fair comment privilege (California) · Go Syfert
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fair comment privilege in California

5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2014 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

CaseFollowedCited
Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc.green
cal · 1960 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1980–1989
2 sentences

1989(See, e.g., Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 643, 651-652 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 617 , 355 P.2d 265 , 87 A.L.R.2d 439 ]; Williams v. Daily Review, Inc. (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 405, 416 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 135 ]; Stockton Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 966, 977-978 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) Second, courts and commentators have often stated that fair comment on matters of public concern is “privileged.” This terminology is incorrect.

1980(See fn. 3, ante.) In California, however, the cases have extended the fair comment privilege so that, where malice is disproved, the privilege applies not only to comment (opinions) but to false statements of fact as well. (4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, § 310, p. 2580.) Maidman itself involved what could appropriately be characterized as false assertions of fact, i.e., the implication that plaintiff, in his professional capacity as a lawyer, deliberately misled a court as to the nature of a religious holiday. ( 54 Cal.2d at p. 651 .) 5 Ordinarily, the existence of the pr

23
Snively v. Record Publishing Co.green
cal · 1921 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1981–1989
2 sentences

1981Thus, the fair comment privilege applies (see Snively v. Record Publishing Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 565, 570-571 [ 198 P. 1 ]), and in order for the complaint to state a cause of action for libel, it must allege facts constituting malice.

1981Thus, the fair comment privilege applies (see Snively v. Record Publishing Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 565, 570-571 [ 198 P. 1 ]), and in order for the complaint to state a cause of action for libel, it must allege facts constituting malice.

12
Institute of Athletic Motivation v. University of Illinoisgreen
calctapp · 1980 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991Common Law Right of Fair Comment Hall attempts to invoke the common law right of fair comment, long recognized in California, “which protects] ‘expressions of opinion about public officials, scientists, artists, composers, performers, authors, and other persons who place themselves or their work in the public eye.’ [Citation.]” (Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 732 .) “In California, *909 . . . the cases have extended the fair comment privilege so that, where malice is disproved, the privilege applies not only to comment (opinions) but to false statements of fact as well

1991Common Law Right of Fair Comment Hall attempts to invoke the common law right of fair comment, long recognized in California, “which protects] ‘expressions of opinion about public officials, scientists, artists, composers, performers, authors, and other persons who place themselves or their work in the public eye.’ [Citation.]” (Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 732 .) “In California, *909 . . . the cases have extended the fair comment privilege so that, where malice is disproved, the privilege applies not only to comment (opinions) but to false statements of fact as well

11
Williams v. the Daily Review, Inc.green
calctapp · 1965 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989(See, e.g., Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 643, 651-652 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 617 , 355 P.2d 265 , 87 A.L.R.2d 439 ]; Williams v. Daily Review, Inc. (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 405, 416 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 135 ]; Stockton Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 966, 977-978 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) Second, courts and commentators have often stated that fair comment on matters of public concern is “privileged.” This terminology is incorrect.

1989For example, dicta in prior cases indicate that a public works contractor may be subject to the fair-comment defense. {Stevens v. Storke, supra, 191 Cal. 329, 334-335 ; Williams v. Daily Review, Inc., supra, 236 Cal.App.2d 405, 417 .) Such language, however, should not be read to mean that the mere receipt of public funds is by itself sufficient to give rise to the fair-comment defense.

11
Stockton Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1988 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989(See, e.g., Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 643, 651-652 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 617 , 355 P.2d 265 , 87 A.L.R.2d 439 ]; Williams v. Daily Review, Inc. (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 405, 416 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 135 ]; Stockton Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 966, 977-978 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) Second, courts and commentators have often stated that fair comment on matters of public concern is “privileged.” This terminology is incorrect.

1989(See, e.g., Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 643, 651-652 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 617 , 355 P.2d 265 , 87 A.L.R.2d 439 ]; Williams v. Daily Review, Inc. (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 405, 416 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 135 ]; Stockton Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 966, 977-978 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 389 ].) Second, courts and commentators have often stated that fair comment on matters of public concern is “privileged.” This terminology is incorrect.

11
Jones v. Express PubLishing Co.green
calctapp · 1927 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989Co. (1927) 87 Cal.App. 246, 257 [ 262 P. 78 ].) 19 It is clear the Maidman court was relying on the fair-comment defense, not a public-interest privilege applicable against a private person.

1989Co. (1927) 87 Cal.App. 246, 257 [ 262 P. 78 ].) 19 It is clear the Maidman court was relying on the fair-comment defense, not a public-interest privilege applicable against a private person.

