Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McIvor v. Savagegreen2 sentences1972“The phrase ‘scope of his employment’ is used in section 3601 to designate the sphere of activity encompassed within the provisions thereof which make the right to recover workmen’s compensation the exclusive remedy available to an injured employee for a compensable injury caused by the negligence of a co-employee; identifies the nature of the act of the coemployee causing the injury and not the nature of the injury sustained as a result of that act; and must be interpreted accordingly.” (McIvor v. Savage, 220 Cal.App.2d 128, 135-136 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 740 ].) It is further pointed out, however, t 1972“The phrase ‘scope of his employment’ is used in section 3601 to designate the sphere of activity encompassed within the provisions thereof which make the right to recover workmen’s compensation the exclusive remedy available to an injured employee for a compensable injury caused by the negligence of a co-employee; identifies the nature of the act of the coemployee causing the injury and not the nature of the injury sustained as a result of that act; and must be interpreted accordingly.” (McIvor v. Savage, 220 Cal.App.2d 128, 135-136 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 740 ].) It is further pointed out, however, t | 1 | 1 |
Hiroshima v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.green2 sentences1963Co., 18 Cal.App.2d 24, 25 [ 63 P.2d 340 ]); whether his conduct occurred during the performance of services for the benefit of the employer, either directly or indirectly, or of himself, or of another person (Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 838-839 [ 180 P.2d 684 , 172 A.L.R. 525 ] ; Kish v. California State Automobile Assn., 190 Cal. 246, 249 [ 212 P. 27 ]); whether his conduct, even though not expressly or impliedly authorized, was an incidental event connected with his assigned work (Carr v. Wm. 1963Co., 18 Cal.App.2d 24, 25 [ 63 P.2d 340 ]); whether his conduct occurred during the performance of services for the benefit of the employer, either directly or indirectly, or of himself, or of another person (Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 838-839 [ 180 P.2d 684 , 172 A.L.R. 525 ] ; Kish v. California State Automobile Assn., 190 Cal. 246, 249 [ 212 P. 27 ]); whether his conduct, even though not expressly or impliedly authorized, was an incidental event connected with his assigned work (Carr v. Wm. | 1 | 1 |
Pacific Employers Insurance v. Industrial Accident Commissiongreen2 sentences1963Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 26 Cal.2d 286, 293 [ 158 P.2d 9 , 159 A.L.R. 313 ].) A determination of the issue as to whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment involves a consideration of many factors including, among others, whether his conduct was authorized by his employer, either expressly or impliedly (Curcic v. Nelson Display Co., 19 Cal.App.2d 46, 53 [ 64 P.2d 1153 ]); the nature of the employment, its object and the duties imposed thereby; whether the employee was acting in the discharge thereof (Hiroshima v. Pacific Cas & Elec. 1963Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 26 Cal.2d 286, 293 [ 158 P.2d 9 , 159 A.L.R. 313 ].) A determination of the issue as to whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment involves a consideration of many factors including, among others, whether his conduct was authorized by his employer, either expressly or impliedly (Curcic v. Nelson Display Co., 19 Cal.App.2d 46, 53 [ 64 P.2d 1153 ]); the nature of the employment, its object and the duties imposed thereby; whether the employee was acting in the discharge thereof (Hiroshima v. Pacific Cas & Elec. | 1 | 1 |
Curcic v. Nelson Display Co.green2 sentences1963Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 26 Cal.2d 286, 293 [ 158 P.2d 9 , 159 A.L.R. 313 ].) A determination of the issue as to whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment involves a consideration of many factors including, among others, whether his conduct was authorized by his employer, either expressly or impliedly (Curcic v. Nelson Display Co., 19 Cal.App.2d 46, 53 [ 64 P.2d 1153 ]); the nature of the employment, its object and the duties imposed thereby; whether the employee was acting in the discharge thereof (Hiroshima v. Pacific Cas & Elec. 1963Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 26 Cal.2d 286, 293 [ 158 P.2d 9 , 159 A.L.R. 313 ].) A determination of the issue as to whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment involves a consideration of many factors including, among others, whether his conduct was authorized by his employer, either expressly or impliedly (Curcic v. Nelson Display Co., 19 Cal.App.2d 46, 53 [ 64 P.2d 1153 ]); the nature of the employment, its object and the duties imposed thereby; whether the employee was acting in the discharge thereof (Hiroshima v. Pacific Cas & Elec. | 1 | 1 |
