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6 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Departmentgreen2 sentences2026Quasi-judicial immunity is thus “limited to those situations where the underlying policy of judicial immunity is served: principled and fearless decision-making by that officer.” Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 . ¶31 Courts in other jurisdictions have consistently held that psychologists who perform court-ordered evaluations or provide professional recommendations to assist the court in its decision-making with their expertise perform functions “integral to the judicial process.” See Lavit, 173 Ariz. at 99 (citing cases); Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496, 498 (Utah 1998) (courts “have uniformly held 2026Quoting Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 , they argue that granting judicial immunity to the defendants would “further ‘the underlying policy of judicial immunity’—namely, to safeguard ‘principled and fearless decision-making.’” However, the defendants’ conduct, insofar as it relates to drafting the allegedly defamatory discharge summary, did not involve any decision-making integral to the judicial process. | 2 | 5 |
Adams v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Fox correctly cites Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 , for the proposition that “the applicability of judicial immunity to officers serving the judiciary is limited to those situations where the underlying policy of judicial immunity is served: principled and fearless decision-making by that officer.” Contrary to Fox’s argument, however, that policy “is served by removing the possibility that ‘a non judicial officer who is delegated judicial duties in aid of the court’” will become a target for litigation “aimed at the court.” Id. (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980)). 5 ¶1 2024Fox correctly cites Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 , for the proposition that “the applicability of judicial immunity to officers serving the judiciary is limited to those situations where the underlying policy of judicial immunity is served: principled and fearless decision-making by that officer.” Contrary to Fox’s argument, however, that policy “is served by removing the possibility that ‘a non judicial officer who is delegated judicial duties in aid of the court’” will become a target for litigation “aimed at the court.” Id. (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980)). 5 ¶1 | 2 | 2 |
Charles Ashbrook and Master Chef, Inc. v. Harlan Hoffmangreen2 sentences2024Fox correctly cites Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 , for the proposition that “the applicability of judicial immunity to officers serving the judiciary is limited to those situations where the underlying policy of judicial immunity is served: principled and fearless decision-making by that officer.” Contrary to Fox’s argument, however, that policy “is served by removing the possibility that ‘a non judicial officer who is delegated judicial duties in aid of the court’” will become a target for litigation “aimed at the court.” Id. (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980)). 5 ¶1 2024Fox correctly cites Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 , for the proposition that “the applicability of judicial immunity to officers serving the judiciary is limited to those situations where the underlying policy of judicial immunity is served: principled and fearless decision-making by that officer.” Contrary to Fox’s argument, however, that policy “is served by removing the possibility that ‘a non judicial officer who is delegated judicial duties in aid of the court’” will become a target for litigation “aimed at the court.” Id. (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980)). 5 ¶1 | 2 | 2 |
Parker v. Dodgiongreen1 sentence2026Quasi-judicial immunity is thus “limited to those situations where the underlying policy of judicial immunity is served: principled and fearless decision-making by that officer.” Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 . ¶31 Courts in other jurisdictions have consistently held that psychologists who perform court-ordered evaluations or provide professional recommendations to assist the court in its decision-making with their expertise perform functions “integral to the judicial process.” See Lavit, 173 Ariz. at 99 (citing cases); Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496, 498 (Utah 1998) (courts “have uniformly held | 1 | 1 |
DeSilva v. Bakergreen2 sentences2007Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 , 690 P.2d at 40 ; Desilva, 208 Ariz. at 601-02, ¶15 , 96 P.3d at 1088-89 . “[T]he applicability of judicial immunity to officers serving the judiciary is limited to those situations where the underlying policy of judicial immunity is served: principled and fearless decision-making by that officer.” Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 , 690 P.2d at 40 . ¶ 9 Burk does not dispute that conciliation services personnel are cloaked with judicial immunity when performing evaluations for use by the court in ruling on requests for modification of child custody orders. 2007Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 , 690 P.2d at 40 ; Desilva, 208 Ariz. at 601-02, ¶15 , 96 P.3d at 1088-89 . “[T]he applicability of judicial immunity to officers serving the judiciary is limited to those situations where the underlying policy of judicial immunity is served: principled and fearless decision-making by that officer.” Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 , 690 P.2d at 40 . ¶ 9 Burk does not dispute that conciliation services personnel are cloaked with judicial immunity when performing evaluations for use by the court in ruling on requests for modification of child custody orders. | 1 | 1 |
Douglas Gregory v. John J. Thompsongreen1 sentence1984Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 63 (9th Cir.1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Yamamoto v. Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors
green
2 sentences2024For example, in Yamamoto v. Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors, 124 Ariz. 538 , 540 (App. 1979), we determined judicial immunity protected a court clerk engaged in an “essentially ministerial” act following a judge’s order. 2024For example, in Yamamoto v. Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors, 124 Ariz. 538 , 540 (App. 1979), we determined judicial immunity protected a court clerk engaged in an “essentially ministerial” act following a judge’s order. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Lavit v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2026Quasi-judicial immunity is thus “limited to those situations where the underlying policy of judicial immunity is served: principled and fearless decision-making by that officer.” Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 . ¶31 Courts in other jurisdictions have consistently held that psychologists who perform court-ordered evaluations or provide professional recommendations to assist the court in its decision-making with their expertise perform functions “integral to the judicial process.” See Lavit, 173 Ariz. at 99 (citing cases); Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496, 498 (Utah 1998) (courts “have uniformly held | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.