reimbursement claim in Texas

2025Like making a just and right division of the community property, the trial court has great discretion and resolving a reimbursement claim is “not merely a balancing of the ledgers between the marital estates.” Marin v. Marin, No. 03-22-00013-CV, 2023 WL 2776296 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 5, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. 1988)).

2022Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1988). 3 Because of a reimbursement claim’s equitable nature, the trial court considers all facts pertaining to the transaction in making its determination, and we reverse a trial court’s decision only when it abuses its discretion.

2022CODE ANN. § 3.402 (requiring a reimbursement claim to be - 21 - 04-19-00736-CV resolved using equitable principles); id. § 7.007 (authorizing the trial court to divide a reimbursement claim “in a manner the court considers just and right”); Penick, 783 S.W.2d at 198 (trial court’s broad discretion); Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 459 .

1987With respect to the reimbursement claim for the appellant’s time, toil, and talent, the “right to reimbursement is only for the value of the time, toil and effort expended to enhance the separate estate other than that reasonably necessary to manage and preserve the separate estate, for which the community did not receive adequate compensation.” Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex.1984) (Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex.1982)).

2001Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. 1984) (apparently allowed a reimbursement claim without pleading reimbursement).

2001Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. 1984) (apparently allowed a reimbursement claim without pleading reimbursement).

2016See Lucy, 162 S.W.3d at 775 (applying, this standard when the division of the estate included an alleged reimbursement claim).' When, as here, the trial.court does not sign findings of fact, we presume the *434 trial court made all necessary findings to support its judgment if those findings are supported by the evidence.

2014Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex.1988); Lucy v. Lucy, 162 S.W.3d 770, 776 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2005, no pet.).

2013Id. at 146 & n. 1 (also awarding separately a reimbursement claim to community estate from ex-wife’s estate).

2013Id. at 146 & n.1 (also awarding separately a reimbursement claim to community estate from ex-wife’s estate).

2016See Anderson, 684 S.W.2d at 675 (determining the reimbursement claim based on the enhancement in value at the time of the husband’s death); Dakan v. Dalcan, 125 Tex. 305 , 83 S.W.2d 620, 628 (1935) (noting the claim is based on the amount of enhancement “at the time of partition”).

2006In Anderson, 684 S.W.2d at 673 , the supreme court considered the proper method for calculating a reimbursement claim.

2017See Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 607 (Tex. 2008) (“If arbitrators simply misinterpret a contractual clause such as the reimbursement clause, that type of error is not one which will justify setting aside an award.”); Denbury Onshore, LLC v. Texcal Energy S. Tex., L.P., 513 S.W.3d 511, 520 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“Because the parties bargained for the arbitrator’s construction of their agreement, an arbitral decision even arguably construing or applying the contract must stand, regardless of a court’s view of its (de)merits.”); Patel v. Moin, No. 14- 15-00851-CV,

2017See Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 607 (Tex. 2008) (“If arbitrators simply misinterpret a contractual clause such as the reimbursement clause, that type of error is not one which will justify setting aside an award.”); Denbury Onshore, LLC v. Texcal Energy S. Tex., L.P., 513 S.W.3d 511, 520 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“Because the parties bargained for the arbitrator’s construction of their agreement, an arbitral decision even arguably construing or applying the contract must stand, regardless of a court’s view of its (de)merits.”); Patel v. Moin, No. 14- 15-00851-CV,

2008Although the claims are not necessarily “so intertwined” that they could not have been segregated, the State’s fee entries include only general entries, such as “reviewing/researching file(s)” and “conferring with agency personnel.” See id.; Owens v. Ousey, 241 S.W.3d 124, 134 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied).

2008Although the claims are not necessarily “so intertwined” that they could not have been segregated, the State’s fee entries include only general entries, such as “reviewing/researching file(s)” and “conferring with agency personnel.” See id.; Owens v. Ousey, 241 S.W.3d 124, 134 (Tex.App.Austin 2007, pet. denied).

