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46 California opinions name it 4 courts 1975–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Board of Equalizationgreen2 sentences2022A court assessing the value of an interpretation must consider a complex of factors material to the substantive legal issue before it . . . .” (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 12 (Yamaha), italics omitted.) Among the 20 factors courts should consider are whether the interpretation was “prepared for litigation” (Wiseman Park, LLC v. Southern Glazer’s Wine & Spirits, LLC (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 110, 118, fn. 9 .) In any event, “ ‘[a] court is more likely to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation than to its interpretation of a statute, s 2019We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. ( Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512 , 527, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 327 , 235 P.3d 988 .) "Deference to administrative interpretations always is 'situational' and depends on 'a complex of factors' **91 [citation], but where the agency has special expertise and its decision is carefully considered by senior agency officials, that decision is entitled to correspondingly greater weight." ( Sharon S. , supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 436 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 699 , 73 P.3d 554 .) Where an agency's action is "quasi-legislative" or "the substantive product | 9 | 17 |
Sharon S. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021(See Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services (2021) 11 Cal.5th 158 , 179.) It is true that “[d]eference to administrative interpretations always is ‘situational’ and depends on ‘a complex of factors’ [citation], but where the agency has special expertise and its decision is carefully considered by senior agency officials, that decision is entitled to 22 BUSKER v. WABTEC CORPORATION Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. correspondingly greater weight.” (Sharon S. v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 417, 436 .) We need not be drawn too deeply into this thicket. 2019We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. ( Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512 , 527, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 327 , 235 P.3d 988 .) "Deference to administrative interpretations always is 'situational' and depends on 'a complex of factors' **91 [citation], but where the agency has special expertise and its decision is carefully considered by senior agency officials, that decision is entitled to correspondingly greater weight." ( Sharon S. , supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 436 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 699 , 73 P.3d 554 .) Where an agency's action is "quasi-legislative" or "the substantive product | 3 | 6 |
Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016(See Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 339 [“For decades, ‘[t]his court has urged trial courts to be procedurally innovative’ [citation] in managing class actions”]; compare Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 28 [“class treatment is not appropriate ‘if every member of the alleged class would be required to litigate numerous and substantial questions determining his individual right to recover following the “class judgment” on common issues’ ”], italics added.) 20 certification hearing, the court remarked, “I don’t know why we have Saint Francis in the case at all. 2016(See Sav-On, supra. 34 Cal.4th at p. 339 [“For decades, ‘[t]his court has urged trial courts to be procedurally innovative’ [citation] in managing class actions”]; cf. Duran, supra. 59 Cal.4th at p. 28 [“class treatment is not appropriate ‘if every member of the alleged class would be required to litigate numerous and *1220 substantial questions determining his individual right to recover following the “class judgment” ’ on common issues” (italics added)].) 12 As one may not recover twice for the same injury (see, e.g., Renda v. Nevarez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1231 , 1237 & fn. 4 [ 167 Cal.Rptr | 2 | 2 |
Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.green2 sentences2016(See Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 339 [“For decades, ‘[t]his court has urged trial courts to be procedurally innovative’ [citation] in managing class actions”]; compare Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 28 [“class treatment is not appropriate ‘if every member of the alleged class would be required to litigate numerous and substantial questions determining his individual right to recover following the “class judgment” on common issues’ ”], italics added.) 20 certification hearing, the court remarked, “I don’t know why we have Saint Francis in the case at all. 2016(See Sav-On, supra. 34 Cal.4th at p. 339 [“For decades, ‘[t]his court has urged trial courts to be procedurally innovative’ [citation] in managing class actions”]; cf. Duran, supra. 59 Cal.4th at p. 28 [“class treatment is not appropriate ‘if every member of the alleged class would be required to litigate numerous and *1220 substantial questions determining his individual right to recover following the “class judgment” ’ on common issues” (italics added)].) 12 As one may not recover twice for the same injury (see, e.g., Renda v. Nevarez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1231 , 1237 & fn. 4 [ 167 Cal.Rptr | 2 | 2 |
Styne v. Stevensgreen2 sentences2011(McGraw v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 490, 493 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 620 ]; accord, Woosley v. State of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 758, 776 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 30 , 838 P.2d 758 ].) “Deference to administrative interpretations always is ‘situational’ and depends on ‘a complex of factors’ [citation], but where the agency has special expertise and its decision is carefully considered by senior agency officials, that decision is entitled to correspondingly greater weight . . . .” (Sharon S. v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 417, 436 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 699 , 73 P.3d 554 ], citing Ya 2011(McGraw v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 490, 493 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 620 ]; accord, Woosley v. State of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 758, 776 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 30 , 838 P.2d 758 ].) “Deference to administrative interpretations always is ‘situational’ and depends on ‘a complex of factors’ [citation], but where the agency has special expertise and its decision is carefully considered by senior agency officials, that decision is entitled to correspondingly greater weight . . . .” (Sharon S. v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 417, 436 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 699 , 73 P.3d 554 ], citing Ya | 2 | 2 |
