5 Alabama opinions name it 1 courts 2003–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Anniston v. Dempseygreen2 sentences2011See City of Anniston v. Douglas, 250 Ala. 367, 371 , 34 So.2d 467, 471 (1948) (“when a statute creates a liability to pay money and prescribes no particular form of action for its recovery, an action of debt is the appropriate remedy”), and City of Anniston v. Dempsey, 253 Ala. 597, 601 , 45 So.2d 773, 776 (1950) (“a cause of action ... for money and nothing else when the liability is fixed by law ... is in debt and the statute of limitations is six years”; citing Douglas and Ala.Code 1940, tit. 7, § 21 (now codified as Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-34)); see also State Highway Dep’t v. Oglesby, 530 So 2011See City of Anniston v. Douglas, 250 Ala. 367, 371 , 34 So.2d 467, 471 (1948) (“when a statute creates a liability to pay money and prescribes no particular form of action for its recovery, an action of debt is the appropriate remedy”), and City of Anniston v. Dempsey, 253 Ala. 597, 601 , 45 So.2d 773, 776 (1950) (“a cause of action ... for money and nothing else when the liability is fixed by law ... is in debt and the statute of limitations is six years”; citing Douglas and Ala.Code 1940, tit. 7, § 21 (now codified as Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-34)); see also State Highway Dep’t v. Oglesby, 530 So | 1 | 1 |
State Highway Department v. Oglesbygreen1 sentence2011See City of Anniston v. Douglas, 250 Ala. 367, 371 , 34 So.2d 467, 471 (1948) (“when a statute creates a liability to pay money and prescribes no particular form of action for its recovery, an action of debt is the appropriate remedy”), and City of Anniston v. Dempsey, 253 Ala. 597, 601 , 45 So.2d 773, 776 (1950) (“a cause of action ... for money and nothing else when the liability is fixed by law ... is in debt and the statute of limitations is six years”; citing Douglas and Ala.Code 1940, tit. 7, § 21 (now codified as Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-34)); see also State Highway Dep’t v. Oglesby, 530 So | 1 | 1 |
City of Anniston v. Douglasgreen2 sentences2011Although we agree with the Board that in this case there is no document, such as a promissory note, that evidences the existence of a contractual debt owed to the AIGA, “[a]n action of debt may or may not be based on contract” (Douglas, 250 Ala. at 370 , 34 So.2d at 470 ), and the AIGA’s right of recovery under the Act as it was in effect in 2003 is no less subject to § 6-2-34 for the lack of such an express agreement. 5 Based upon the foregoing facts and authorities, we conclude that the AIGA’s reimbursement claim against the Board was timely brought in October 2009, less than six years after 2011Although we agree with the Board that in this case there is no document, such as a promissory note, that evidences the existence of a contractual debt owed to the AIGA, “[a]n action of debt may or may not be based on contract” (Douglas, 250 Ala. at 370 , 34 So.2d at 470 ), and the AIGA’s right of recovery under the Act as it was in effect in 2003 is no less subject to § 6-2-34 for the lack of such an express agreement. 5 Based upon the foregoing facts and authorities, we conclude that the AIGA’s reimbursement claim against the Board was timely brought in October 2009, less than six years after | 1 | 1 |
Sussman v. Ostroffgreen2 sentences2003“We see no reason why the reimbursement claim of a workers’ compensation insurer should not be classified as that of an insurance industry creditor or why its burden should be borne by the policyholders of solvent ... insurers.” Sussman v. Ostroff, 232 N.J.Super. 306, 312-14 , 556 A.2d 1301, 1304-05 (App.Div.1989) (footnote omitted). 2003“We see no reason why the reimbursement claim of a workers’ compensation insurer should not be classified as that of an insurance industry creditor or why its burden should be borne by the policyholders of solvent ... insurers.” Sussman v. Ostroff, 232 N.J.Super. 306, 312-14 , 556 A.2d 1301, 1304-05 (App.Div.1989) (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Trott v. Brinks, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024Thus, under the holding of Trott, supra, the Fund's claim under § 25-5-11(a) is more properly categorized as one seeking reimbursement, as the Fund urges, as opposed to asserting a subrogation claim, as the estate contends and the trial court ruled. 4 Yet the question remains: did the trial court err in concluding that the Fund's reimbursement claim was untimely asserted? 2024Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-30(a), provides that "[a]ll civil actions must be commenced after the cause of action has accrued within the period prescribed in [Article 2 of Chapter 2 of Title 6] and not afterwards, unless otherwise specifically 4In certain cases preceding Trott v. Brinks, 972 So. 2d 81 (Ala. 2007), our courts, in addressing rights of recovery set forth in § 25-5-11 inuring to the benefit of an employer or a workers' compensation insurance carrier, have used the terms "reimbursement" and "subrogation" interchangeably. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Melvin v. Loats
green
1 sentence2010Although § 12-21-45(c) does afford plaintiffs, such as Kapoor, a conditional right to adduce coro- petent evidence 2 , “that a third party has asserted, or has a valid basis for asserting, a reimbursement claim” (Melvin, 23 So.3d at 670-71 ), we must disagree with Kap-oor’s contention that her testimony amounts to “competent evidence” of the existence of such a potential or actual reimbursement claim. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Apex Lines, Inc. v. Lopez
green
2 sentences2007We note, however, that in addressing the AGC Fund's claim on remand, the trial court may properly take into account, among other pertinent considerations, the following factors that were identified in two of the principal cases upon which the main opinion in Hedgemon relied: "the [employee's] culpability, if any, in allowing the overpayments to continue; the employer's negligence or lack of such negligence in making the overpayments; the [employee's] ability to repay sums to the employer; the hardship [the *Page 565 employee] would suffer if benefits were immediately cut off; and the amount of 2007We note, however, that in addressing the AGC Fund's claim on remand, the trial court may properly take into account, among other pertinent considerations, the following factors that were identified in two of the principal cases upon which the main opinion in Hedgemon relied: "the [employee's] culpability, if any, in allowing the overpayments to continue; the employer's negligence or lack of such negligence in making the overpayments; the [employee's] ability to repay sums to the employer; the hardship [the *Page 565 employee] would suffer if benefits were immediately cut off; and the amount of | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.