fcra claim in California

2024As the Crabill court stated: “Many statutes, notably consumer-protection statutes, authorize the award of 11 damages (called ‘statutory damages’) for violations that cause so little measurable injury that the cost of proving up damages would exceed the damages themselves, making the right to sue nugatory.” (Crabill, supra, 259 F.3d at p. 665 , italics added.) “Injury in fact” is required because “if no injury is alleged (or, if the allegation is contested, proved, [citation]), . . . there is no case or controversy between the parties within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution.” (Ibi

2024As the Crabill court stated: “Many statutes, notably consumer-protection statutes, authorize the award of 11 damages (called ‘statutory damages’) for violations that cause so little measurable injury that the cost of proving up damages would exceed the damages themselves, making the right to sue nugatory.” (Crabill, supra, 259 F.3d at p. 665 , italics added.) “Injury in fact” is required because “if no injury is alleged (or, if the allegation is contested, proved, [citation]), . . . there is no case or controversy between the parties within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution.” (Ibi

2022Va. 2017) 277 F.Supp.3d 821, 846 [“ ‘Because “summary judgment is ‘seldom appropriate’ on whether a party possessed a particular state of mind,” courts have frequently held that willfulness is a question of fact for the jury.’ ”].) For reasons we will explain, this case is no exception to the general rule that willfulness presents a question of fact properly reserved for the jury. i There Is Evidence From Which a Reasonable Jury Could Find a Reckless Violation of the FCRA As noted, willfulness under the FCRA includes reckless statutory violations, in addition to knowing statutory violations. (

2022Va. 2017) 277 F.Supp.3d 821, 846 [“ ‘Because “summary judgment is ‘seldom appropriate’ on whether a party possessed a particular state of mind,” courts have frequently held that willfulness is a question of fact for the jury.’ ”].) For reasons we will explain, this case is no exception to the general rule that willfulness presents a question of fact properly reserved for the jury. i There Is Evidence From Which a Reasonable Jury Could Find a Reckless Violation of the FCRA As noted, willfulness under the FCRA includes reckless statutory violations, in addition to knowing statutory violations. (

2024Actual damages require “proof of actual harm.” (Syed v. M-I, LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 853 F.3d 492, 498 , citing Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C. (7th Cir. 2001) 259 F.3d 662, 664 (Crabill).) Although proof of actual harm is not required to recover statutory damages, this does not obviate the need for an “injury in fact” when bringing an FCRA claim purely for statutory damages.

2024Actual damages require “proof of actual harm.” (Syed v. M-I, LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 853 F.3d 492, 498 , citing Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C. (7th Cir. 2001) 259 F.3d 662, 664 (Crabill).) Although proof of actual harm is not required to recover statutory damages, this does not obviate the need for an “injury in fact” when bringing an FCRA claim purely for statutory damages.

2023A. Standard of Review “ ‘Summary adjudication motions are “procedurally identical” to summary judgment motions. [Citation.] A summary judgment motion “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” [Citation.] To be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the moving party must show by admissible evidence that the “action has no merit or that there is no defense” thereto. [Citation.] A defendant moving for summary judgment meets this burden by presenting evidence d

2023A. Standard of Review “ ‘Summary adjudication motions are “procedurally identical” to summary judgment motions. [Citation.] A summary judgment motion “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” [Citation.] To be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the moving party must show by admissible evidence that the “action has no merit or that there is no defense” thereto. [Citation.] A defendant moving for summary judgment meets this burden by presenting evidence d

2010There, the plaintiff brought multiple claims (including the § 17200 claim as well as FCRA claims) against various defendants. ( Howard , 371 F.Supp.2d at p. 1142 .) The plaintiff's claims stemmed from allegedly inaccurate and derogatory information furnished to and reported by consumer reporting agencies. ( Ibid. ) The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the FCRA did not preempt his section 17200 claim because section 17200 is not *Page 797 inconsistent with the FCRA, but merely provides an additional state remedy for the conduct giving rise to the FCRA claim. ( 371 F.Supp.2d at p. 11

2010There, the plaintiff brought multiple claims (including the § 17200 claim as well as FCRA claims) against various defendants. ( Howard , 371 F.Supp.2d at p. 1142 .) The plaintiff's claims stemmed from allegedly inaccurate and derogatory information furnished to and reported by consumer reporting agencies. ( Ibid. ) The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the FCRA did not preempt his section 17200 claim because section 17200 is not *Page 797 inconsistent with the FCRA, but merely provides an additional state remedy for the conduct giving rise to the FCRA claim. ( 371 F.Supp.2d at p. 11

2010There, the plaintiff brought multiple claims (including the § 17200 claim as well as FCRA claims) against various defendants. ( Howard , 371 F.Supp.2d at p. 1142 .) The plaintiff's claims stemmed from allegedly inaccurate and derogatory information furnished to and reported by consumer reporting agencies. ( Ibid. ) The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the FCRA did not preempt his section 17200 claim because section 17200 is not *Page 797 inconsistent with the FCRA, but merely provides an additional state remedy for the conduct giving rise to the FCRA claim. ( 371 F.Supp.2d at p. 11

2010There, the plaintiff brought multiple claims (including the § 17200 claim as well as FCRA claims) against various defendants. ( Howard , 371 F.Supp.2d at p. 1142 .) The plaintiff's claims stemmed from allegedly inaccurate and derogatory information furnished to and reported by consumer reporting agencies. ( Ibid. ) The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the FCRA did not preempt his section 17200 claim because section 17200 is not *Page 797 inconsistent with the FCRA, but merely provides an additional state remedy for the conduct giving rise to the FCRA claim. ( 371 F.Supp.2d at p. 11