Palazzolo v. Rhode Islandgreen2 sentences2025A categorical regulatory taking will occur where a government regulation deprives the owner of all economically beneficial uses. (640 Tenth, at p. 860.) This type of regulatory taking is an “extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted.” (Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) 535 U.S. 302, 330 .) But “ ‘[w]here a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the 2020(Lingle, at p. 537.) To determine whether a regulation has gone “too far,” courts usually—rather than apply per se rules—consider “a complex of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.” (Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606, 617 .) Apart from these two general categories of takings, the Supreme Court has also identified a “special” category of takings claims for “land-use exactions.” (Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 538 .) | 1 | 7 |
City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2018(See, e.g., Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 631 , 639, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 155 ; City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 999 , 1002, 1007, 244 Cal.Rptr. 105 .) Finally, the fortuitous presence of Dr. Whitehill on the scene of Hass's collapse does not necessarily make any potential RhodyCo negligence immaterial. 2018(See, e.g., Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 631 , 639, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 155 ; City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 999 , 1002, 1007, 244 Cal.Rptr. 105 .) Finally, the fortuitous presence of Dr. Whitehill on the scene of Hass's collapse does not necessarily make any potential RhodyCo negligence immaterial. | 1 | 2 |
In Re Retirement Casesgreen2 sentences2007Imposing liability for lost punitive damages on negligent attorneys would therefore neither punish the culpable tortfeasor [citation] ... nor deter that tortfeasor and others from committing similar wrongful acts in the future." ( Ferguson, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 1046-1047, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 46 , 69 P.3d 965 .) The court also concluded "permitting recovery of lost punitive damages would violate the public policy against speculative damages" ( id. at p. 1048, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 46 , 69 P.3d 965 ), "the complex standard of proof applicable to claims for lost punitive damages militates against the r 2007Imposing liability for lost punitive damages on negligent attorneys would therefore neither punish the culpable tortfeasor [citation] ... nor deter that tortfeasor and others from committing similar wrongful acts in the future." ( Ferguson, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 1046-1047, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 46 , 69 P.3d 965 .) The court also concluded "permitting recovery of lost punitive damages would violate the public policy against speculative damages" ( id. at p. 1048, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 46 , 69 P.3d 965 ), "the complex standard of proof applicable to claims for lost punitive damages militates against the r | 1 | 2 |
Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc.green1 sentence2024Defendants are not liable unless their conduct … was a “legal cause” of plaintiff’s injury.’ ” (Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 696 (Whiteley).) The “substantial factor” test for causation is appropriate in all tort actions. | 1 | 1 |
Wiseman Park, LLC v. S. Glazer's Wine & Spirits, LLCgreen1 sentence2022A court assessing the value of an interpretation must consider a complex of factors material to the substantive legal issue before it . . . .” (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 12 (Yamaha), italics omitted.) Among the 20 factors courts should consider are whether the interpretation was “prepared for litigation” (Wiseman Park, LLC v. Southern Glazer’s Wine & Spirits, LLC (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 110, 118, fn. 9 .) In any event, “ ‘[a] court is more likely to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation than to its interpretation of a statute, s | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gilmangreen1 sentence2021(See People v. Gilman, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at p. 762 [Robinson’s jury found him guilty of conspiracy to commit mayhem and assault with a caustic substance and found true as to the conspiracy count the section 12022.7 great bodily injury enhancement].) Based on the limited record before us, it is impossible to conduct what the Attorney General properly describes as “a complex analysis of whether the theories in the two trials are irreconcilable and whether the prosecution acted in bad faith” to conclude the section 12022.7 enhancement was improperly pleaded and argued in Savage’s trial in vio | 1 | 1 |
Diablo Valley College Faculty Senate v. Contra Costa Community College Districtgreen2 sentences2017A court is more likely to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation than to its interpretation of a statute, since the agency is likely to be intimately familiar with regulations it authored and sensitive to the practical implications of one interpretation over another.’ [Citation.] The second group of factors . . .—those suggesting the agency’s interpretation is likely to be correct—includes indications of careful consideration by senior agency officials (‘an interpretation of a statute contained in a regulation adopted after public notice and comment is more deserving of defe 2017A court is more likely to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation than to its interpretation of a statute, since the agency is likely to be intimately familiar with regulations it authored and sensitive to the practical implications of one interpretation over another.’ [Citation.] The second group of factors . . .—those suggesting the agency’s interpretation is likely to be correct—includes indications of careful consideration by senior agency officials (‘an interpretation of a statute contained in a regulation adopted after public notice and comment is more deserving of defe | 1 | 1 |
| Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n, Local 104 v. Duncangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Woosley v. State of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| California Highway Patrol v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McGraw v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson Cityred | 1 | 1 |
| Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Skidmore v. Swift & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Wiley v. County of San Diegogreen | 1 | 1 |
| County of Orange v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Pacific Bell v. Public Utilities Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Fernandezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wetmorered | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc.
