Analyst analysis (California) · Go Syfert
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Analyst analysis in California

5 California opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjilgreen
cal · 2006 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Analyst’s analysis, p. 73; Richmond, at pp. 426-427; Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 39 Cal.4th 205, 217 (Bighorn); City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water Dist. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 926, 934 ; Paland, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1371-1372.) Article XIII D section 6 imposes procedural and substantive limitations for imposing or increasing a property-related fee.

11
Brown v. Board of Educationgreen
scotus · 1954 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
2 sentences

2002But while we appreciate the unique value and importance of education (see, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 347 U.S. 483, 493 [ 74 S.Ct. 686, 691 , 98 L.Ed. 873 , 38 A.L.R.2d 1180 ] [“education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments”]), it is clear the intention of the voters was that Proposition 209 apply to education.

2002But while we appreciate the unique value and importance of education (see, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 347 U.S. 483, 493 [ 74 S.Ct. 686, 691 , 98 L.Ed. 873 , 38 A.L.R.2d 1180 ] [“education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments”]), it is clear the intention of the voters was that Proposition 209 apply to education.

11
Coalition For Economic Equity v. Pete Wilsongreen
ca9 · 1997 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Moreover, preferences, for any purpose, are anathema to the very process of democracy." ( Price, supra, 26 Cal.3d 257, 299 , 161 Cal. Rptr. 475 , 604 P.2d 1365 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) By virtue of the initiative process, the California electorate "set a different course" from that charted by the courts since Weber and Price. ( Weber, supra, 443 U.S. 193, 216 , 99 S.Ct. 2721 , 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (cone. opn. of Blackmun, J.).) "Rather than classifying individuals by race or gender, Proposition 209 prohibits the State from classifying individuals by race or gender." ( Coalition for Economic Equity

2000Moreover, preferences, for any purpose, are anathema to the very process of democracy.” ( Price, supra, 26 Cal.3d 257, 299 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) By virtue of the initiative process, the California electorate “set a different course” from that charted by the courts since Weber and Price. ( Weber, supra, 443 U.S. 193, 216 [ 99 S.Ct. 2721, 2733-2734 ] (conc. opn. of Black-mun, J.).) “Rather than classifying individuals by race or gender, Proposition 209 prohibits the State from classifying individuals by race or gender.” (Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson (9th Cir. 1997) 122 F.3d 692,

11
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.green
scotus · 1971 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Moreover, preferences, for any purpose, are anathema to the very process of democracy." ( Price, supra, 26 Cal.3d 257, 299 , 161 Cal. Rptr. 475 , 604 P.2d 1365 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) By virtue of the initiative process, the California electorate "set a different course" from that charted by the courts since Weber and Price. ( Weber, supra, 443 U.S. 193, 216 , 99 S.Ct. 2721 , 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (cone. opn. of Blackmun, J.).) "Rather than classifying individuals by race or gender, Proposition 209 prohibits the State from classifying individuals by race or gender." ( Coalition for Economic Equity

2000Moreover, preferences, for any purpose, are anathema to the very process of democracy." ( Price, supra, 26 Cal.3d 257, 299 , 161 Cal. Rptr. 475 , 604 P.2d 1365 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) By virtue of the initiative process, the California electorate "set a different course" from that charted by the courts since Weber and Price. ( Weber, supra, 443 U.S. 193, 216 , 99 S.Ct. 2721 , 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (cone. opn. of Blackmun, J.).) "Rather than classifying individuals by race or gender, Proposition 209 prohibits the State from classifying individuals by race or gender." ( Coalition for Economic Equity

11
Price v. Civil Service Commissiongreen
cal · 1980 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Analyst's analysis of Prop. 209, p. 30 ["[Current] law requires [state] departments ... to reject bids from companies that have not made sufficient `good faith efforts' to meet [`affirmative action' contracting] goals."].) As the district court in Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at page 1489, correctly perceived from these arguments, "the people of California meant to do something more than simply restate existing law when they adopted Proposition 209." In taking a measure of that "something more," the "historic Civil Rights Act" referent tells us the voters intended to reinstitute the interpr

2000Analyst's analysis of Prop. 209, p. 30 ["[Current] law requires [state] departments ... to reject bids from companies that have not made sufficient `good faith efforts' to meet [`affirmative action' contracting] goals."].) As the district court in Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at page 1489, correctly perceived from these arguments, "the people of California meant to do something more than simply restate existing law when they adopted Proposition 209." In taking a measure of that "something more," the "historic Civil Rights Act" referent tells us the voters intended to reinstitute the interpr

