case cited standard in California

2025(See Kastigar v. U.S. (1972) 406 U.S. 441 , 461- 462 [a defendant’s showing that they testified under a grant of immunity shifts a heavy burden to the government to prove that all the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources].) A prosecutor may also anticipate that even if the witness would provide testimony favorable to the prosecution, the defense is likely to point to a grant of immunity to impeach the witness’s credibility—just as defense counsel in this case cited the immunity granted to Jacob to attack the credibility of his testimony. 4 We note that wh

2015“Now, that having been said, it is worth looking at the case cited by the defense [Grobeson v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 778 (Grobeson)], because I think it points out the differences between what happened in that case and what happened in this case. 15 “First, in Grobeson, there was evidence that at the very time that the juror came to a conclusion that she was convinced by certain evidence, she told one of her fellow jurors that that was her belief, so we have a statement made contemporaneous with the supposed prejudgment.

2000The case cited in standard of review, People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th 1 , involved an assault with a firearm in which the defendant took out a gun and put the barrel under his victim’s chin while threatening him. {Id. at p. 7.) Confronted with the same claim made herein, our Supreme Court held: “California courts have often held that a defendant’s statements and behavior, while making an armed threat against a victim, may warrant a jury’s finding the weapon was loaded: For example, in People v. Montgomery (1911) 15 Cal.App. 315 [ 114 P. 792 ], the Court of Appeal, in the absence of dire

2000The case cited in standard of review, People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th 1 , involved an assault with a firearm in which the defendant took out a gun and put the barrel under his victim’s chin while threatening him. {Id. at p. 7.) Confronted with the same claim made herein, our Supreme Court held: “California courts have often held that a defendant’s statements and behavior, while making an armed threat against a victim, may warrant a jury’s finding the weapon was loaded: For example, in People v. Montgomery (1911) 15 Cal.App. 315 [ 114 P. 792 ], the Court of Appeal, in the absence of dire

2000The case cited in standard of review, People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th 1 , involved an assault with a firearm in which the defendant took out a gun and put the barrel under his victim’s chin while threatening him. {Id. at p. 7.) Confronted with the same claim made herein, our Supreme Court held: “California courts have often held that a defendant’s statements and behavior, while making an armed threat against a victim, may warrant a jury’s finding the weapon was loaded: For example, in People v. Montgomery (1911) 15 Cal.App. 315 [ 114 P. 792 ], the Court of Appeal, in the absence of dire

2000The case cited in standard of review, People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th 1 , involved an assault with a firearm in which the defendant took out a gun and put the barrel under his victim’s chin while threatening him. {Id. at p. 7.) Confronted with the same claim made herein, our Supreme Court held: “California courts have often held that a defendant’s statements and behavior, while making an armed threat against a victim, may warrant a jury’s finding the weapon was loaded: For example, in People v. Montgomery (1911) 15 Cal.App. 315 [ 114 P. 792 ], the Court of Appeal, in the absence of dire

1980Appellant alleges that respondents made the representations in question “for their own benefit,” that is, that respondents were “induced [to do so] by the desire to continue enjoying Mitman’s patronage as an IBC customer,...” It is on the basis of this allegation alone that appellant-Seneca contends that respondents are estopped to raise the bar of section 1974, Code of Civil Procedure, as one who “receivefd] a benefit to himself.” The case cited for this exception, by the Senate Judiciary Committee in its comment to the 1970 amendment, is Michael Distributing Co. v. Tobin (1964) 225 Cal.App.2

1980Appellant alleges that respondents made the representations in question “for their own benefit,” that is, that respondents were “induced [to do so] by the desire to continue enjoying Mitman’s patronage as an IBC customer,...” It is on the basis of this allegation alone that appellant-Seneca contends that respondents are estopped to raise the bar of section 1974, Code of Civil Procedure, as one who “receivefd] a benefit to himself.” The case cited for this exception, by the Senate Judiciary Committee in its comment to the 1970 amendment, is Michael Distributing Co. v. Tobin (1964) 225 Cal.App.2