complex factors (Alabama) · Go Syfert
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complex factors in Alabama

5 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2012 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
Bolton v. Boltongreen
alacivapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009Instead, those cases explain that in *1094 dividing marital property the trial court undertakes a complex analysis of numerous factual components, including: "`[T]he future prospects of the parties; their ages, health, and stations in life; the length of their marriage; the source, value and type of property owned; the standard of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage and the potential for maintaining that standard; and, in appropriate situations, the conduct of the parties with reference to the cause of the divorce.'" Adams v. Adams, 778 So.2d 825, 827 (Ala. C

2009Instead, those cases explain that in dividing marital property the trial court undertakes a complex analysis of numerous factual components, including: “ ‘[T]he future prospects of the parties; their ages, health, and stations in life; the length of their marriage; the source, value and type of property owned; the standard of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage and the potential for maintaining that standard; and, in appropriate situations, the conduct of the parties with reference to the cause of the divorce.’ ” Adams v. Adams, 778 So.2d 825, 827 (Ala.Civ.Ap

11
Adams v. Adamsgreen
alacivapp · 2000 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009Instead, those cases explain that in *1094 dividing marital property the trial court undertakes a complex analysis of numerous factual components, including: "`[T]he future prospects of the parties; their ages, health, and stations in life; the length of their marriage; the source, value and type of property owned; the standard of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage and the potential for maintaining that standard; and, in appropriate situations, the conduct of the parties with reference to the cause of the divorce.'" Adams v. Adams, 778 So.2d 825, 827 (Ala. C

2009Instead, those cases explain that in dividing marital property the trial court undertakes a complex analysis of numerous factual components, including: “ ‘[T]he future prospects of the parties; their ages, health, and stations in life; the length of their marriage; the source, value and type of property owned; the standard of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage and the potential for maintaining that standard; and, in appropriate situations, the conduct of the parties with reference to the cause of the divorce.’ ” Adams v. Adams, 778 So.2d 825, 827 (Ala.Civ.Ap

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead green
scotus · 1962
2 sentences

2012The phrase actually used in Penn Central was ‘distinct investment-backed expectations.’ Penn Central cited Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 , 82 S.Ct. 987 , 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962), as the source of this factor, but no phrasing similar to it is used at the page cited or anywhere else in the Goldblatt opinion.

2012The phrase actually used in Penn Central was ‘distinct investment-backed expectations.’ Penn Central cited Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 , 82 S.Ct. 987 , 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962), as the source of this factor, but no phrasing similar to it is used at the page cited or anywhere else in the Goldblatt opinion.

12012–2012
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency green
scotus · 2002
2 sentences

2012“In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, supra, the Court explained that ‘[t]he Penn Central analysis involves “a complex of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.” ’ 535 U.S. at 315 n. 10, 122 S.Ct. 1465 , 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 , 150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001)).

2012“In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, supra, the Court explained that ‘[t]he Penn Central analysis involves “a complex of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.” ’ 535 U.S. at 315 n. 10, 122 S.Ct. 1465 , 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 , 150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001)).

12012–2012
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island green
scotus · 2001
2 sentences

2012“In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, supra, the Court explained that ‘[t]he Penn Central analysis involves “a complex of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.” ’ 535 U.S. at 315 n. 10, 122 S.Ct. 1465 , 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 , 150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001)).

2012“In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, supra, the Court explained that ‘[t]he Penn Central analysis involves “a complex of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.” ’ 535 U.S. at 315 n. 10, 122 S.Ct. 1465 , 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 , 150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001)).

12012–2012
Clayton v. State green
alactapp · 1969
2 sentences

1984The trial judge is characterized as *Page 863 having exercised a "roughshod manner . . . in refusing to continue the trial . . . pending discovery of any and all exculpatory material . . ., or the location of any and all witnesses who could aid in the presentation of the complex defense such as entrapment." "The reversal of a conviction because of the refusal of the trial judge to grant a continuance requires `a positive demonstration of abuse of judicial discretion.' Clayton v. State , 45 Ala. App. 127 , 129 , 226 So.2d 671 , 672 (1969)." Beauregard v. State , 372 So.2d 37 , 43 (Ala.Cr.App.),