11
United Steelworkers of America v. Webergreen
scotus · 1979 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Analyst's analysis of Prop. 209, p. 30 ["[Current] law requires [state] departments ... to reject bids from companies that have not made sufficient `good faith efforts' to meet [`affirmative action' contracting] goals."].) As the district court in Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at page 1489, correctly perceived from these arguments, "the people of California meant to do something more than simply restate existing law when they adopted Proposition 209." In taking a measure of that "something more," the "historic Civil Rights Act" referent tells us the voters intended to reinstitute the interpr

2000Analyst's analysis of Prop. 209, p. 30 ["[Current] law requires [state] departments ... to reject bids from companies that have not made sufficient `good faith efforts' to meet [`affirmative action' contracting] goals."].) As the district court in Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at page 1489, correctly perceived from these arguments, "the people of California meant to do something more than simply restate existing law when they adopted Proposition 209." In taking a measure of that "something more," the "historic Civil Rights Act" referent tells us the voters intended to reinstitute the interpr

11
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty.green
scotus · 1987 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Moreover, preferences, for any purpose, are anathema to the very process of democracy." ( Price, supra, 26 Cal.3d 257, 299 , 161 Cal. Rptr. 475 , 604 P.2d 1365 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) By virtue of the initiative process, the California electorate "set a different course" from that charted by the courts since Weber and Price. ( Weber, supra, 443 U.S. 193, 216 , 99 S.Ct. 2721 , 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (cone. opn. of Blackmun, J.).) "Rather than classifying individuals by race or gender, Proposition 209 prohibits the State from classifying individuals by race or gender." ( Coalition for Economic Equity

2000Moreover, preferences, for any purpose, are anathema to the very process of democracy." ( Price, supra, 26 Cal.3d 257, 299 , 161 Cal. Rptr. 475 , 604 P.2d 1365 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) By virtue of the initiative process, the California electorate "set a different course" from that charted by the courts since Weber and Price. ( Weber, supra, 443 U.S. 193, 216 , 99 S.Ct. 2721 , 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (cone. opn. of Blackmun, J.).) "Rather than classifying individuals by race or gender, Proposition 209 prohibits the State from classifying individuals by race or gender." ( Coalition for Economic Equity

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
Paland v. Brooktrails Township Community Services District Board of Directors green
calctapp · 2009
1 sentence

2022Analyst’s analysis, p. 73; Richmond, at pp. 426-427; Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 39 Cal.4th 205, 217 (Bighorn); City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water Dist. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 926, 934 ; Paland, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1371-1372.) Article XIII D section 6 imposes procedural and substantive limitations for imposing or increasing a property-related fee.

12022–2022
City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water District green
calctapp · 2011
1 sentence

2022Analyst’s analysis, p. 73; Richmond, at pp. 426-427; Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 39 Cal.4th 205, 217 (Bighorn); City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water Dist. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 926, 934 ; Paland, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1371-1372.) Article XIII D section 6 imposes procedural and substantive limitations for imposing or increasing a property-related fee.

12022–2022
Hunter v. Erickson green
scotus · 1969
2 sentences

2010J.).) Finally, affirmative action is a racial issue in the same way that the fair housing ordinance in Hunter and the desegregative busing in Seattle were racial issues. ( Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 471-472; Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at p. 391 .) That is, "although [section 31] on its face treats [Whites and racial minorities, men and women] in an identical manner, the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority." ( Hunter, at p. 391.) Affirmative action "inures primarily to the benefit of the minority, and is designed for that purpose." ( Seattle, at p. 472.) And while racial mi

2010J.).) Finally, affirmative action is a racial issue in the same way that the fair housing ordinance in Hunter and the desegregative busing in Seattle were racial issues. ( Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 471-472; Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. at p. 391 .) That is, "although [section 31] on its face treats [Whites and racial minorities, men and women] in an identical manner, the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority." ( Hunter, at p. 391.) Affirmative action "inures primarily to the benefit of the minority, and is designed for that purpose." ( Seattle, at p. 472.) And while racial mi

12010–2010
People v. Edelbacher green
cal · 1989
2 sentences

2003Analyst's analysis of Prop. 18, Mar. 7, 2000 Ballot Pamphlet.) The analysis further stated: "This measure amends state law so that a case of first degree murder is eligible for a finding of a special circumstance if the murderer intentionally killed the victim 'by means of lying in wait.' In so doing, this measure replaces the current language establishing a special circumstance for murders committed `while lying in wait.' This change would permit the finding of a special circumstance not only in a case in which a murder occurred immediately upon a confrontation between the murderer and the vi

