time of the dispositional hearing in California

2021The opinion in this matter, filed November 15, 2021, is modified by adding the following four paragraphs after the final paragraph of the opinion (page 19): In any event, father’s contentions lack merit. “[T]o remove a child from a parent, DCFS must prove by clear and convincing evidence that, at the time of the dispositional hearing, ‘a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor’ exists, and that there are ‘no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s p

2021The opinion in this matter, filed November 15, 2021, is modified by adding the following four paragraphs after the final paragraph of the opinion (page 19): In any event, father’s contentions lack merit. “[T]o remove a child from a parent, DCFS must prove by clear and convincing evidence that, at the time of the dispositional hearing, ‘a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor’ exists, and that there are ‘no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s p

2026However, as this court has explained, “ ‘[n]ot every change in circumstance can justify modification of a prior order,’ ” and “[t]he change in circumstances supporting a section 388 petition must be material.” (In re N.F. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112 , 120-121; see In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223 [“To support a section 388 petition, the change in circumstances must be substantial.”].) 9 The record here shows that, at the time of the dispositional hearing on the supplemental petition, Mother had already completed the parenting and domestic violence classes required as part of her

2024In our view, neither of these facts were sufficient to constitute a prima facie showing of changed circumstances warranting modification of the juvenile court’s prior visitation order. 4 Specifically, at the time of the dispositional hearing, CFS had already notified the juvenile court that (1) Mother had completed a nurturing parent course in 2022; (2) Mother’s related criminal proceeding had been resolved; (3) Mother was actively participating in an extensive child abuse program as part of the terms of her probation; and (4) the criminal protective order in favor of D.T. had been modified to

2023(See In re John M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1570 [“By the time of the dispositional hearing, John was nearly 14 years old.

2015In any event, even if X.B. had expressed an independent, uninfluenced desire to remain with his maternal family, the seven-year-old child’s preference is not clear and convincing evidence of emotional detriment. “[A] child’s preference is not the deciding factor in a placement decision, even when that child is a teenager.” (In re Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1265 [“Resignation” to a particular placement “does not constitute substantial evidence of emotional detriment”]; see also In re John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1570 [“While, at [14 years of age], he was entitled to have h

2016(Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242 , 253–254.) If no finding of detriment is made with respect to a particular parent at the dispositional stage, however, that parent’s parental rights cannot be terminated at a later stage in the proceedings unless the juvenile court, at that time, makes 4 a section 361.2 finding of detriment on the basis of clear and convincing evidence.

2012(Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 , 851 P.2d 1307 ]; see § 361, subd. (c).) The dependency scheme generally entitles a parent to receive a minimum period of reunification services—six or 12 months depending on the age of the dependent child. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) Section 361.5, subdivision (b), however, sets forth certain exceptions— called reunification bypass provisions—to this “general mandate of providing reunification services.” (In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 470 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 110 ].) These enumerated “bypass” provisions are the s

2007(See In re Richard D. (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 592, 595 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 351 ] [erroneous failure to follow detention hearing procedural requirements rendered moot by subsequent jurisdiction and disposition proceedings].) Furthermore, by the time of the dispositional hearing, Sabrina and Ashley were no longer living in Alfredo’s home; they were in foster care. 8 Ordinarily, we do not address moot issues; however, in this case we reach the issue because it is important to distinguish the standards applicable to detaining dependent children in a relative’s home before the dispositional hearing and th

2007(See In re Richard D. (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 592, 595 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 351 ] [erroneous failure to follow detention hearing procedural requirements rendered moot by subsequent jurisdiction and disposition proceedings].) Furthermore, by the time of the dispositional hearing, Sabrina and Ashley were no longer living in Alfredo’s home; they were in foster care. 8 Ordinarily, we do not address moot issues; however, in this case we reach the issue because it is important to distinguish the standards applicable to detaining dependent children in a relative’s home before the dispositional hearing and th

2004(See generally In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413-414 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 683 , 73 P.3d 541 ] [normal rules precluding consideration of new evidence on appeal apply equally in juvenile dependency cases].) Yet “we cannot simply unwind a juvenile case and presume that circumstances cannot have changed in the interim.

2004(See generally In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413-414 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 683 , 73 P.3d 541 ] [normal rules precluding consideration of new evidence on appeal apply equally in juvenile dependency cases].) Yet “we cannot simply unwind a juvenile case and presume that circumstances cannot have changed in the interim.