1984The trial judge is characterized as *Page 863 having exercised a "roughshod manner . . . in refusing to continue the trial . . . pending discovery of any and all exculpatory material . . ., or the location of any and all witnesses who could aid in the presentation of the complex defense such as entrapment." "The reversal of a conviction because of the refusal of the trial judge to grant a continuance requires `a positive demonstration of abuse of judicial discretion.' Clayton v. State , 45 Ala. App. 127 , 129 , 226 So.2d 671 , 672 (1969)." Beauregard v. State , 372 So.2d 37 , 43 (Ala.Cr.App.),

11984–1984
Beauregard v. State green
alacrimapp · 1979
1 sentence

1984The trial judge is characterized as *Page 863 having exercised a "roughshod manner . . . in refusing to continue the trial . . . pending discovery of any and all exculpatory material . . ., or the location of any and all witnesses who could aid in the presentation of the complex defense such as entrapment." "The reversal of a conviction because of the refusal of the trial judge to grant a continuance requires `a positive demonstration of abuse of judicial discretion.' Clayton v. State , 45 Ala. App. 127 , 129 , 226 So.2d 671 , 672 (1969)." Beauregard v. State , 372 So.2d 37 , 43 (Ala.Cr.App.),

11984–1984
Ex Parte Beauregard green
ala · 1979
1 sentence

1984The trial judge is characterized as *Page 863 having exercised a "roughshod manner . . . in refusing to continue the trial . . . pending discovery of any and all exculpatory material . . ., or the location of any and all witnesses who could aid in the presentation of the complex defense such as entrapment." "The reversal of a conviction because of the refusal of the trial judge to grant a continuance requires `a positive demonstration of abuse of judicial discretion.' Clayton v. State , 45 Ala. App. 127 , 129 , 226 So.2d 671 , 672 (1969)." Beauregard v. State , 372 So.2d 37 , 43 (Ala.Cr.App.),

11984–1984
Tucker v. State green
alacrimapp · 1983
1 sentence

1984"This Court must determine whether or not there has been an abuse of discretion in light of the circumstances of each case, looking particularly to those reasons the defendant presented to the trial judge." Tucker v. State , 429 So.2d 1165 , 1169 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983).

11984–1984
City of Mobile v. Havard green
ala · 1972
2 sentences

1980That case, City of Mobile v. Havard , 289 Ala. 532 , 268 So.2d 805 (1972), was a negligence case.

1980That case, City of Mobile v. Havard , 289 Ala. 532 , 268 So.2d 805 (1972), was a negligence case.

11980–1980
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc. green
scotus · 1979
2 sentences

1979In Wolston v. Readers Digest Association, Inc., ___ U.S. ____, 99 S.Ct. 2701 , 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979), the Supreme Court held that a "libel defendant must show more than mere newsworthiness to justify application of the demanding burden of New York Times . " Wolston, supra, employed a complex analysis in determining whether one is a "limited-purpose public figure." First, did the party voluntarily thrust or inject himself into the forefront of the public controversy surrounding the alleged libelous statements?

1979In Wolston v. Readers Digest Association, Inc., ___ U.S. ____, 99 S.Ct. 2701 , 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979), the Supreme Court held that a "libel defendant must show more than mere newsworthiness to justify application of the demanding burden of New York Times . " Wolston, supra, employed a complex analysis in determining whether one is a "limited-purpose public figure." First, did the party voluntarily thrust or inject himself into the forefront of the public controversy surrounding the alleged libelous statements?

11979–1979

Where else courts name it

CA 46 (1975–2026) NJ 21 (1957–2026) IL 17 (1962–2008) PA 12 (1986–2021) DC 11 (1978–2024) TX 10 (2005–2020) FL 8 (1984–2016) MI 7 (1976–2017) RI 7 (1976–2010) UT 6 (1993–2017) CO 6 (1990–2025) NY 5 (1951–2018) MA 5 (1987–2025) AL 5 (1979–2012) IN 5 (1986–2025) ME 5 (2001–2017) OH 4 (2005–2019) LA 4 (1992–2005) AZ 4 (2004–2016) CT 4 (1991–2024) WA 3 (1978–1997) NM 3 (1990–2017) OR 3 (1994–2021) AR 2 (1997–2003) SC 2 (2003–2013) ND 2 (2001–2001) AK 2 (2016–2016) HI 2 (2017–2018) TN 2 (2016–2021) NC 2 (2001–2007)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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