D'Oench Duhme doctrine in California

2015In its appeal, First-Citizens challenges the court's rejection of its two jurisdictional challenges, and alternatively argues the Deed of Trust is valid as a matter of law because the undisputed evidence establishes: (1) First-Citizens and TVB were bona fide encumbrancers; (2) the Church ratified the conveyance of, and encumbrance on, the Property; and/or (3) the D'Oench Duhme doctrine bars the Church's claims (see D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC (1942) 315 U.S. 447 ).

2015In its appeal, First-Citizens challenges the court's rejection of its two jurisdictional challenges, and alternatively argues the Deed of Trust is valid as a matter of law because the undisputed evidence establishes: (1) First-Citizens and TVB were bona fide encumbrancers; (2) the Church ratified the conveyance of, and encumbrance on, the Property; and/or (3) the D'Oench Duhme doctrine bars the Church's claims (see D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC (1942) 315 U.S. 447 ).

1996The same concept of void versus voidable transfer was raised in Langley v. FDIC, supra, 484 U.S. 86 .

1996The same concept of void versus voidable transfer was raised in Langley v. FDIC, supra, 484 U.S. 86 .

1997Corp. v. Griffin (5th Cir. 1991) 935 F.2d 691, 698 ; Sunburst Bank v. Executive Life Ins.

1997Corp. v. Griffin (5th Cir. 1991) 935 F.2d 691, 698 ; Sunburst Bank v. Executive Life Ins.

1996Moreover, the focus of their action is not the enforceability of a promissory note to which they made a contemporaneous oral agreement. *1750 Nonetheless, mindful of the federal court’s expansive interpretations of the doctrine and consistent with the authorities cited above, we conclude this case comes within the D’Oench Duhme doctrine because (1) the Walshes are attempting to enforce an oral agreement (their property exchange agreement with Gallegos) and/or to recover for oral misrepresentations made by Gallegos in connection with that agreement (2) which would reduce the value of assets for

1996Moreover, the focus of their action is not the enforceability of a promissory note to which they made a contemporaneous oral agreement. *1750 Nonetheless, mindful of the federal court’s expansive interpretations of the doctrine and consistent with the authorities cited above, we conclude this case comes within the D’Oench Duhme doctrine because (1) the Walshes are attempting to enforce an oral agreement (their property exchange agreement with Gallegos) and/or to recover for oral misrepresentations made by Gallegos in connection with that agreement (2) which would reduce the value of assets for

1991Bank (N.D.Tex. 1990) 733 F.Supp. 1099, 1103 .) *1545 Application of D’oench Duhme doctrine Admittedly this case does not fit within the usual pattern into which a D’Oench Duhme defense is generally asserted.

1991Bank (N.D.Tex. 1990) 733 F.Supp. 1099, 1103 .) *1545 Application of D’oench Duhme doctrine Admittedly this case does not fit within the usual pattern into which a D’Oench Duhme defense is generally asserted.

1991The Bartrams rely on Vernon v. Resolution Trust Corp., supra, 907 F.2d 1101 .

1991The Bartrams rely on Vernon v. Resolution Trust Corp., supra, 907 F.2d 1101 .

1991Corp. (9th Cir. 1978) 572 F.2d 1361 is misplaced since those decisions did not involve a consideration of the D’Oench Duhme defense. 9 Civil Code section 1717 provides as follows: “(a) In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded ... to one of the parties . . . , then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees . . .”

1991Corp. (9th Cir. 1978) 572 F.2d 1361 is misplaced since those decisions did not involve a consideration of the D’Oench Duhme defense. 9 Civil Code section 1717 provides as follows: “(a) In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded ... to one of the parties . . . , then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees . . .”