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5 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Meyers v. Hamilton Corp.green2 sentences1987Although a two-step jurisdictional analysis—first addressing the long-arm rule and then addressing due process—is based on established Arizona case law, e.g., Meyers v. Hamilton Corp., 143 Ariz. 249, 251 , 693 P.2d 904, 906 (1984); Manufacturers’ Lease Plans, Inc. v. Alverson Draughon College, 115 Ariz. 358, 359 , 565 P.2d 864, 865 (1977), in recent decisions our supreme court has avoided the first step and analyzed jurisdiction solely in terms of minimum contacts, recognizing that the two-step inquiry is redundant because the limits of our long-arm statute are co-extensive with those of the d 1987Although a two-step jurisdictional analysis—first addressing the long-arm rule and then addressing due process—is based on established Arizona case law, e.g., Meyers v. Hamilton Corp., 143 Ariz. 249, 251 , 693 P.2d 904, 906 (1984); Manufacturers’ Lease Plans, Inc. v. Alverson Draughon College, 115 Ariz. 358, 359 , 565 P.2d 864, 865 (1977), in recent decisions our supreme court has avoided the first step and analyzed jurisdiction solely in terms of minimum contacts, recognizing that the two-step inquiry is redundant because the limits of our long-arm statute are co-extensive with those of the d | 2 | 3 |
Manufacturers' Lease Plans, Inc. v. Alverson Draughon Collegegreen2 sentences1987Although a two-step jurisdictional analysis—first addressing the long-arm rule and then addressing due process—is based on established Arizona case law, e.g., Meyers v. Hamilton Corp., 143 Ariz. 249, 251 , 693 P.2d 904, 906 (1984); Manufacturers’ Lease Plans, Inc. v. Alverson Draughon College, 115 Ariz. 358, 359 , 565 P.2d 864, 865 (1977), in recent decisions our supreme court has avoided the first step and analyzed jurisdiction solely in terms of minimum contacts, recognizing that the two-step inquiry is redundant because the limits of our long-arm statute are co-extensive with those of the d 1987Although a two-step jurisdictional analysis—first addressing the long-arm rule and then addressing due process—is based on established Arizona case law, e.g., Meyers v. Hamilton Corp., 143 Ariz. 249, 251 , 693 P.2d 904, 906 (1984); Manufacturers’ Lease Plans, Inc. v. Alverson Draughon College, 115 Ariz. 358, 359 , 565 P.2d 864, 865 (1977), in recent decisions our supreme court has avoided the first step and analyzed jurisdiction solely in terms of minimum contacts, recognizing that the two-step inquiry is redundant because the limits of our long-arm statute are co-extensive with those of the d | 2 | 2 |
Batton v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2000Co., 153 Ariz. 268, 270 , 736 P.2d 2, 4 (1987); see also Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir.1985) (if a state’s long-arm rule extends to the limits of due process, the court need only inquire whether asserting jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible). ¶ 9 The Due Process Clause of the federal constitution limits a state’s power to exercise jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who have “no contacts, ties, or relations” with the forum state, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and requires that the defendants ha 2000Co., 153 Ariz. 268, 270 , 736 P.2d 2, 4 (1987); see also Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir.1985) (if a state’s long-arm rule extends to the limits of due process, the court need only inquire whether asserting jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible). ¶ 9 The Due Process Clause of the federal constitution limits a state’s power to exercise jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who have “no contacts, ties, or relations” with the forum state, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and requires that the defendants ha | 1 | 1 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2000Co., 153 Ariz. 268, 270 , 736 P.2d 2, 4 (1987); see also Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir.1985) (if a state’s long-arm rule extends to the limits of due process, the court need only inquire whether asserting jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible). ¶ 9 The Due Process Clause of the federal constitution limits a state’s power to exercise jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who have “no contacts, ties, or relations” with the forum state, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and requires that the defendants ha 2000Co., 153 Ariz. 268, 270 , 736 P.2d 2, 4 (1987); see also Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir.1985) (if a state’s long-arm rule extends to the limits of due process, the court need only inquire whether asserting jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible). ¶ 9 The Due Process Clause of the federal constitution limits a state’s power to exercise jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who have “no contacts, ties, or relations” with the forum state, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and requires that the defendants ha | 1 | 1 |
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S. A. v. Hallgreen2 sentences2000See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14 , 104 S.Ct. 1868 , 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) (defendant must have substantial or continuous and systematic contacts with the forum to support general jurisdiction). 2000See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14 , 104 S.Ct. 1868 , 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) (defendant must have substantial or continuous and systematic contacts with the forum to support general jurisdiction). | 1 | 1 |
David H. Stuart and Richard A. Whitaker v. Richard G. Spademangreen1 sentence2000Co., 153 Ariz. 268, 270 , 736 P.2d 2, 4 (1987); see also Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir.1985) (if a state’s long-arm rule extends to the limits of due process, the court need only inquire whether asserting jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible). ¶ 9 The Due Process Clause of the federal constitution limits a state’s power to exercise jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who have “no contacts, ties, or relations” with the forum state, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and requires that the defendants ha | 1 | 1 |
Laura Ann Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., Regie Nationale Des Usines Renaultgreen1 sentence1995DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3rd Cir.1981); see also Ver-meulen, 985 F.2d at 1548 (delivering title in foreign country “in no way determines the degree of contacts between the United States *575 and [the defendant]”); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 , 105 S.Ct. at 2188 (due process is not a territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed). | 1 | 1 |
Joseph Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc.green1 sentence1995DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3rd Cir.1981); see also Ver-meulen, 985 F.2d at 1548 (delivering title in foreign country “in no way determines the degree of contacts between the United States *575 and [the defendant]”); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 , 105 S.Ct. at 2188 (due process is not a territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed). | 1 | 1 |
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewiczgreen2 sentences1995DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3rd Cir.1981); see also Ver-meulen, 985 F.2d at 1548 (delivering title in foreign country “in no way determines the degree of contacts between the United States *575 and [the defendant]”); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 , 105 S.Ct. at 2188 (due process is not a territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed). 1995DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3rd Cir.1981); see also Ver-meulen, 985 F.2d at 1548 (delivering title in foreign country “in no way determines the degree of contacts between the United States *575 and [the defendant]”); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 , 105 S.Ct. at 2188 (due process is not a territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed). | 1 | 1 |
Northern Propane Gas Co. v. Kippsgreen2 sentences1987As we implicitly recognized in Northern Propane Gas Co. v. Kipps, 127 Ariz. 522, 525-27 , 622 P.2d 469, 472-74 (1980) (skipping the first step and analyzing jurisdiction solely in terms of minimum contacts), this two-step inquiry is redundant because our interpretation extends Rule 4(e)(2) to the permissible limits of due process. 1987As we implicitly recognized in Northern Propane Gas Co. v. Kipps, 127 Ariz. 522, 525-27 , 622 P.2d 469, 472-74 (1980) (skipping the first step and analyzing jurisdiction solely in terms of minimum contacts), this two-step inquiry is redundant because our interpretation extends Rule 4(e)(2) to the permissible limits of due process. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.