2003Jensen v. Jensen , 665 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. 1984) (op. on reh’g) ; Vallone , 644 S.W.2d at 459 ; Lifshutz v. Lifshutz , 61 S.W.3d 511, 519 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).

2003Jensen v. Jensen , 665 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. 1984) (op. on reh'g); Vallone , 644 S.W.2d at 459 ; Lifshutz v. Lifshutz , 61 S.W.3d 511, 519 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).

2025See Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 893 (Tex. 2009); Jones v. Carson, No. 03-22-00086-CV, 2023 WL 3873509 , at *7 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 8, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

2021Cf. Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 893 (Tex. 2009) (emphasizing that both parties presented testimony on unpleaded claim and one party even submitted the issue in the jury charge).

2025See In re Marriage of Douthit, 573 S.W.3d 927, 932 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2019, no pet.); McCann v. McCann, 22 S.W.3d 21, 24 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 5 Separate from this testimony, Alexis also offered the testimony of the couple’s realtor, who had been their agent for both the purchase of the Adelanto House and for its sale.

2016See, e.g., McCann v, McCann, 22 S.W.3d 21, 24 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (remanding for new division of the community estate when the trial court erroneously included a $37,261 reimbursement claim in the .award of $292,750 of community property to the ap-pellee). , Accordingly, we. reverse the portion of the decree of divorce concerning the division of the marital estate and the equitable lien for Wife’s reimbursement claim.

2022Id. (citing Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965 S.W.2d 690, 703 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, pet. denied)). 6 The trial court, in its final decree of divorce, awarded Ronald reimbursement in relevant part as follows: 3 Reimbursement Claim No. 6: IT IS ORDERED that Ronald Wells is awarded the sum of $68,582.50 reflecting one-half of the community estate’s reimbursement claim for payment of items at cost for capital improvements to the real property situated at VZCR 1117, Fruitvale, Texas, confirmed as [Deborah’s] separate property herein, and secured by an equitable lien as set out above in award of property to

2006Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965 S.W.2d 690, 700 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1998, pet. denied).

2019See, e.g., Alexander Dubose, 540 S.W.3d at 584–85; Buller, 806 S.W.2d at 227 ; Alexander Dubose, 2019 WL 1181730 , at *6–7; see also Elgohary v. Herrera Partners, L.P., No. 01- 13-00193-CV, 2014 WL 2538556 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 5, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that “the turnover statute does not authorize a court to issue orders against those who are not judgment debtors or under the judgment debtor’s control”); Moon, 2011 WL 3447491 , at *6 (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by making a substantive determination that the appellant’s reimbursement cl

2019See, e.g., Alexander Dubose, 540 S.W.3d at 584–85; Buller, 806 S.W.2d at 227 ; Alexander Dubose, 2019 WL 1181730 , at *6–7; see also Elgohary v. Herrera Partners, L.P., No. 01- 13-00193-CV, 2014 WL 2538556 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 5, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that “the turnover statute does not authorize a court to issue orders against those who are not judgment debtors or under the judgment debtor’s control”); Moon, 2011 WL 3447491 , at *6 (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by making a substantive determination that the appellant’s reimbursement cl

2019See, e.g., Alexander Dubose, 540 S.W.3d at 584–85; Buller, 806 S.W.2d at 227 ; Alexander Dubose, 2019 WL 1181730 , at *6–7; see also Elgohary v. Herrera Partners, L.P., No. 01- 13-00193-CV, 2014 WL 2538556 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 5, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that “the turnover statute does not authorize a court to issue orders against those who are not judgment debtors or under the judgment debtor’s control”); Moon, 2011 WL 3447491 , at *6 (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by making a substantive determination that the appellant’s reimbursement cl

2019See, e.g., Alexander Dubose, 540 S.W.3d at 584–85; Buller, 806 S.W.2d at 227 ; Alexander Dubose, 2019 WL 1181730 , at *6–7; see also Elgohary v. Herrera Partners, L.P., No. 01- 13-00193-CV, 2014 WL 2538556 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 5, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that “the turnover statute does not authorize a court to issue orders against those who are not judgment debtors or under the judgment debtor’s control”); Moon, 2011 WL 3447491 , at *6 (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by making a substantive determination that the appellant’s reimbursement cl

