reimbursement claim in California

2026(Crawford, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 564 ; see pt.

2026(Crawford, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 564 ; see pt.

2021(Walrath, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 920 .) Similarly, the fact that separate and community property interests have been commingled in an asset does not defeat a reimbursement claim, if the separate property interest “can be traced to its separate property source.” (Cochran, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1057 .) We understand the trial court’s statement that Duerkson “did not adequately unravel” the separate and community property interests in Windsor Way to be a factual finding that Husband did not 16 adequately trace his separate property contributions from Cebolla and Kazan to Windsor Way.

2021(Walrath, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 920 .) Similarly, the fact that separate and community property interests have been commingled in an asset does not defeat a reimbursement claim, if the separate property interest “can be traced to its separate property source.” (Cochran, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1057 .) We understand the trial court’s statement that Duerkson “did not adequately unravel” the separate and community property interests in Windsor Way to be a factual finding that Husband did not 16 adequately trace his separate property contributions from Cebolla and Kazan to Windsor Way.

2021(Walrath, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 920 .) Similarly, the fact that separate and community property interests have been commingled in an asset does not defeat a reimbursement claim, if the separate property interest “can be traced to its separate property source.” (Cochran, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1057 .) We understand the trial court’s statement that Duerkson “did not adequately unravel” the separate and community property interests in Windsor Way to be a factual finding that Husband did not 16 adequately trace his separate property contributions from Cebolla and Kazan to Windsor Way.

2021(Walrath, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 920 .) Similarly, the fact that separate and community property interests have been commingled in an asset does not defeat a reimbursement claim, if the separate property interest “can be traced to its separate property source.” (Cochran, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1057 .) We understand the trial court’s statement that Duerkson “did not adequately unravel” the separate and community property interests in Windsor Way to be a factual finding that Husband did not 16 adequately trace his separate property contributions from Cebolla and Kazan to Windsor Way.

2018As we have said, a misrepresentation claim is not preempted if a plan or administrator makes a representation to a healthcare provider that services will be covered, the provider relies on that representation and provides services, and the plan later denies a reimbursement claim after determining the services are not covered. ( Memorial Hospital, supra , 904 F.2d at p. 250 ; Silver, supra , 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 805-806, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 461 .) In that instance, the provider's suit does not relate to the ERISA plan precisely because the services provided are not covered under the plan.

2018(Memorial Hospital, supra, 904 F.2d at p. 250 ; Silver, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 805– 806.) In that instance, the provider’s suit does not relate to the ERISA plan precisely because the services provided are not covered under the plan.

2018(County of San Diego, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 81 ; §§ 17551, 17555.) “The state shall reimburse each local agency and school district for all ‘costs mandated by the state.’ ” (§ 17561, subd. (a).) If the Commission determines a statute or executive order imposes state-mandated costs, it must “adopt parameters and guidelines for reimbursement of any claims relating to the statute or executive order.” (§ 17557, subd. (a).) In adopting parameters and guidelines, the Commission “may adopt a reasonable reimbursement methodology.” (§ 17557, subd. (b).) The Commission submits the adopted parameters a

2018(County of San Diego, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 81 ; §§ 17551, 17555.) “The state shall reimburse each local agency and school district for all ‘costs mandated by the state.’ ” (§ 17561, subd. (a).) If the Commission determines a statute or executive order imposes state-mandated costs, it must “adopt parameters and guidelines for reimbursement of any claims relating to the statute or executive order.” (§ 17557, subd. (a).) In adopting parameters and guidelines, the Commission “may adopt a reasonable reimbursement methodology.” (§ 17557, subd. (b).) The Commission submits the adopted parameters a

1984Co. (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 562 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 486 ].)” (Italics added.) In accordance with Lee we find the reimbursement clause contained in the policy before us to be valid and enforceable.

1984Co. (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 562 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 486 ].)” (Italics added.) In accordance with Lee we find the reimbursement clause contained in the policy before us to be valid and enforceable.

1984Co. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 458 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 271 ], at issue was the language of a reimbursement clause in an insurance policy that is virtually identical with the language in the clause contained in the policy before us.

1984Co. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 458 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 271 ], at issue was the language of a reimbursement clause in an insurance policy that is virtually identical with the language in the clause contained in the policy before us.

2025In a footnote, the trial court rejected “Laurie’s contention” that LBS was “a community asset and/or that a Pereira interest should apply to LBS.” The trial court explained: “[A] fair reading of Pereira supports the view that where more than minimal community effort combines with a separate capital investment to increase the value of the separate investment, the court must determine the amount of the increase attributable to the capital, and the amount attributable to community effort.” (See generally Dekker, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 852 .) Although the trial court acknowledged that “commun

2025In a footnote, the trial court rejected “Laurie’s contention” that LBS was “a community asset and/or that a Pereira interest should apply to LBS.” The trial court explained: “[A] fair reading of Pereira supports the view that where more than minimal community effort combines with a separate capital investment to increase the value of the separate investment, the court must determine the amount of the increase attributable to the capital, and the amount attributable to community effort.” (See generally Dekker, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 852 .) Although the trial court acknowledged that “commun

2024(Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 561, 574 .) DISCUSSION The Sotos argue that the Education Code sections on which CalSTRS relies do not authorize a reimbursement claim against the Sotos as opposed to the third-party tortfeasors who injured Arasely.