green
2 sentences2020(Lingle, at p. 537.) To determine whether a regulation has gone “too far,” courts usually—rather than apply per se rules—consider “a complex of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.” (Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606, 617 .) Apart from these two general categories of takings, the Supreme Court has also identified a “special” category of takings claims for “land-use exactions.” (Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 538 .) 2020(Lingle, at p. 537.) To determine whether a regulation has gone “too far,” courts usually—rather than apply per se rules—consider “a complex of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.” (Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606, 617 .) Apart from these two general categories of takings, the Supreme Court has also identified a “special” category of takings claims for “land-use exactions.” (Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 538 .) | 4 | 2019–2020 |
Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd.
green
2 sentences2025(See § 10721, subds. (r), (v), (w), (x).) The groundwater plans can include such actions as the monitoring and management of groundwater levels, quality, and land subsidence, as well as mitigation of overdraft and groundwater recharging. (§ 10727.2, subd. (d).) A cornerstone of the Act “is a transfer of responsibility for groundwater management from the state to local jurisdictions when possible.” (Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 844, 863 .) Thus, the Act generally requires actions by local groundwater agencies, which are then subject to 2025(See § 10721, subds. (r), (v), (w), (x).) The groundwater plans can include such actions as the monitoring and management of groundwater levels, quality, and land subsidence, as well as mitigation of overdraft and groundwater recharging. (§ 10727.2, subd. (d).) A cornerstone of the Act “is a transfer of responsibility for groundwater management from the state to local jurisdictions when possible.” (Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 844, 863 .) Thus, the Act generally requires actions by local groundwater agencies, which are then subject to | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Christensen v. Lightbourne
green
2 sentences2021The California Supreme Court recently summarized the guiding principles for review of cases such as this, as follows: “‘Deference to administrative interpretations always is “situational” and depends on “a complex of factors” [citation], but where the agency had special expertise and its decision is carefully considered by senior agency officials, that decision is entitled to correspondingly greater weight.’ [Citation.] Where an agency’s action is ‘quasi-legislative’ or ‘the substantive product of a delegated legislative power conferred on the agency,’ the scope of our review is ‘limited to de 2019The bill applies to policies issued or delivered on or after January 1, 2013, not before." Also, in a July 2016 e-mail, attorney Tick informed an inquiring attorney that the Department had issued a SERFF instruction on this issue when the legislation was newly enacted, and added that Assembly Bill No. 1747 "applies to new policies issued on or after [January 1, 2013, but] not to policies renewed on or after [January 1, 2013]." The California Supreme Court recently reminded us of the weight to accord to an agency's interpretation of law: " 'Deference to administrative interpretations always is | 2 | 2019–2021 |
Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP
green
2 sentences2020To support its decision that lost punitive damages could not be recovered in a legal malpractice action, the court stated, “the complex standard of proof applicable to claims for lost punitive damages militates against the recovery of such damages.” (Ferguson, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1049 .) The court acknowledged “the standards of proof governing compensatory and punitive damages are different” and compared the preponderance of the evidence standard in Evidence Code section 115 with the clear and convincing evidence standard in Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a). ( Ferguson, supra, at p 2020To support its decision that lost punitive damages could not be recovered in a legal malpractice action, the court stated, “the complex standard of proof applicable to claims for lost punitive damages militates against the recovery of such damages.” (Ferguson, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1049 .) The court acknowledged “the standards of proof governing compensatory and punitive damages are different” and compared the preponderance of the evidence standard in Evidence Code section 115 with the clear and convincing evidence standard in Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a). ( Ferguson, supra, at p | 2 | 2007–2020 |
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County
green
2 sentences2019Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528 , 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074 , 161 L.Ed.2d 876 .) "Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. [Citation.]" ( Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606 , 617-618, 121 S.Ct. 2448 , 150 L.Ed.2d 592 .) *1194 The United States Supreme Court co 2019Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528 , 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074 , 161 L.Ed.2d 876 .) "Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. [Citation.]" ( Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606 , 617-618, 121 S.Ct. 2448 , 150 L.Ed.2d 592 .) *1194 The United States Supreme Court co | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA CA2/3