2017See Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 607 (Tex. 2008) (“If arbitrators simply misinterpret a contractual clause such as the reimbursement clause, that type of error is not one which will justify setting aside an award.”); Denbury Onshore, LLC v. Texcal Energy S. Tex., L.P., 513 S.W.3d 511, 520 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“Because the parties bargained for the arbitrator’s construction of their agreement, an arbitral decision even arguably construing or applying the contract must stand, regardless of a court’s view of its (de)merits.”); Patel v. Moin, No. 14- 15-00851-CV,

2017See Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 607 (Tex. 2008) (“If arbitrators simply misinterpret a contractual clause such as the reimbursement clause, that type of error is not one which will justify setting aside an award.”); Denbury Onshore, LLC v. Texcal Energy S. Tex., L.P., 513 S.W.3d 511, 520 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“Because the parties bargained for the arbitrator’s construction of their agreement, an arbitral decision even arguably construing or applying the contract must stand, regardless of a court’s view of its (de)merits.”); Patel v. Moin, No. 14- 15-00851-CV,

2015Ed. 2d 917 (2008) (″A prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to achieve streamlined proceedings and expeditious results.″); Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995) [**47] (noting that ″the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are more generous than those of the American Arbitration Association″); cf. Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding prejudice due to discovery as ″discovery --whether meaningful or otherwise--is not available in arbitration″); Miller Brewing Co. v.

2008Co. v. Advance'd Temps., Inc., 227 S.W.3d 46, 50 (Tex.2007) ("What might otherwise be a question of fact becomes one of law when the fact is not in dispute or is conclusively established."); Hall, supra note 97, at 284 ("[A] trial court abuses its discretion [if the court] . . . fails to properly apply the law to the undisputed facts. . . ."). [105] See supra Part VI.A. [106] 258 S.W.3d at 606-07 ("But even if the Court is right and the reimbursement clause does not allow for recovery of all Defendants' litigation attorney's fees, an arbitration award would not be subject to being vacated if a

2015Co. v. Advance’d Temps., Inc., 227 S.W.3d 46, 50 (Tex. 2007) (″What might otherwise be a question of fact becomes one of law when the fact is not in dispute or is conclusively established.″); [**45] Hall, supra note 97, at 284 (″[A] trial court abuses its discretion [if the court] . . . fails to properly apply the law to the undisputed facts . . . .″). 105 See supra Part VI.A. 106 S.W.3d at (″But even if the Court is right and the reimbursement clause does not allow for recovery of all Defendants’ litigation attorney’s fees, an arbitration award would not be subject to being vacated if an arbi

2008Co. v. Advance'd Temps., Inc., 227 S.W.3d 46, 50 (Tex.2007) ("What might otherwise be a question of fact becomes one of law when the fact is not in dispute or is conclusively established."); Hall, supra note 97, at 284 ("[A] trial court abuses its discretion [if the court] . . . fails to properly apply the law to the undisputed facts. . . ."). [105] See supra Part VI.A. [106] 258 S.W.3d at 606-07 ("But even if the Court is right and the reimbursement clause does not allow for recovery of all Defendants' litigation attorney's fees, an arbitration award would not be subject to being vacated if a

2015Ed. 2d 917 (2008) (″A prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to achieve streamlined proceedings and expeditious results.″); Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995) [**47] (noting that ″the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are more generous than those of the American Arbitration Association″); cf. Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding prejudice due to discovery as ″discovery --whether meaningful or otherwise--is not available in arbitration″); Miller Brewing Co. v.

2008Co. v. Advance'd Temps., Inc., 227 S.W.3d 46, 50 (Tex.2007) ("What might otherwise be a question of fact becomes one of law when the fact is not in dispute or is conclusively established."); Hall, supra note 97, at 284 ("[A] trial court abuses its discretion [if the court] . . . fails to properly apply the law to the undisputed facts. . . ."). [105] See supra Part VI.A. [106] 258 S.W.3d at 606-07 ("But even if the Court is right and the reimbursement clause does not allow for recovery of all Defendants' litigation attorney's fees, an arbitration award would not be subject to being vacated if a

2015See Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 852 (Tex. 1992); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992).

