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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 2011–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brake v. Beech Aircraft Corp.green2 sentences2021(See, e.g., Brake v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 930, 937 [in a products liability lawsuit following a plane crash, the judge properly prohibited expert from relying on a statistical analysis comparing accident rates for the defendant’s aircraft with rates for other aircraft].) Given the confounding factors and unknowns in the poison control data and articles about energy drinks as a class, the judge could reasonably conclude that relying on them to form an opinion that Monster Energy causes cardiac arrythmias requires “a leap of logic or conjecture.” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th 2021(See, e.g., Brake v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 930, 937 [in a products liability lawsuit following a plane crash, the judge properly prohibited expert from relying on a statistical analysis comparing accident rates for the defendant’s aircraft with rates for other aircraft].) Given the confounding factors and unknowns in the poison control data and articles about energy drinks as a class, the judge could reasonably conclude that relying on them to form an opinion that Monster Energy causes cardiac arrythmias requires “a leap of logic or conjecture.” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th | 2 | 2 |
People v. Valdezgreen1 sentence2016The Supreme Court explicitly recognized that "in some circumstances, expert testimony regarding the specific defendants might be proper." (Vang, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1048, fn. 4 , citing People v. Valdez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 494, 507 (Valdez).) After assuming the gang expert could not properly have testified about the 29 defendants under the facts of that case (Vang, at p. 1048), the Supreme Court explained that the propriety of the questions should be judged against the statutory requirement that the subject matter must be sufficiently beyond common experience to assist the trier of fact. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Xue Vanggreen1 sentence2016The Supreme Court explicitly recognized that "in some circumstances, expert testimony regarding the specific defendants might be proper." (Vang, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1048, fn. 4 , citing People v. Valdez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 494, 507 (Valdez).) After assuming the gang expert could not properly have testified about the 29 defendants under the facts of that case (Vang, at p. 1048), the Supreme Court explained that the propriety of the questions should be judged against the statutory requirement that the subject matter must be sufficiently beyond common experience to assist the trier of fact. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ramosgreen2 sentences2016(People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 507-508 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 , 101 P.3d 478 ], quoting People v. Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 519 .) The trial court therefore did not err in failing to institute competency proceedings under section 1369, subdivision (a). 2016(People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 507-508 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 , 101 P.3d 478 ], quoting People v. Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 519 .) The trial court therefore did not err in failing to institute competency proceedings under section 1369, subdivision (a). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California
green
2 sentences2021(See, e.g., Brake v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 930, 937 [in a products liability lawsuit following a plane crash, the judge properly prohibited expert from relying on a statistical analysis comparing accident rates for the defendant’s aircraft with rates for other aircraft].) Given the confounding factors and unknowns in the poison control data and articles about energy drinks as a class, the judge could reasonably conclude that relying on them to form an opinion that Monster Energy causes cardiac arrythmias requires “a leap of logic or conjecture.” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th 2021(See, e.g., Brake v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 930, 937 [in a products liability lawsuit following a plane crash, the judge properly prohibited expert from relying on a statistical analysis comparing accident rates for the defendant’s aircraft with rates for other aircraft].) Given the confounding factors and unknowns in the poison control data and articles about energy drinks as a class, the judge could reasonably conclude that relying on them to form an opinion that Monster Energy causes cardiac arrythmias requires “a leap of logic or conjecture.” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Pennington
green
1 sentence2016(People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 507-508 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 , 101 P.3d 478 ], quoting People v. Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 519 .) The trial court therefore did not err in failing to institute competency proceedings under section 1369, subdivision (a). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Killebrew
green
2 sentences2011In support of this argument, defendant Vang and the Court of Appeal rely primarily on Killebrew, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 644 . 2011But the Court of Appeal found these questions were too closely based on the evidence in a manner that was only "thinly disguised." This conclusion transforms the requirement that a hypothetical question be rooted in the evidence into a prohibition —or at least into the confounding rule that the party posing the question must disguise from the jury the fact it is rooted in the evidence—and not "thinly," it appears, but thickly. *1047 In support of this argument, defendant Vang and the Court of Appeal rely primarily on Killebrew, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 644 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Gonzalez
green
2 sentences2011We discussed Killebrew in People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237 , 135 P.3d 649 ] ( Gonzalez ). 2011We discussed Killebrew in People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237 , 135 P.3d 649 ] ( Gonzalez ). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.