2004(Karen S. v. Superior Court (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1010 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 858 ].) At the time of the dispositional hearing in this case, subdivision (b) of section 361.5 provided: “Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the following: [f] . . . [f] (5) That the child was brought within the jurisdiction of the court under subdivision (e) of Section 300 because of the conduct of that parent or guardian. [][] (6) That the child has been adjudicated a dependent pursuant to

2004(Karen S. v. Superior Court (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1010 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 858 ].) At the time of the dispositional hearing in this case, subdivision (b) of section 361.5 provided: “Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the following: [f] . . . [f] (5) That the child was brought within the jurisdiction of the court under subdivision (e) of Section 300 because of the conduct of that parent or guardian. [][] (6) That the child has been adjudicated a dependent pursuant to

2025DISCUSSION A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Courts recognize that “providing children expeditious resolutions is a core concern of the entire dependency scheme,” and that is “doubly true for the very young.” (Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 847, fn. 4 (Tonya M.).) As a general matter, when a child under the age of three is removed from the parent’s physical custody, court-ordered reunification services are provided for six months from the time of the dispositional hearing, but no longer than 12 months from the date the child entered foster care. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)

2025DISCUSSION A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Courts recognize that “providing children expeditious resolutions is a core concern of the entire dependency scheme,” and that is “doubly true for the very young.” (Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 847, fn. 4 (Tonya M.).) As a general matter, when a child under the age of three is removed from the parent’s physical custody, court-ordered reunification services are provided for six months from the time of the dispositional hearing, but no longer than 12 months from the date the child entered foster care. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)

2025(See A.H. v. Superior Court (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1062 [although perfection is not the standard, “a demonstrated lack of progress necessary for reunification . . . is absolutely relevant when the ultimate goal is expeditious resolution for the child”].) We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for substantial evidence, “resolv[ing] all conflicts in favor of the court’s determinations, and indulg[ing] all legitimate inferences to uphold its findings.” (J.H. v. Superior Court (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 530, 535 .) B Analysis In terminating Mother’s reunification services, the juvenile c

2024(In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 536 ; see also Cole C., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 917 [“The parent need not be dangerous and the child need not have been actually harmed for removal to be appropriate”].) Although Mother was still engaged in services at the time of the dispositional hearing and her two younger daughters observed she was “ ‘nicer’ ” and requested overnight visits, she was still early in the process.

2024(In re N.F., at p. 121, fn. 3; In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1072 [showing only that “the circumstances were changing” is “insufficient to warrant a hearing on a section 388 modification petition”].) At best, the fact that Mother had continued to participate in additional sessions of her 52- week child abuse program showed that circumstances might be changing, but it was not sufficient to show a material change that would warrant revisitation of any prior order.

2024(See Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 525 [“The law requires that a child remain in parental custody pending the resolution of dependency proceedings, despite the problems that led the court to take jurisdiction over the child, unless the court is clearly convinced that such a disposition would harm the child.”]; Jasmine G., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 289–290.) Accordingly, the juvenile court’s dispositional order as to mother’s request for family maintenance for children 4, 5, and 6 must be reversed and remanded for a new hearing in conformity with the statutes and California Rules of

2024(See Isabella G., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 722 [“The obligation to assess a relative’s home is triggered by the relative’s request for placement of the child.”], citing § 361.3, subd. (a).) “If an assessment of a relative’s home is pending at the time of the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court should proceed with the dispositional hearing and set a hearing under section 361.3 to review the relative placement 40 request as soon as practicable.

2024(In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1160 [alleged steps that were already known when juvenile court made its initial order cannot constitute changed circumstances].) Once the facts already presented at the time of the dispositional hearing were disregarded, Mother’s petitions actually asserted only two new facts for the juvenile court’s consideration: (1) Mother had now completed 30 (as opposed to 12) sessions of her 52-week child abuse program, and (2) the children had purportedly expressed a desire to see Mother.

2023Substantial Evidence Supports Bypass When, as we have concluded is proper, mother’s effort to treat her drug addiction is viewed starting from the time of Damion’s removal from her custody in 2001 due to that addiction through the dispositional hearing for Jayden in 2022, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that her effort was not “reasonable.” A “reasonable effort to treat” a problem means just that.10 The question is not whether the parent has “‘“cure[d]”’” or “‘abolished’” the problem (Cheryl P., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 97 ; Renee J., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p.