Fields v. Sandersgreen2 sentences1963Co., 18 Cal.App.2d 24, 25 [ 63 P.2d 340 ]); whether his conduct occurred during the performance of services for the benefit of the employer, either directly or indirectly, or of himself, or of another person (Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 838-839 [ 180 P.2d 684 , 172 A.L.R. 525 ] ; Kish v. California State Automobile Assn., 190 Cal. 246, 249 [ 212 P. 27 ]); whether his conduct, even though not expressly or impliedly authorized, was an incidental event connected with his assigned work (Carr v. Wm. 1963Co., 18 Cal.App.2d 24, 25 [ 63 P.2d 340 ]); whether his conduct occurred during the performance of services for the benefit of the employer, either directly or indirectly, or of himself, or of another person (Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 838-839 [ 180 P.2d 684 , 172 A.L.R. 525 ] ; Kish v. California State Automobile Assn., 190 Cal. 246, 249 [ 212 P. 27 ]); whether his conduct, even though not expressly or impliedly authorized, was an incidental event connected with his assigned work (Carr v. Wm. | 1 | 1 |
Kish v. California State Automobile Ass'ngreen2 sentences1963Co., 18 Cal.App.2d 24, 25 [ 63 P.2d 340 ]); whether his conduct occurred during the performance of services for the benefit of the employer, either directly or indirectly, or of himself, or of another person (Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 838-839 [ 180 P.2d 684 , 172 A.L.R. 525 ] ; Kish v. California State Automobile Assn., 190 Cal. 246, 249 [ 212 P. 27 ]); whether his conduct, even though not expressly or impliedly authorized, was an incidental event connected with his assigned work (Carr v. Wm. 1963Co., 18 Cal.App.2d 24, 25 [ 63 P.2d 340 ]); whether his conduct occurred during the performance of services for the benefit of the employer, either directly or indirectly, or of himself, or of another person (Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 838-839 [ 180 P.2d 684 , 172 A.L.R. 525 ] ; Kish v. California State Automobile Assn., 190 Cal. 246, 249 [ 212 P. 27 ]); whether his conduct, even though not expressly or impliedly authorized, was an incidental event connected with his assigned work (Carr v. Wm. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Szeto
green
2 sentences2014When a sentencing court states ample reasons for its choices we do not assume that the reasons were intended to “mask a hidden unconstitutional agenda.” (People v. Huston (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 192, 223 , citing Szeto, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 35 .) As the trial court’s comments reflect no more than a consideration of many factors relating to whether probation should be granted, defendant has failed to establish a reasonable inference of punishment for having a trial. 2014When a sentencing court states ample reasons for its choices we do not assume that the reasons were intended to “mask a hidden unconstitutional agenda.” (People v. Huston (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 192, 223 , citing Szeto, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 35 .) As the trial court’s comments reflect no more than a consideration of many factors relating to whether probation should be granted, defendant has failed to establish a reasonable inference of punishment for having a trial. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Huston
green
1 sentence2014When a sentencing court states ample reasons for its choices we do not assume that the reasons were intended to “mask a hidden unconstitutional agenda.” (People v. Huston (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 192, 223 , citing Szeto, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 35 .) As the trial court’s comments reflect no more than a consideration of many factors relating to whether probation should be granted, defendant has failed to establish a reasonable inference of punishment for having a trial. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Ghebretensae
green
1 sentence2014(See People v. Ghebretensae (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 741, 762-763 .) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Duprey v. Shane
green
2 sentences1972Plaintiff relies principally upon the case of Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal.2d 781 [ 249 P.2d 8 ], to support his contention that he is entitled to bring a separate action at common law for malpractice against defendant Rogers. 1972Plaintiff relies principally upon the case of Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal.2d 781 [ 249 P.2d 8 ], to support his contention that he is entitled to bring a separate action at common law for malpractice against defendant Rogers. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Estate of Stevens
