intent-to-kill requirement in California

2023“As to offenses committed after Carlos but before Anderson,” such as those at issue here, “due process and ex post facto principles demand that the intent-to-kill requirement apply to any felony-murder special circumstance charged in connection with such offenses.” (People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879 .) Thus, the law in effect at the time of the offenses, the jury instructions, and the special circumstance true findings establish that the jury concluded, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendan

2022(Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 153-154 , overruled by People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 , 1138- 1139; see also People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44 [“As to offenses committed after Carlos but before Anderson . . . due process and ex post facto principles demand that the intent-to-kill requirement apply to any felony-murder special circumstance charged in connection with such offenses.”].) Because the jury was instructed on the then prevailing law, its true finding on the felony-murder special circumstance included the finding that defendant intended to kill the vict

2006(People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1150 ; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 227 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 , 821 P.2d 1302 ].) “As to offenses committed after Carlos but before Anderson . . . due process and ex post facto principles demand that the intent-to-kill requirement apply to any felony-murder special circumstance charged in connection with such offenses.” (People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ]; see In re Baert (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 514, 519-522 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 418 ].) “Retroactive application of Anderson in these circumstances would depriv

2006(People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1150 ; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 227 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 , 821 P.2d 1302 ].) “As to offenses committed after Carlos but before Anderson . . . due process and ex post facto principles demand that the intent-to-kill requirement apply to any felony-murder special circumstance charged in connection with such offenses.” (People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ]; see In re Baert (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 514, 519-522 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 418 ].) “Retroactive application of Anderson in these circumstances would depriv

2023“As to offenses committed after Carlos but before Anderson,” such as those at issue here, “due process and ex post facto principles demand that the intent-to-kill requirement apply to any felony-murder special circumstance charged in connection with such offenses.” (People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879 .) Thus, the law in effect at the time of the offenses, the jury instructions, and the special circumstance true findings establish that the jury concluded, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendan

2022(Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 153-154 , overruled by People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 , 1138- 1139; see also People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44 [“As to offenses committed after Carlos but before Anderson . . . due process and ex post facto principles demand that the intent-to-kill requirement apply to any felony-murder special circumstance charged in connection with such offenses.”].) Because the jury was instructed on the then prevailing law, its true finding on the felony-murder special circumstance included the finding that defendant intended to kill the vict

1997(See, e.g., People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 227 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 , 821 P.2d 1302 ]; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 980-981 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 , 820 P.2d 214 ]; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 973, fn. 4 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 ].) The murder in this case occurred on April 13, 1986, during the “window” period.

1997(See, e.g., People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 227 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 , 821 P.2d 1302 ]; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 980-981 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 , 820 P.2d 214 ]; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 973, fn. 4 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 ].) The murder in this case occurred on April 13, 1986, during the “window” period.

2022(Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 153-154 , overruled by People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 , 1138- 1139; see also People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44 [“As to offenses committed after Carlos but before Anderson . . . due process and ex post facto principles demand that the intent-to-kill requirement apply to any felony-murder special circumstance charged in connection with such offenses.”].) Because the jury was instructed on the then prevailing law, its true finding on the felony-murder special circumstance included the finding that defendant intended to kill the vict

2006Defendant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to request an intent to kill instruction under Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131 , borders on the specious.

2006(People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1150 ; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 227 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 , 821 P.2d 1302 ].) “As to offenses committed after Carlos but before Anderson . . . due process and ex post facto principles demand that the intent-to-kill requirement apply to any felony-murder special circumstance charged in connection with such offenses.” (People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ]; see In re Baert (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 514, 519-522 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 418 ].) “Retroactive application of Anderson in these circumstances would depriv

2006(People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1150 ; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 227 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 , 821 P.2d 1302 ].) “As to offenses committed after Carlos but before Anderson . . . due process and ex post facto principles demand that the intent-to-kill requirement apply to any felony-murder special circumstance charged in connection with such offenses.” (People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ]; see In re Baert (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 514, 519-522 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 418 ].) “Retroactive application of Anderson in these circumstances would depriv

1998(People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44-45 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ]; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 227 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 , 821 P.2d 1302 ]; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 981 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 , 820 P.2d 214 ].) The reason for this last rule is that retroactive application of Anderson in those circumstances would deprive the defendant of a defense against the death penalty that the law would have permitted at the time of the crime.

