judicial proceedings immunity in California

2003Under these circumstances, as in Cutter v. Brownbridge, supra, at page 848, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545 , `[w]e have determined that the constitutional right to privacy outweighs the policies underlying the judicial proceedings immunity when private material is voluntarily published, without resort to a prior judicial determination.'" [28] In Susan S. v. Israels , [29] defense counsel in a criminal prosecution for sexual battery served a subpoena duces tecum for the crime victim's records on the mental health facility where she sought treatment.

2001The decision concluded, "We have determined that the constitutional right to privacy outweighs the policies underlying the judicial proceedings immunity when private material is voluntarily published, without resort to a prior judicial determination." ( Cutter v. Brownbridge, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 848 , 228 Cal.Rptr. 545 .) Nine years ago, we applied our analysis in Cutter to facts similar to the present case in Urbaniak v. Newton, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d 1128 , 277 Cal.Rptr. 354 .

2001The decision concluded, "We have determined that the constitutional right to privacy outweighs the policies underlying the judicial proceedings immunity when private material is voluntarily published, without resort to a prior judicial determination." ( Cutter v. Brownbridge, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 848 , 228 Cal.Rptr. 545 .) Nine years ago, we applied our analysis in Cutter to facts similar to the present case in Urbaniak v. Newton, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d 1128 , 277 Cal.Rptr. 354 .

2001The decision concluded, "We have determined that the constitutional right to privacy outweighs the policies underlying the judicial proceedings immunity when private material is voluntarily published, without resort to a prior judicial determination." ( Cutter v. Brownbridge, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 848 , 228 Cal.Rptr. 545 .) Nine years ago, we applied our analysis in Cutter to facts similar to the present case in Urbaniak v. Newton, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d 1128 , 277 Cal.Rptr. 354 .

2001Under these circumstances, as in Cutter v. Brownbridge, supra, at p. 848 , 228 Cal. Rptr. 545 , `[w]e have determined that the constitutional right to privacy outweighs the policies underlying the judicial proceedings immunity when private material is voluntarily published, without resort to a prior judicial determination.'" ( Urbaniak v. Newton, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1141 , 277 Cal.Rptr. 354 .) Respondent relies on language in Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205, 215 , 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 , describing the privilege as being "absolute in nature," that does not allow fo

2001Under these circumstances, as in Cutter v. Brownbridge, supra, at p. 848 , 228 Cal. Rptr. 545 , `[w]e have determined that the constitutional right to privacy outweighs the policies underlying the judicial proceedings immunity when private material is voluntarily published, without resort to a prior judicial determination.'" ( Urbaniak v. Newton, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1141 , 277 Cal.Rptr. 354 .) Respondent relies on language in Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205, 215 , 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 , describing the privilege as being "absolute in nature," that does not allow fo

2007These grounds were not raised before the trial court and we do not consider them. 11 In Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 364 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 143 , 696 P.2d 637 ], the Supreme Court observed that the purpose of the judicial proceedings privilege “seems no less relevant to [statutory] claims.” 12 In addition, other purposes are “to encourage open channels of communication and zealous advocacy, to promote complete and truthful testimony, to give finality to judgments, and to avoid unending litigation . . . .” (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1063 .) 13 Rusheen cited acts that have been deeme

2007(Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1058 .) Acts deemed noncommunicative and unprivileged include prelitigation illegal recording of confidential telephone conversations; eavesdropping on a telephone conversation; and a physician’s negligent examination of a patient causing physical injury. {Ibid.) 14 Another court has pointed out that the protections afforded by the anti-SLAPP statute and the privilege “are not entirely coextensive,” in that malicious prosecution actions are not barred by the litigation privilege, but are subject to a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute.

1989In May 1988, a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend as to those counts, and a motion to strike was granted as to those portions of the unlawful business practices count which incorporated the allegations of counts two and three. 3 The Cutter court then held that the constitutional right to privacy outweighed the policies underlying “the judicial proceedings immunity” of Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2, when private material was voluntarily published, without resort to a prior judicial determination of the need for disclosure. ( Cutter, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at pp. 846-848.) 4 Peo

1989In May 1988, a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend as to those counts, and a motion to strike was granted as to those portions of the unlawful business practices count which incorporated the allegations of counts two and three. 3 The Cutter court then held that the constitutional right to privacy outweighed the policies underlying “the judicial proceedings immunity” of Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2, when private material was voluntarily published, without resort to a prior judicial determination of the need for disclosure. ( Cutter, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at pp. 846-848.) 4 Peo

1987Paul Title Co. v. Meier (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 948 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 538 ]; Fox v. Pollack (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 954 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 532 ].) *1332 Having concluded that the amended complaint fails to state any cause of action against Lerner, we need not determine the applicability of the judicial proceedings immunity of Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2.

1987Paul Title Co. v. Meier (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 948 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 538 ]; Fox v. Pollack (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 954 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 532 ].) *1332 Having concluded that the amended complaint fails to state any cause of action against Lerner, we need not determine the applicability of the judicial proceedings immunity of Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2.

1987Paul Title Co. v. Meier (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 948 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 538 ]; Fox v. Pollack (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 954 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 532 ].) *1332 Having concluded that the amended complaint fails to state any cause of action against Lerner, we need not determine the applicability of the judicial proceedings immunity of Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2.

1987Paul Title Co. v. Meier (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 948 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 538 ]; Fox v. Pollack (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 954 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 532 ].) *1332 Having concluded that the amended complaint fails to state any cause of action against Lerner, we need not determine the applicability of the judicial proceedings immunity of Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2.

1986(Cf., Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d 652, 657 .) Consequently, we construe section 47, subdivision 2, as providing no blanket immunity for causes of action based upon constitutional violations. *848 We have determined that the constitutional right to privacy outweighs the policies underlying the judicial proceedings immunity when private material is voluntarily published, without resort to a prior judicial determination.

1986(In re Lifschutz, supra, 2 Cal.3d 415, 435 ; Board of Trustees v. Superior Court, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 525 .) To compel compliance with the statutory provisions of the Evidence Code requiring a psychotherapist to have claimed the privilege in the action in which the information was provided as a prerequisite to application of the judicial proceedings immunity in a subsequent action against the psychotherapist does not involve factual inquiries into a witness’ motives or truthfulness.

1986(In re Lifschutz, supra, 2 Cal.3d 415, 435 ; Board of Trustees v. Superior Court, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 525 .) To compel compliance with the statutory provisions of the Evidence Code requiring a psychotherapist to have claimed the privilege in the action in which the information was provided as a prerequisite to application of the judicial proceedings immunity in a subsequent action against the psychotherapist does not involve factual inquiries into a witness’ motives or truthfulness.

1985Underlying the privilege is the vital public policy of affording free access to *365 the courts and facilitating the crucial functions of the finder of fact. ( Kachig v. Boothe, supra, 22 Cal. App.3d 626, 641 .) "The resulting lack of any really effective civil remedy against perjurers is simply part of the price that is paid for witnesses who are free from intimidation by the possibility of civil liability for what they say." (Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) p. 778.) This policy is equally compelling in the context of common law and statutory claims for invasion of privacy; there is no v