylor v. Cnty. of Pima, 913 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[I]mmunity from liability may be vindicated fully after final judgment, so the collateral-order doctrine does not encompass an interlocutory appeal from a denial of immunity from liability.”). | 1 | 1 |
Hamilton v. Howard Universitygreen1 sentence2020Hamilton v. Howard Univ., 960 A.2d 308, 313 (D.C. 2008). | 1 | 1 |
Mazanderan v. McGranerygreen1 sentence2020This case, therefore, presents a pure question of law. 4 Arneja v. Gildar, 541 A.2d 621, 623 (D.C. 1988); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 587 (1997) (extending the privilege to “[a] party to a private litigation”). 5 Arneja, 541 A.2d at 623 . 6 Mazanderan v. McGranery, 490 A.2d 180, 181-82 (D.C. 1984) (Hacker’s License Appeal Board, an administrative body that heard complaints about taxi drivers); see also Arneja, 541 A.2d at 623 (District of Columbia Rental (continued…) 5 tribunals. 7 And we have applied the privilege to statements made preliminary to judicial proceedings, so long as | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gautiergreen2 sentences2010See Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran, 774 A.2d at 340 (“[I]n denying the motion to dismiss ... the trial court conclusively determined (by rejecting) their claim of immunity.”) (quotations omitted). 2010We said in Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran, “the judicial proceedings privilege is more than a defense to liability,” “[it] is intended to afford an attorney absolute immunity from actions in defamation for communications related to judicial proceedings.” 774 A.2d at 340 (quoting Arneja, 541 A.2d at 623 ). | 1 | 1 |
McBride v. Pizza Hut, Inc.green1 sentence2010See McBride v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 658 A.2d 205, 207-08 (D.C.1995) (letter to opposing counsel in response to threatened lawsuit is absolutely privileged); Arn eja v. Gildar, 541 A.2d 621, 623 (D.C.1988) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Messina v. Fontanagreen2 sentences2009Messina v. Fontana (Messina I), 260 F.Supp.2d 173 (D.D.C.2003). 8 The trial court in Messina I held that the judicial proceedings privilege “applies to statements [made] to persons having an interest in or connection to the litigation” and “affords absolute protection, without regard to the attorney’s motives, for comments made preliminary to a judicial proceeding and related to it.” 9 Id. at 178-79 (internal citations omitted). *1142 Here, the trial court relied on Messina I and Messina II to show that Ginsberg was fully aware that such a negligence claim did not lie because of the judicial p 2009Messina v. Fontana (Messina I), 260 F.Supp.2d 173 (D.D.C.2003). 8 The trial court in Messina I held that the judicial proceedings privilege “applies to statements [made] to persons having an interest in or connection to the litigation” and “affords absolute protection, without regard to the attorney’s motives, for comments made preliminary to a judicial proceeding and related to it.” 9 Id. at 178-79 (internal citations omitted). *1142 Here, the trial court relied on Messina I and Messina II to show that Ginsberg was fully aware that such a negligence claim did not lie because of the judicial p | 1 | 1 |
Braley v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2009In sum, we are satisfied no competent counsel would reasonably believe that the complaint here was not frivolous, see Braley, supra, 832 F.2d at 1512, and that Ginsberg’s counsel was fully aware that an action for negligence did not he in these circumstances. 2009In sum, we are satisfied no competent counsel would reasonably believe that the complaint here was not frivolous, see Braley, supra, 832 F.2d at 1512, and that Ginsberg’s counsel was fully aware that an action for negligence did not he in these circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
Chevalier v. Moongreen1 sentence2009Because the complaint could have been dismissed for any of these reasons, we conclude that in filing this complaint Ginsberg “was acting far outside the bounds of the law.” Chevalier v. Moon, 576 A.2d 722, 724 (D.C.1990) (affirming the trial court’s finding of bad faith); see Gen. | 1 | 1 |
Popp v. O'NEILgreen2 sentences2001In Popp v. O’Neil, 313 Ill.App.3d 638 , 246 Ill.Dec. 481 , 730 N.E.2d 506, 508 (2000), the court addressed the applicability of the judicial proceedings privilege to defamatory statements made by an attorney to a potential client during a preliminary legal consultation. 2001In Popp v. O’Neil, 313 Ill.App.3d 638 , 246 Ill.Dec. 481 , 730 N.E.2d 506, 508 (2000), the court addressed the applicability of the judicial proceedings privilege to defamatory statements made by an attorney to a potential client during a preliminary legal consultation. | 1 | 1 |
Samson Investment Co. v. Chevailliergreen1 sentence2001In Samson Investment Co. v. Chevaillier, Mysock & Chevaillier, 988 P.2d 327, 328 (Okla.1999), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that an attorney’s circulation to a prospective client of a proposed class action complaint, which charged that the “Samson entities” had defrauded investors, was absolutely privileged and hence could not be the basis of a defamation action against the attorney. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Finkelstein v. Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020As we stated above, however, we have applied the judicial-proceedings privilege to statements made preliminary to judicial proceedings so long as “an attorney [made the statements] while performing his function as such,” 33 there is “a reasonable nexus between the publication in question and the litigation under consideration,” 34 and the statements had a genuine “relationship to potential litigation” and were not made as a “mere afterthought or [with a] sham rationale.” 35 These requirements have been met in instances where an attorney solicited shareholders of a corporation to participate in 2005With respect to the absolute privilege for attorneys for statements made in judicial proceedings, this court has stated: “An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he [or she'] participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.” Finkelstein, supra, 774 A.2d at 338 (quoting Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 586) (other citations omitted). | 2 | 2005–2020 |
Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter
green
