attorney-client relationship defense in California

2025“A trial court’s authority to disqualify an attorney derives from its inherent power to ‘control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto.’” (Clark, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 47 ; Ontiveros v. Constable (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 686, 694 .) “‘[U]ltimately the issue involves a conflict between a client’s right to counsel of his choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility.’” (Johnson, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p.

2025“A trial court’s authority to disqualify an attorney derives from its inherent power to ‘control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto.’” (Clark, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 47 ; Ontiveros v. Constable (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 686, 694 .) “‘[U]ltimately the issue involves a conflict between a client’s right to counsel of his choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility.’” (Johnson, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p.

2006Defendant asserts that the possibility the prosecution may have gained some nonevidentiary advantage from its examination of defendant constituted an improper intrusion into the attorney-client relationship in violation of the Sixth Amendment. ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 1012 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122 , 846 P.2d 704 ["A defendant's right to the assistance of counsel free from unreasonable government interference is protected by the Sixth Amendment"].) The predicates of this argument are that the immunity described in Arcega fails to protect a defendant against nonevidentiary uses of st

2006Defendant asserts that the possibility the prosecution may have gained some nonevidentiary advantage from its examination of defendant constituted an improper intrusion into the attorney-client relationship in violation of the Sixth Amendment. ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 1012 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122 , 846 P.2d 704 ["A defendant's right to the assistance of counsel free from unreasonable government interference is protected by the Sixth Amendment"].) The predicates of this argument are that the immunity described in Arcega fails to protect a defendant against nonevidentiary uses of st

2005Defense . counsel cited Barber v. Municipal Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 742 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 598 P.2d 818 ] for the proposition that when “the prosecution infiltrates the defense camp, the prosecution runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment, and *455 Mr. Panah does have standing to complain about Sixth Amendment violations, and I would submit it.” The trial court denied the motion to quash, observing there was not “even a hint that this has anything to do with the attorney-client relationship or privilege.” Then, while recognizing “there’s no motion before the court,” it invited the prosecutor to re

2005Defense . counsel cited Barber v. Municipal Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 742 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 598 P.2d 818 ] for the proposition that when “the prosecution infiltrates the defense camp, the prosecution runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment, and *455 Mr. Panah does have standing to complain about Sixth Amendment violations, and I would submit it.” The trial court denied the motion to quash, observing there was not “even a hint that this has anything to do with the attorney-client relationship or privilege.” Then, while recognizing “there’s no motion before the court,” it invited the prosecutor to re

2000Co. v. Bell (1991) 438 Mich. 512 [ 475 N.W.2d 294 ], 3 which it quoted, at length, as follows: “ ‘A rule of law expanding the parameters of the attorney-client relationship in the defense counsel-insurer context might well detract from the attorney’s duty of loyalty to the client in a potentially conflict-ridden setting.

2000Co. v. Bell (1991) 438 Mich. 512 [ 475 N.W.2d 294 ], 3 which it quoted, at length, as follows: “ ‘A rule of law expanding the parameters of the attorney-client relationship in the defense counsel-insurer context might well detract from the attorney’s duty of loyalty to the client in a potentially conflict-ridden setting.

1988(Arden v. State Bar, supra, 43 Cal.3d 713, 726 .) When a transaction results from an ongoing process of solicitation, begun during the attorney-client relationship and proceeding to consummation uninterrupted by advice from independent counsel, the transaction is properly viewed as one “entered into” during the attorney-client relationship under rule 5-101.

1988One of the purposes of the rule is to protect clients from their attorneys' personal use of financial information gained from confidences disclosed during the attorney-client relationship. ( Arden v. State Bar, supra, 43 Cal.3d 713, 726 .) When a transaction results from an ongoing process of solicitation, begun during the attorney-client relationship and proceeding to consummation uninterrupted by advice from independent counsel, the transaction is properly viewed as one "entered into" during the attorney-client relationship under rule 5-101. (1c) Moreover, even if we were to accept either of