green
2 sentences2018(See, e.g., Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 631 , 639, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 155 ; City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 999 , 1002, 1007, 244 Cal.Rptr. 105 .) Finally, the fortuitous presence of Dr. Whitehill on the scene of Hass's collapse does not necessarily make any potential RhodyCo negligence immaterial. 2018(See, e.g., Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 631 , 639, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 155 ; City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 999 , 1002, 1007, 244 Cal.Rptr. 105 .) Finally, the fortuitous presence of Dr. Whitehill on the scene of Hass's collapse does not necessarily make any potential RhodyCo negligence immaterial. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Mohilef v. Janovici
green
1 sentence2026Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts.’ ” (Mohilef v. Janovici (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 267, 286 .) “[T]he extent to which due process relief will be available depends on a careful and clearly articulated balancing of the interests at stake in each context. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Bell v. Burson
green
1 sentence2026Courts have routinely found citizens have a property interest in driver’s licenses such that 6 “ ‘ “[a] driver’s license cannot be suspended without due process of law.” ’ ” (California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 517 , 529.) “This is but an application of the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a ‘right’ or a ‘privilege.’ ” (Bell v. Burson (1971) 402 U.S. 535, 539 .) What process is due is a more complex inquiry. “ ‘ “Due process” is an elusi | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Yee v. City of Escondido
green
1 sentence2025A categorical regulatory taking will occur where a government regulation deprives the owner of all economically beneficial uses. (640 Tenth, at p. 860.) This type of regulatory taking is an “extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted.” (Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) 535 U.S. 302, 330 .) But “ ‘[w]here a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
green
2 sentences2025A categorical regulatory taking will occur where a government regulation deprives the owner of all economically beneficial uses. (640 Tenth, at p. 860.) This type of regulatory taking is an “extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted.” (Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) 535 U.S. 302, 330 .) But “ ‘[w]here a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the 2025A categorical regulatory taking will occur where a government regulation deprives the owner of all economically beneficial uses. (640 Tenth, at p. 860.) This type of regulatory taking is an “extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted.” (Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) 535 U.S. 302, 330 .) But “ ‘[w]here a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the | 1 | 2025–2025 |
York v. City of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2025A categorical regulatory taking will occur where a government regulation deprives the owner of all economically beneficial uses. (640 Tenth, at p. 860.) This type of regulatory taking is an “extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted.” (Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) 535 U.S. 302, 330 .) But “ ‘[w]here a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In Re Sakarias
green
2 sentences2021(See People v. Gilman, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at p. 762 [Robinson’s jury found him guilty of conspiracy to commit mayhem and assault with a caustic substance and found true as to the conspiracy count the section 12022.7 great bodily injury enhancement].) Based on the limited record before us, it is impossible to conduct what the Attorney General properly describes as “a complex analysis of whether the theories in the two trials are irreconcilable and whether the prosecution acted in bad faith” to conclude the section 12022.7 enhancement was improperly pleaded and argued in Savage’s trial in vio 2021(See People v. Gilman, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at p. 762 [Robinson’s jury found him guilty of conspiracy to commit mayhem and assault with a caustic substance and found true as to the conspiracy count the section 12022.7 great bodily injury enhancement].) Based on the limited record before us, it is impossible to conduct what the Attorney General properly describes as “a complex analysis of whether the theories in the two trials are irreconcilable and whether the prosecution acted in bad faith” to conclude the section 12022.7 enhancement was improperly pleaded and argued in Savage’s trial in vio | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
green