1998(People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44-45 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ]; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 227 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 , 821 P.2d 1302 ]; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 981 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 , 820 P.2d 214 ].) The reason for this last rule is that retroactive application of Anderson in those circumstances would deprive the defendant of a defense against the death penalty that the law would have permitted at the time of the crime.

1984As to the Murtishaw error, the same general analysis applies to the absence of a specific intent to kill instruction, since the jury was properly instructed on express malice and there was no reasonable basis for concluding the jury found otherwise than that Acero had the specific intent to kill as he pummeled the stabbed victim with the rifle butt (People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 584, fn. 13 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 266 , 639 P.2d 908 ]; People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 765 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 738 , 631 P.2d 446 ]).

1984As to the Murtishaw error, the same general analysis applies to the absence of a specific intent to kill instruction, since the jury was properly instructed on express malice and there was no reasonable basis for concluding the jury found otherwise than that Acero had the specific intent to kill as he pummeled the stabbed victim with the rifle butt (People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 584, fn. 13 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 266 , 639 P.2d 908 ]; People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 765 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 738 , 631 P.2d 446 ]).

2003Defendant argues that, even though the evidence to support his proposed instructions was sparse, under Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 [ 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 ] and Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376 [ 106 S.Ct. 689 , 88 L.Ed.2d 704 ], an intent to kill instruction is required whenever the other instructions permit the jury to impose the death penalty on a defendant “without ever finding that he had killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill.” (Cabana, at p. 382 [106 S.Ct. at p. 695].) The Attorney General, citing Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 154 [ 107 S.Ct. 16

2003Defendant argues that, even though the evidence to support his proposed instructions was sparse, under Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 [ 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 ] and Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376 [ 106 S.Ct. 689 , 88 L.Ed.2d 704 ], an intent to kill instruction is required whenever the other instructions permit the jury to impose the death penalty on a defendant “without ever finding that he had killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill.” (Cabana, at p. 382 [106 S.Ct. at p. 695].) The Attorney General, citing Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 154 [ 107 S.Ct. 16

2025(See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal. 5th 433, 447-448, 461-464 .) “This requires proof the jury found the defendant harbored the necessary intent and he committed the necessary act or acts to be guilty under a presently valid theory.” (People v. Kelly (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 162 , 170 (Kelly), second italics added, review granted Nov. 26, 2024, S287341.) Jackson argues the jury’s true special circumstance findings “do not establish that that jury found [him] guilty of the Castaneda and Treas murders under a currently valid theory of murder” because the instructions allowed the jury to find him guilty of

2025(See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal. 5th 433, 447-448, 461-464 .) “This requires proof the jury found the defendant harbored the necessary intent and he committed the necessary act or acts to be guilty under a presently valid theory.” (People v. Kelly (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 162 , 170 (Kelly), second italics added, review granted Nov. 26, 2024, S287341.) Jackson argues the jury’s true special circumstance findings “do not establish that that jury found [him] guilty of the Castaneda and Treas murders under a currently valid theory of murder” because the instructions allowed the jury to find him guilty of

2005(Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 153-154 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 79 , 672 P.2d 862 ].) Although we overruled Carlos in People v. Anderson[, supra], 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 , holding that the intent-to-kill requirement applied only to an accomplice [and] not to the actual killer, Carlos remained applicable to [(and the trial court was required to instruct the jury on)] intent to kill in . . . all cases involving a defendant charged with a felony-murder special circumstance if the offense was committed during the ‘window’ period between our decisions in Carlos and Anderson. [Citations.]” (Pe

1998“As to offenses committed after Carlos but before Anderson , however, due process and ex post facto principles demand that the intent-to-kill requirement apply to any felony-murder special circumstance charged in connection with such offenses.” (People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ]; see also People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 41-44 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84 , 931 P.2d 262 ].) Defendant committed his crimes within the so-called Carlos “window period,” that is, between our decision in Carlos and its subsequent overruling in Anderson .