2 sentences2010We decide that in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 , 126 S.Ct. 952 , 168 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006), and Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 599 , 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009), which refined application of the collateral order doctrine, we do not have jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal. 2010Denial of the judicial proceedings privilege does not implicate a substantial public interest of a “high order” on a par with those noted by the Supreme Court in Will, 11 nor does it satisfy the functional assessment in Mohawk, because “deferring review until final judgment [will not] so imperil[ ] the interest as to justify the cost of allowing immediate appeal....” 130 S.Ct. at 606 . 12 *1142 Therefore, bearing in mind that these conditions are “stringent,” Will, 546 U.S. at 346 , 126 S.Ct. 952 , the court’s denial of summary judgment based on the asserted judicial proceedings privilege for | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Henry v. Lake Charles American Press, L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2010Nor does the interest protected by the judicial proceedings privilege approximate the public’s interest in the full exercise of First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition for redress of grievances concerning “matters of public significance,” Henry, 566 F.3d at 180 , or the public’s need to safeguard against witness intimidation and other tactics that can *1140 cripple the criminal justice system. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Will v. Hallock
green
2 sentences2010Denial of the judicial proceedings privilege does not implicate a substantial public interest of a “high order” on a par with those noted by the Supreme Court in Will, 11 nor does it satisfy the functional assessment in Mohawk, because “deferring review until final judgment [will not] so imperil[ ] the interest as to justify the cost of allowing immediate appeal....” 130 S.Ct. at 606 . 12 *1142 Therefore, bearing in mind that these conditions are “stringent,” Will, 546 U.S. at 346 , 126 S.Ct. 952 , the court’s denial of summary judgment based on the asserted judicial proceedings privilege for 2010Denial of the judicial proceedings privilege does not implicate a substantial public interest of a “high order” on a par with those noted by the Supreme Court in Will, 11 nor does it satisfy the functional assessment in Mohawk, because “deferring review until final judgment [will not] so imperil[ ] the interest as to justify the cost of allowing immediate appeal....” 130 S.Ct. at 606 . 12 *1142 Therefore, bearing in mind that these conditions are “stringent,” Will, 546 U.S. at 346 , 126 S.Ct. 952 , the court’s denial of summary judgment based on the asserted judicial proceedings privilege for | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Jeffrey Moldowan v. Maureen Fournier
green
1 sentence2010Mol-dowan, 578 F.3d at 371 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Alice G. Kelly Norman P. Kelly v. Great Seneca Financial Corp. Javitch, Block & Rathbone
green
1 sentence2010In Kelly , the court assumed that immunity from suit and not only from liability is also a purpose of advocacy immunity. 447 F.3d at 950 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Mitchell v. Forsyth
green
2 sentences2010As noted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 (1977), the judicial proceedings privilege must afford absolute immunity to lawyers because “[this privilege] is based upon a public policy of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients.” Id. cmt. a. 6 Moreover, we have noted that the judicial proceedings privilege, beyond a defense to liability, “is intended to afford an attorney absolute immunity from actions in defamation for communications related to judicial proceedings,” that is, an “entitlement not to stand tri 2010As noted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 (1977), the judicial proceedings privilege must afford absolute immunity to lawyers because “[this privilege] is based upon a public policy of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients.” Id. cmt. a. 6 Moreover, we have noted that the judicial proceedings privilege, beyond a defense to liability, “is intended to afford an attorney absolute immunity from actions in defamation for communications related to judicial proceedings,” that is, an “entitlement not to stand tri | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Savings Bank v. Ward
green
2 sentences2009Relying on Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 , 25 L.Ed. 621 (1879), Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196 (D.C.1980), and Conservative Club of Washington v. Finkelstein, 738 F.Supp. 6 (D.D.C.1990), the trial court held that the absence of privity of contract precludes suits by a party against opposing counsel. 2009Relying on Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 , 25 L.Ed. 621 (1879), Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196 (D.C.1980), and Conservative Club of Washington v. Finkelstein, 738 F.Supp. 6 (D.D.C.1990), the trial court held that the absence of privity of contract precludes suits by a party against opposing counsel. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Conservative Club of Washington v. Finkelstein
green
1 sentence2009Relying on Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 , 25 L.Ed. 621 (1879), Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196 (D.C.1980), and Conservative Club of Washington v. Finkelstein, 738 F.Supp. 6 (D.D.C.1990), the trial court held that the absence of privity of contract precludes suits by a party against opposing counsel. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Morowitz v. Marvel
green
1 sentence2009Relying on Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 , 25 L.Ed. 621 (1879), Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196 (D.C.1980), and Conservative Club of Washington v. Finkelstein, 738 F.Supp. 6 (D.D.C.1990), the trial court held that the absence of privity of contract precludes suits by a party against opposing counsel. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest
green
2 sentences1985In Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 , 99 S.Ct. 1667 , 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979), the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for determining when grand jury materials may be released *916 pursuant to the judicial proceedings exception. 1985In Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 , 99 S.Ct. 1667 , 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979), the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for determining when grand jury materials may be released *916 pursuant to the judicial proceedings exception. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.