green
1 sentence1972(Estate of Stevens, supra, 163 Cal.App.2d 255, 266 .)” ( 191 Cal.App.2d at p. 445 .) 13 The court stated: “The inquiry thus imposed involves a consideration of many factors, including the prospective time between transfer and death; the relationship between the parties, i.e., whether harmonious or hostile feelings existed . . ., whether they are the natural objects of each other’s bounty . . ., and whether they are dealing with each other at arm’s length . . .; the type of partnership business, i.e., whether it is one involving certainty or speculation; the nature of the partnership assets, i. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Cranston v. Craycroft
green
2 sentences1972(Estate of Stevens, supra, 163 Cal.App.2d 255, 266 .)” ( 191 Cal.App.2d at p. 445 .) 13 The court stated: “The inquiry thus imposed involves a consideration of many factors, including the prospective time between transfer and death; the relationship between the parties, i.e., whether harmonious or hostile feelings existed . . ., whether they are the natural objects of each other’s bounty . . ., and whether they are dealing with each other at arm’s length . . .; the type of partnership business, i.e., whether it is one involving certainty or speculation; the nature of the partnership assets, i. 1972(Estate of Stevens, supra, 163 Cal.App.2d 255, 266 .)” ( 191 Cal.App.2d at p. 445 .) 13 The court stated: “The inquiry thus imposed involves a consideration of many factors, including the prospective time between transfer and death; the relationship between the parties, i.e., whether harmonious or hostile feelings existed . . ., whether they are the natural objects of each other’s bounty . . ., and whether they are dealing with each other at arm’s length . . .; the type of partnership business, i.e., whether it is one involving certainty or speculation; the nature of the partnership assets, i. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bensel
green
1 sentence1961The inquiry thus posed involves a consideration of many factors, including the prospective time between transfer and death; the relationship between the parties, i.e., whether harmonious or hostile feelings existed (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bensel, 100 F.2d 639 ), whether they are the natural objects of each other’s bounty (Giannini v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, 148 F.2d 285, 287 ), and whether they are dealing with each other at arm’s length (In re Cowles' Estate, supra, 36 Wn.2d 710 [ 219 P.2d 964, 967 ]); the type of partnership business, i.e., whether it is one inv | 1 | 1961–1961 |
In Re Estate of Cowles
neutral
2 sentences1961The inquiry thus posed involves a consideration of many factors, including the prospective time between transfer and death; the relationship between the parties, i.e., whether harmonious or hostile feelings existed (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bensel, 100 F.2d 639 ), whether they are the natural objects of each other’s bounty (Giannini v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, 148 F.2d 285, 287 ), and whether they are dealing with each other at arm’s length (In re Cowles' Estate, supra, 36 Wn.2d 710 [ 219 P.2d 964, 967 ]); the type of partnership business, i.e., whether it is one inv 1961The inquiry thus posed involves a consideration of many factors, including the prospective time between transfer and death; the relationship between the parties, i.e., whether harmonious or hostile feelings existed (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bensel, 100 F.2d 639 ), whether they are the natural objects of each other’s bounty (Giannini v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, 148 F.2d 285, 287 ), and whether they are dealing with each other at arm’s length (In re Cowles' Estate, supra, 36 Wn.2d 710 [ 219 P.2d 964, 967 ]); the type of partnership business, i.e., whether it is one inv | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Giannini v. Commissioner
green
1 sentence1961The inquiry thus posed involves a consideration of many factors, including the prospective time between transfer and death; the relationship between the parties, i.e., whether harmonious or hostile feelings existed (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bensel, 100 F.2d 639 ), whether they are the natural objects of each other’s bounty (Giannini v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, 148 F.2d 285, 287 ), and whether they are dealing with each other at arm’s length (In re Cowles' Estate, supra, 36 Wn.2d 710 [ 219 P.2d 964, 967 ]); the type of partnership business, i.e., whether it is one inv | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.