constitutionality of any standard in California

2013(See Rich v. Thatcher (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1181 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 897 ] (Rich).) We recognize that both the plurality in Troxel and the majority in In re Marriage of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 842 , 96 P.3d 141 ] (Harris), counseled that in this area courts proceed with caution: “ ‘[W]e agree with JUSTICE KENNEDY that the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are best “elaborated with care.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 228, quoting Troxel, supra,

2013(See Rich v. Thatcher (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1181 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 897 ] (Rich).) We recognize that both the plurality in Troxel and the majority in In re Marriage of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 842 , 96 P.3d 141 ] (Harris), counseled that in this area courts proceed with caution: “ ‘[W]e agree with JUSTICE KENNEDY that the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are best “elaborated with care.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 228, quoting Troxel, supra,

2004As the plurality opinion in Troxel cautioned, we should be very careful in identifying the scope of the due process interest in parenting. ( Troxel v. Granville, supra, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 (plur. opn. of O'Connor, J.) ["we agree with Justice Kennedy that the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are best `elaborated with care.'"].) In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Baxter concludes that "[t]he majority errs in reaching out to co

2004As the plurality opinion in Troxel cautioned, we should be very careful in identifying the scope of the due process interest in parenting. ( Troxel v. Granville, supra, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 (plur. opn. of O'Connor, J.) ["we agree with Justice Kennedy that the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are best `elaborated with care.'"].) In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Baxter concludes that "[t]he majority errs in reaching out to co

2013(See Rich v. Thatcher (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1181 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 897 ] (Rich).) We recognize that both the plurality in Troxel and the majority in In re Marriage of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 842 , 96 P.3d 141 ] (Harris), counseled that in this area courts proceed with caution: “ ‘[W]e agree with JUSTICE KENNEDY that the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are best “elaborated with care.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 228, quoting Troxel, supra,

2013(See Rich v. Thatcher (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1181 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 897 ] (Rich).) We recognize that both the plurality in Troxel and the majority in In re Marriage of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 842 , 96 P.3d 141 ] (Harris), counseled that in this area courts proceed with caution: “ ‘[W]e agree with JUSTICE KENNEDY that the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are best “elaborated with care.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 228, quoting Troxel, supra,

2013Proof by clear and convincing evidence has been required by our Supreme Court “ ‘where particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake,’ such as the termination of parental rights, involuntary commitment, and deportation.” (Weiner v. Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 487 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 40 , 816 P.2d 892 ].) The standard of proof often depends on the “ ‘gravity of the consequences that would result from an erroneous determination of the issue involved.’ ” (Ibid.) In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Harris, Justice Chin argued that any infringement on a custodial paren

2013Proof by clear and convincing evidence has been required by our Supreme Court “ ‘where particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake,’ such as the termination of parental rights, involuntary commitment, and deportation.” (Weiner v. Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 487 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 40 , 816 P.2d 892 ].) The standard of proof often depends on the “ ‘gravity of the consequences that would result from an erroneous determination of the issue involved.’ ” (Ibid.) In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Harris, Justice Chin argued that any infringement on a custodial paren

1983(See Sandstrom, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 514 [ 60 L.Ed.2d at p. 45 ].) 8 In the present case, if we approach this threshold issue purely as a matter of statutory interpretation, there is little question but that the presumption established by section 496 is a “mandatory presumption” within the meaning of Ulster County and Sandstrom .