11
Martin v. Kearneygreen
calctapp · 1975 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981The malice required is actual malice, that "state of mind arising from hatred or ill will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person" ( Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944 [ 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]), or lack of reasonable grounds for a belief in the truth of the statement. ( Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal. App.3d 926, 936 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 82 ].) Mere allegations of malice are not sufficient ( Locke v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.2d at p. 603 ; Boyich *539 v. Howell (1963) 221 Cal. App.2d 801, 803 [ 34 Cal. Rptr. 794 ]); actual facts must be alleg

1981The malice required is actual malice, that "state of mind arising from hatred or ill will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person" ( Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944 [ 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]), or lack of reasonable grounds for a belief in the truth of the statement. ( Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal. App.3d 926, 936 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 82 ].) Mere allegations of malice are not sufficient ( Locke v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.2d at p. 603 ; Boyich *539 v. Howell (1963) 221 Cal. App.2d 801, 803 [ 34 Cal. Rptr. 794 ]); actual facts must be alleg

11
Roemer v. Retail Credit Co.green
calctapp · 1975 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981The malice required is actual malice, that “state of mind arising from hatred or ill . will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person” {Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]), or lack of reasonable grounds for a belief in the truth of the statement. {Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 926, 936 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 82 ].) Mere allegations of malice are not sufficient {Locke v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal. 2d at p. 603 ; Boyich v. Howell (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 801, 803 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 794 ]); actual facts must be alleged, unless

1981The malice required is actual malice, that “state of mind arising from hatred or ill . will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person” {Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]), or lack of reasonable grounds for a belief in the truth of the statement. {Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 926, 936 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 82 ].) Mere allegations of malice are not sufficient {Locke v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal. 2d at p. 603 ; Boyich v. Howell (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 801, 803 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 794 ]); actual facts must be alleged, unless

11
Mullins v. Brandogreen
calctapp · 1970 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981The malice required is actual malice, that "state of mind arising from hatred or ill will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person" ( Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944 [ 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]), or lack of reasonable grounds for a belief in the truth of the statement. ( Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal. App.3d 926, 936 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 82 ].) Mere allegations of malice are not sufficient ( Locke v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.2d at p. 603 ; Boyich *539 v. Howell (1963) 221 Cal. App.2d 801, 803 [ 34 Cal. Rptr. 794 ]); actual facts must be alleg

1981The malice required is actual malice, that "state of mind arising from hatred or ill will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person" ( Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944 [ 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]), or lack of reasonable grounds for a belief in the truth of the statement. ( Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal. App.3d 926, 936 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 82 ].) Mere allegations of malice are not sufficient ( Locke v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.2d at p. 603 ; Boyich *539 v. Howell (1963) 221 Cal. App.2d 801, 803 [ 34 Cal. Rptr. 794 ]); actual facts must be alleg

11
Agarwal v. Johnsongreen
cal · 1979 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981The malice required is actual malice, that “state of mind arising from hatred or ill . will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person” {Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]), or lack of reasonable grounds for a belief in the truth of the statement. {Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 926, 936 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 82 ].) Mere allegations of malice are not sufficient {Locke v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal. 2d at p. 603 ; Boyich v. Howell (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 801, 803 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 794 ]); actual facts must be alleged, unless

1981The malice required is actual malice, that “state of mind arising from hatred or ill . will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person” {Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]), or lack of reasonable grounds for a belief in the truth of the statement. {Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 926, 936 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 82 ].) Mere allegations of malice are not sufficient {Locke v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal. 2d at p. 603 ; Boyich v. Howell (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 801, 803 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 794 ]); actual facts must be alleged, unless

11
Boyich v. Howellgreen
calctapp · 1963 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981The malice required is actual malice, that “state of mind arising from hatred or ill . will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person” {Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]), or lack of reasonable grounds for a belief in the truth of the statement. {Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 926, 936 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 82 ].) Mere allegations of malice are not sufficient {Locke v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal. 2d at p. 603 ; Boyich v. Howell (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 801, 803 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 794 ]); actual facts must be alleged, unless

1981The malice required is actual malice, that “state of mind arising from hatred or ill . will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person” {Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]), or lack of reasonable grounds for a belief in the truth of the statement. {Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 926, 936 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 82 ].) Mere allegations of malice are not sufficient {Locke v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal. 2d at p. 603 ; Boyich v. Howell (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 801, 803 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 794 ]); actual facts must be alleged, unless

11
Kramer v. Fergusongreen
calctapp · 1964 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
2 sentences

1980(Kramer v. Ferguson (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 237, 245 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 61 ]; Gantry Constr.