2003Analyst's analysis of Prop. 18, Mar. 7, 2000 Ballot Pamphlet.) The analysis further stated: "This measure amends state law so that a case of first degree murder is eligible for a finding of a special circumstance if the murderer intentionally killed the victim 'by means of lying in wait.' In so doing, this measure replaces the current language establishing a special circumstance for murders committed `while lying in wait.' This change would permit the finding of a special circumstance not only in a case in which a murder occurred immediately upon a confrontation between the murderer and the vi

12003–2003
People v. Morales green
cal · 1989
2 sentences

2003Analyst's analysis of Prop. 18, Mar. 7, 2000 Ballot Pamphlet.) The analysis further stated: "This measure amends state law so that a case of first degree murder is eligible for a finding of a special circumstance if the murderer intentionally killed the victim 'by means of lying in wait.' In so doing, this measure replaces the current language establishing a special circumstance for murders committed `while lying in wait.' This change would permit the finding of a special circumstance not only in a case in which a murder occurred immediately upon a confrontation between the murderer and the vi

2003Analyst's analysis of Prop. 18, Mar. 7, 2000 Ballot Pamphlet.) The analysis further stated: "This measure amends state law so that a case of first degree murder is eligible for a finding of a special circumstance if the murderer intentionally killed the victim 'by means of lying in wait.' In so doing, this measure replaces the current language establishing a special circumstance for murders committed `while lying in wait.' This change would permit the finding of a special circumstance not only in a case in which a murder occurred immediately upon a confrontation between the murderer and the vi

12003–2003
Domino v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 1982
1 sentence

2003Analyst's analysis of Prop. 18, Mar. 7, 2000 Ballot Pamphlet.) The analysis further stated: "This measure amends state law so that a case of first degree murder is eligible for a finding of a special circumstance if the murderer intentionally killed the victim 'by means of lying in wait.' In so doing, this measure replaces the current language establishing a special circumstance for murders committed `while lying in wait.' This change would permit the finding of a special circumstance not only in a case in which a murder occurred immediately upon a confrontation between the murderer and the vi

12003–2003
DeRonde v. Regents of the University of California green
cal · 1981
2 sentences

2000Analyst's analysis of Prop. 209, p. 30 ["[Current] law requires [state] departments ... to reject bids from companies that have not made sufficient `good faith efforts' to meet [`affirmative action' contracting] goals."].) As the district court in Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at page 1489, correctly perceived from these arguments, "the people of California meant to do something more than simply restate existing law when they adopted Proposition 209." In taking a measure of that "something more," the "historic Civil Rights Act" referent tells us the voters intended to reinstitute the interpr

2000Analyst's analysis of Prop. 209, p. 30 ["[Current] law requires [state] departments ... to reject bids from companies that have not made sufficient `good faith efforts' to meet [`affirmative action' contracting] goals."].) As the district court in Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at page 1489, correctly perceived from these arguments, "the people of California meant to do something more than simply restate existing law when they adopted Proposition 209." In taking a measure of that "something more," the "historic Civil Rights Act" referent tells us the voters intended to reinstitute the interpr

12000–2000
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke green
scotus · 1978
2 sentences

2000Analyst's analysis of Prop. 209, p. 30 ["[Current] law requires [state] departments ... to reject bids from companies that have not made sufficient `good faith efforts' to meet [`affirmative action' contracting] goals."].) As the district court in Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at page 1489, correctly perceived from these arguments, "the people of California meant to do something more than simply restate existing law when they adopted Proposition 209." In taking a measure of that "something more," the "historic Civil Rights Act" referent tells us the voters intended to reinstitute the interpr

2000Analyst's analysis of Prop. 209, p. 30 ["[Current] law requires [state] departments ... to reject bids from companies that have not made sufficient `good faith efforts' to meet [`affirmative action' contracting] goals."].) As the district court in Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at page 1489, correctly perceived from these arguments, "the people of California meant to do something more than simply restate existing law when they adopted Proposition 209." In taking a measure of that "something more," the "historic Civil Rights Act" referent tells us the voters intended to reinstitute the interpr

12000–2000
Lungren v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 1996
2 sentences

2000(Cf. Lungren, supra, 48 Cal. App.4th 435 , 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 690 .) Our holding is necessarily limited to the form at issue here, which requires prime contractors to notify, solicit, and negotiate with MBE/WBE subcontractors as well as justify rejection of their bids.

2000(Cf. Lungren, supra, 48 Cal. App.4th 435 , 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 690 .) Our holding is necessarily limited to the form at issue here, which requires prime contractors to notify, solicit, and negotiate with MBE/WBE subcontractors as well as justify rejection of their bids.

12000–2000

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