2008See Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 852 (Tex.1992); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex.1992).

2015If arbitrators simply misinterpret a contractual clause such as the reimbursement clause, that type of error is not one which will justify setting aside an award. 5 See Wise v. Wachovia Securities, LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that in reviewing an arbitration award under the FAA, ″the issue for the court is not whether the contract interpretation is incorrect or even wacky but whether the arbitrators had failed to interpret the contract at all″).

2008If arbitrators simply misinterpret a contractual clause such as the reimbursement clause, that type of error is not one which will justify setting aside an award. 5 See Wise v. Wachovia Securities, LLQ 450 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that in reviewing an arbitration award under the FAA, “the issue for the court is not whether the contract interpretation is incorrect or even wacky but whether the arbitrators had failed to interpret the contract at all”).

2022Id. (citing Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965 S.W.2d 690, 703 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, pet. denied)). 6 The trial court, in its final decree of divorce, awarded Ronald reimbursement in relevant part as follows: 3 Reimbursement Claim No. 6: IT IS ORDERED that Ronald Wells is awarded the sum of $68,582.50 reflecting one-half of the community estate’s reimbursement claim for payment of items at cost for capital improvements to the real property situated at VZCR 1117, Fruitvale, Texas, confirmed as [Deborah’s] separate property herein, and secured by an equitable lien as set out above in award of property to

2012Id. at 239 .

2022Driskill v. Ford Motor Co., 269 S.W.3d 199, 203 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (citing King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003)). 3 Regarding a reimbursement claim, we give great latitude to the trial court in determining the value of the claim.

2012See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810 ; King Ranch, Inc., 118 S.W.3d at 751 .

2021Although Wolf asks this Court to render judgment that Nygard take nothing by his reimbursement claim, “once reversible error affecting the ‘just and right’ division of the community estate is found, the court of appeals must remand the entire community estate for a new division.” Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1985).1 Even where a reimbursement claim can be identified in the trial court’s property division, we cannot simply modify the decree by striking the reimbursement award, “because to do so would be to make a new division of the estate of the parties, a matter within the disc

2021Although Wolf asks this Court to render judgment that Nygard take nothing by his reimbursement claim, “once reversible error affecting the ‘just and right’ division of the community estate is found, the court of appeals must remand the entire community estate for a new division.” Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1985).1 Even where a reimbursement claim can be identified in the trial court’s property division, we cannot simply modify the decree by striking the reimbursement award, “because to do so would be to make a new division of the estate of the parties, a matter within the disc

2015Co. v. Advance’d Temps., Inc., 227 S.W.3d 46, 50 (Tex. 2007) (″What might otherwise be a question of fact becomes one of law when the fact is not in dispute or is conclusively established.″); [**45] Hall, supra note 97, at 284 (″[A] trial court abuses its discretion [if the court] . . . fails to properly apply the law to the undisputed facts . . . .″). 105 See supra Part VI.A. 106 S.W.3d at (″But even if the Court is right and the reimbursement clause does not allow for recovery of all Defendants’ litigation attorney’s fees, an arbitration award would not be subject to being vacated if an arbi

2015Co. v. Advance’d Temps., Inc., 227 S.W.3d 46, 50 (Tex. 2007) (″What might otherwise be a question of fact becomes one of law when the fact is not in dispute or is conclusively established.″); [**45] Hall, supra note 97, at 284 (″[A] trial court abuses its discretion [if the court] . . . fails to properly apply the law to the undisputed facts . . . .″). 105 See supra Part VI.A. 106 S.W.3d at (″But even if the Court is right and the reimbursement clause does not allow for recovery of all Defendants’ litigation attorney’s fees, an arbitration award would not be subject to being vacated if an arbi