1980(Kramer v. Ferguson (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 237, 245 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 61 ]; Gantry Constr.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Sandoval green
cal · 1992
1 sentence

2014Nor did the comments refer to facts not in evidence; namely, 7 that defense counsel “always” rely on a mitigation strategy, and that it “happens all the time.” (See, e.g., People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 827-828 [statements of fact not in evidence are worthless as a matter of law but can be “dynamite” to a jury].) This too was nothing more than acceptable “advocate’s hyperbole.” (People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 184 .) The jury would have understood that the prosecutor was not stating as “fact” that all defense counsel ask that their clients be convicted of a lesser included

12014–2014
People v. Hill green
calctapp · 1998
1 sentence

2014Nor did the comments refer to facts not in evidence; namely, 7 that defense counsel “always” rely on a mitigation strategy, and that it “happens all the time.” (See, e.g., People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 827-828 [statements of fact not in evidence are worthless as a matter of law but can be “dynamite” to a jury].) This too was nothing more than acceptable “advocate’s hyperbole.” (People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 184 .) The jury would have understood that the prosecutor was not stating as “fact” that all defense counsel ask that their clients be convicted of a lesser included

12014–2014
Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. green
cal · 1989
1 sentence

1991Common Law Right of Fair Comment Hall attempts to invoke the common law right of fair comment, long recognized in California, “which protects] ‘expressions of opinion about public officials, scientists, artists, composers, performers, authors, and other persons who place themselves or their work in the public eye.’ [Citation.]” (Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 732 .) “In California, *909 . . . the cases have extended the fair comment privilege so that, where malice is disproved, the privilege applies not only to comment (opinions) but to false statements of fact as well

11991–1991
Stevens v. Storke green
cal · 1923
2 sentences

1989For example, dicta in prior cases indicate that a public works contractor may be subject to the fair-comment defense. {Stevens v. Storke, supra, 191 Cal. 329, 334-335 ; Williams v. Daily Review, Inc., supra, 236 Cal.App.2d 405, 417 .) Such language, however, should not be read to mean that the mere receipt of public funds is by itself sufficient to give rise to the fair-comment defense.

1989For example, dicta in prior cases indicate that a public works contractor may be subject to the fair-comment defense. {Stevens v. Storke, supra, 191 Cal. 329, 334-335 ; Williams v. Daily Review, Inc., supra, 236 Cal.App.2d 405, 417 .) Such language, however, should not be read to mean that the mere receipt of public funds is by itself sufficient to give rise to the fair-comment defense.

11989–1989
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan green
scotus · 1964
1 sentence

1989(Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, supra, § 114, p. 815.) As we have noted, that rule was restricted in New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. 254 , and subsequent cases and abrogated in Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. 323 .

11989–1989
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. green
scotus · 1974
1 sentence

1989(Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, supra, § 114, p. 815.) As we have noted, that rule was restricted in New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. 254 , and subsequent cases and abrogated in Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. 323 .

11989–1989
Locke v. Mitchell green
cal · 1936
2 sentences

1981The malice required is actual malice, that "state of mind arising from hatred or ill will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person" ( Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944 [ 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]), or lack of reasonable grounds for a belief in the truth of the statement. ( Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal. App.3d 926, 936 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 82 ].) Mere allegations of malice are not sufficient ( Locke v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.2d at p. 603 ; Boyich *539 v. Howell (1963) 221 Cal. App.2d 801, 803 [ 34 Cal. Rptr. 794 ]); actual facts must be alleg

1981The malice required is actual malice, that “state of mind arising from hatred or ill . will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person” {Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]), or lack of reasonable grounds for a belief in the truth of the statement. {Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 926, 936 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 82 ].) Mere allegations of malice are not sufficient {Locke v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal. 2d at p. 603 ; Boyich v. Howell (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 801, 803 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 794 ]); actual facts must be alleged, unless

11981–1981

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Civil Code § 47 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 13 (1987–2023) NJ 12 (1978–2009) MD 7 (1975–2017) CA 5 (1980–2014) OK 4 (2004–2014) IL 4 (1968–1987) UT 3 (1992–2025) MO 3 (1980–1987) NY 3 (1938–1989) CT 2 (1998–1998) OH 2 (2001–2001) PA 2 (1997–2016) MS 2 (1967–1983) MI 2 (1986–1987)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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