1 sentence2019Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 .) The Lindstroms make no attempt to show that special condition 3.a constitutes a taking under this multifactor approach. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Reid v. Google, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. ( Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512 , 527, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 327 , 235 P.3d 988 .) "Deference to administrative interpretations always is 'situational' and depends on 'a complex of factors' **91 [citation], but where the agency has special expertise and its decision is carefully considered by senior agency officials, that decision is entitled to correspondingly greater weight." ( Sharon S. , supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 436 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 699 , 73 P.3d 554 .) Where an agency's action is "quasi-legislative" or "the substantive product 2019We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. ( Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512 , 527, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 327 , 235 P.3d 988 .) "Deference to administrative interpretations always is 'situational' and depends on 'a complex of factors' **91 [citation], but where the agency has special expertise and its decision is carefully considered by senior agency officials, that decision is entitled to correspondingly greater weight." ( Sharon S. , supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 436 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 699 , 73 P.3d 554 .) Where an agency's action is "quasi-legislative" or "the substantive product | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Association of California Insurance Companies v. Jones
green
2 sentences2019Cos. v. Jones (2017) 2 Cal.5th 376 , 397, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 395 , 386 P.3d 1188 .) At times, it is "helpful ... to imagine 'quasi-legislative' and 'interpretive' as the outer boundaries of a continuum measuring the breadth of the authority delegated by the Legislature. [Citation.] Thus, in certain circumstances, a regulation may have both quasi-legislative and interpretive characteristics - 'as when an administrative agency exercises a legislatively delegated power to interpret key statutory terms.' " ( Id. at p. 397, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 395 , 386 P.3d 1188 .) A. Section 11451.5 directs the Departme 2019Cos. v. Jones (2017) 2 Cal.5th 376 , 397, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 395 , 386 P.3d 1188 .) At times, it is "helpful ... to imagine 'quasi-legislative' and 'interpretive' as the outer boundaries of a continuum measuring the breadth of the authority delegated by the Legislature. [Citation.] Thus, in certain circumstances, a regulation may have both quasi-legislative and interpretive characteristics - 'as when an administrative agency exercises a legislatively delegated power to interpret key statutory terms.' " ( Id. at p. 397, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 395 , 386 P.3d 1188 .) A. Section 11451.5 directs the Departme | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Lanquist v. Ventura County Employees' Retirement Ass'n
green
1 sentence2017(Lanquist v. Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 186 , 192–193 [finding county retirement board interpretation of CERL provision entitled to ―due consideration‖].) As an initial matter, it is not entirely clear that Yamaha applies at all. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Company
green
2 sentences2016Yamaha as Clarified by Ramirez Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 , 978 P.2d 2 ] (Ramirez), added a key refinement to the Yamaha framework. 2016Yamaha as Clarified by Ramirez Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 , 978 P.2d 2 ] (Ramirez), added a key refinement to the Yamaha framework. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Renda v. Nevarez
green
2 sentences2016(See Sav-On, supra. 34 Cal.4th at p. 339 [“For decades, ‘[t]his court has urged trial courts to be procedurally innovative’ [citation] in managing class actions”]; cf. Duran, supra. 59 Cal.4th at p. 28 [“class treatment is not appropriate ‘if every member of the alleged class would be required to litigate numerous and *1220 substantial questions determining his individual right to recover following the “class judgment” ’ on common issues” (italics added)].) 12 As one may not recover twice for the same injury (see, e.g., Renda v. Nevarez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1231 , 1237 & fn. 4 [ 167 Cal.Rptr 2016(See Sav-On, supra. 34 Cal.4th at p. 339 [“For decades, ‘[t]his court has urged trial courts to be procedurally innovative’ [citation] in managing class actions”]; cf. Duran, supra. 59 Cal.4th at p. 28 [“class treatment is not appropriate ‘if every member of the alleged class would be required to litigate numerous and *1220 substantial questions determining his individual right to recover following the “class judgment” ’ on common issues” (italics added)].) 12 As one may not recover twice for the same injury (see, e.g., Renda v. Nevarez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1231 , 1237 & fn. 4 [ 167 Cal.Rptr | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| In Re Easterbrook green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Agnew v. Parks green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Breckenridge green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Bause v. Anthony Pools, Inc. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Thomas Haverty Co. v. Jones green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Shell v. Schmidt green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Williams v. Elliott green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Lowy v. United Pacific Insurance green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Heyer v. Flaig green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.