2023The court found that such evidence did “not provide substantial evidence for tracing Husband’s separate property because it is unclear what amount of money from the sale of the [separate property house] was used to pay for construction.” (Id. at pp. 274–275, italics added.) Similarly, in Braud, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 797 , the wife’s admission that “some payments were made” from a commingled account for improvements to the family home was inadequate to support the husband’s reimbursement claim because there was no proof of the amounts expended on the improvements nor any other evidence about fu

2023The court found that such evidence did “not provide substantial evidence for tracing Husband’s separate property because it is unclear what amount of money from the sale of the [separate property house] was used to pay for construction.” (Id. at pp. 274–275, italics added.) Similarly, in Braud, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 797 , the wife’s admission that “some payments were made” from a commingled account for improvements to the family home was inadequate to support the husband’s reimbursement claim because there was no proof of the amounts expended on the improvements nor any other evidence about fu

2023(Id. at pp. 1501–1502.) Officers challenged the reimbursement requirement under section 2802, arguing “the cost of the academy is a necessary expenditure incurred as a direct consequence of the discharge of the officer’s duties.” (Id. at p. 1505.) The city argued the statute did not apply “because the training recruits receive is mandated by law under the peace officer standards and training (POST) legislation.” (Ibid.) The court of appeal concluded section 2802 was ambiguous as to an employer’s responsibility for “training costs.” (Acknowledgment Cases, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505 .) Th

2022In rejecting the districts’ reimbursement claim for those new open meeting requirements, we explained that because the “notice and agenda provisions [were merely] mandatory elements of [voluntary] programs” (Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 731 ), the districts were not legally compelled to comply with those provisions.

2022(Hove, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1272 ; Hume, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1000 .) Moreover, similar to Hove and Hume, J.M.’s payments may be subject to a reimbursement claim by Kaiser.

2022(Hove, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1272 ; Hume, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1000 .) Moreover, similar to Hove and Hume, J.M.’s payments may be subject to a reimbursement claim by Kaiser.

2021(See also S.S. v. State (Utah 1998) 972 P.2d 439 , 442 [“Payments made by a third party do not legally become the property of the recipient until after a valid settlement, which necessarily must include reimbursement to Medicaid.”].) Our conclusion is reenforced by the reimbursement clause of the Medicaid Act, which specifically requires states, in any case in which a third party has been found legally liable for medical assistance paid for by the state’s Medicaid program, to “seek reimbursement for such assistance to the extent of such legal liability.” (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(B), italics a

2018As we have said, a misrepresentation claim is not preempted if a plan or administrator makes a representation to a healthcare provider that services will be covered, the provider relies on that representation and provides services, and the plan later denies a reimbursement claim after determining the services are not covered. ( Memorial Hospital, supra , 904 F.2d at p. 250 ; Silver, supra , 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 805-806, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 461 .) In that instance, the provider's suit does not relate to the ERISA plan precisely because the services provided are not covered under the plan.

2018As we have said, a misrepresentation claim is not preempted if a plan or administrator makes a representation to a healthcare provider that services will be covered, the provider relies on that representation and provides services, and the plan later denies a reimbursement claim after determining the services are not covered. ( Memorial Hospital, supra , 904 F.2d at p. 250 ; Silver, supra , 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 805-806, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 461 .) In that instance, the provider's suit does not relate to the ERISA plan precisely because the services provided are not covered under the plan.

2016Finally, because no creditor claims proceeding under Part 8 of the Probate Code was instituted, the three-year limitation period of Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a), applied to the Department’s reimbursement claim (Maxwell-Jolly, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 363 ), with the three-year period beginning upon proper notice to the Department of the decedent’s death in compliance with section 215. ( Shewry, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 645-646.) The Department filed its lawsuit on March 29, 2013, within three years of the Holloway letter (April 6, 2010).

2016Finally, because no creditor claims proceeding under Part 8 of the Probate Code was instituted, the three-year limitation period of Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a), applied to the Department’s reimbursement claim (Maxwell-Jolly, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 363 ), with the three-year period beginning upon proper notice to the Department of the decedent’s death in compliance with section 215. ( Shewry, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 645-646.) The Department filed its lawsuit on March 29, 2013, within three years of the Holloway letter (April 6, 2010).

2010Martha contends that under In re Marriage of Peet (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 974 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 108 ] (Peet) the court had discretion to deny the reimbursement claim.

2010Martha contends that under In re Marriage of Peet (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 974 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 108 ] (Peet) the court had discretion to deny the reimbursement claim.