2003Defendant argues that, even though the evidence to support his proposed instructions was sparse, under Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 [ 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 ] and Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376 [ 106 S.Ct. 689 , 88 L.Ed.2d 704 ], an intent to kill instruction is required whenever the other instructions permit the jury to impose the death penalty on a defendant “without ever finding that he had killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill.” (Cabana, at p. 382 [106 S.Ct. at p. 695].) The Attorney General, citing Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 154 [ 107 S.Ct. 16

2003Defendant argues that, even though the evidence to support his proposed instructions was sparse, under Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 [ 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 ] and Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376 [ 106 S.Ct. 689 , 88 L.Ed.2d 704 ], an intent to kill instruction is required whenever the other instructions permit the jury to impose the death penalty on a defendant “without ever finding that he had killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill.” (Cabana, at p. 382 [106 S.Ct. at p. 695].) The Attorney General, citing Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 154 [ 107 S.Ct. 16

2023(People v. Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1, 45 [finding where there is evidence the defendant was an accomplice courts must instruct, and the jury must find, the appropriate mental state required for accomplices]; People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117-1118 [same].) The intent to kill requirement for an accomplice can be provided by a CALJIC No. 8.80.1 instruction for the special 10 circumstances if the defendant was not the actual killer.

2023(People v. Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1, 45 [finding where there is evidence the defendant was an accomplice courts must instruct, and the jury must find, the appropriate mental state required for accomplices]; People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117-1118 [same].) The intent to kill requirement for an accomplice can be provided by a CALJIC No. 8.80.1 instruction for the special 10 circumstances if the defendant was not the actual killer.

2023(People v. Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1, 45 [finding where there is evidence the defendant was an accomplice courts must instruct, and the jury must find, the appropriate mental state required for accomplices]; People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117-1118 [same].) The intent to kill requirement for an accomplice can be provided by a CALJIC No. 8.80.1 instruction for the special 10 circumstances if the defendant was not the actual killer.

2023(People v. Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1, 45 [finding where there is evidence the defendant was an accomplice courts must instruct, and the jury must find, the appropriate mental state required for accomplices]; People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117-1118 [same].) The intent to kill requirement for an accomplice can be provided by a CALJIC No. 8.80.1 instruction for the special 10 circumstances if the defendant was not the actual killer.

2016(See People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 575 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586 , 904 P.2d 1197 ] [Prop. 115 “eliminated the former, judicially imposed requirement that a jury find intent to kill in order to sustain a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation against a defendant who was not the actual killer”].) CALCRIM’s introductory special circumstances instructions, Nos. 702 and 703, spell out the differing intent to kill requirements for defendants who are actual killers and those who are accomplices.

2016(See People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 575 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586 , 904 P.2d 1197 ] [Prop. 115 “eliminated the former, judicially imposed requirement that a jury find intent to kill in order to sustain a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation against a defendant who was not the actual killer”].) CALCRIM’s introductory special circumstances instructions, Nos. 702 and 703, spell out the differing intent to kill requirements for defendants who are actual killers and those who are accomplices.

2011“Failure to object to instructional error forfeits the issue on appeal unless the error affects defendant’s substantial rights. [Citations.] The question is whether the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]. [Citation.]” (People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 927 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 903 ] (Anderson).) We find no error, much less a miscarriage of justice. “ ‘Under settled canons of statutory construction, in construing a statute we ascertain the Legislature’s intent in order to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We m

2011“Failure to object to instructional error forfeits the issue on appeal unless the error affects defendant’s substantial rights. [Citations.] The question is whether the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]. [Citation.]” (People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 927 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 903 ] (Anderson).) We find no error, much less a miscarriage of justice. “ ‘Under settled canons of statutory construction, in construing a statute we ascertain the Legislature’s intent in order to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We m

2011“Failure to object to instructional error forfeits the issue on appeal unless the error affects defendant’s substantial rights. [Citations.] The question is whether the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]. [Citation.]” (People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 927 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 903 ] (Anderson).) We find no error, much less a miscarriage of justice. “ ‘Under settled canons of statutory construction, in construing a statute we ascertain the Legislature’s intent in order to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We m

2011“Failure to object to instructional error forfeits the issue on appeal unless the error affects defendant’s substantial rights. [Citations.] The question is whether the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]. [Citation.]” (People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 927 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 903 ] (Anderson).) We find no error, much less a miscarriage of justice. “ ‘Under settled canons of statutory construction, in construing a statute we ascertain the Legislature’s intent in order to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We m

2009“Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.” (People v. Superior Court (Decker) (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1, 7 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 421 , 157 P.3d 1017 ].) The main issue before us on review concerns the nature of the intent-to-kill requirement.

2009“Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.” (People v. Superior Court (Decker) (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1, 7 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 421 , 157 P.3d 1017 ].) The main issue before us on review concerns the nature of the intent-to-kill requirement.