fraud or perjury exception in California

2023The fraud or perjury exception to the interim adverse judgment rule applies when the prior adverse ruling “ ‘was induced by materially false facts,’ ” and “the person making the allegedly false statements ‘ “knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that his representations were false.” ’ [Citation.]” (Kinsella v. Kinsella (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 442 , 463 (Kinsella); see Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 782 [“when a litigant relies on evidence that she knows to be false, she is not entitled to reap the benefits of the interim 24 adverse judgment rule by deceiving a cou

2023The fraud or perjury exception to the interim adverse judgment rule applies when the prior adverse ruling “ ‘was induced by materially false facts,’ ” and “the person making the allegedly false statements ‘ “knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that his representations were false.” ’ [Citation.]” (Kinsella v. Kinsella (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 442 , 463 (Kinsella); see Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 782 [“when a litigant relies on evidence that she knows to be false, she is not entitled to reap the benefits of the interim 24 adverse judgment rule by deceiving a cou

2020Marble Co. (1939) 30 Cal.App.2d 451, 454 ; see also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 639 .) It is not for us to decide whether the handiwork of our sister courts is in error, but we agree it is probably too much to say that Carpenter permits invocation of the fraud or perjury exception for any species of misconduct that might qualify as fraudulent.

2020Marble Co. (1939) 30 Cal.App.2d 451, 454 ; see also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 639 .) It is not for us to decide whether the handiwork of our sister courts is in error, but we agree it is probably too much to say that Carpenter permits invocation of the fraud or perjury exception for any species of misconduct that might qualify as fraudulent.

2020(Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811 , 817–818 & fn. 2 (Wilson); see Fairchild v. Adams (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 10, 15 ; Crescent City Live Stock Co. v. Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House Co. (1887) 120 U.S. 141 , 149–151 (Crescent City Live Stock).) Hence the moniker “interim,” which in these early decisions generally meant a victory embodied in a judgment before it became final on appeal.

2020(Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811 , 817–818 & fn. 2 (Wilson); see Fairchild v. Adams (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 10, 15 ; Crescent City Live Stock Co. v. Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House Co. (1887) 120 U.S. 141 , 149–151 (Crescent City Live Stock).) Hence the moniker “interim,” which in these early decisions generally meant a victory embodied in a judgment before it became final on appeal.

2020(Alfaro, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393 [where deed restrictions in deeds gave plaintiff home buyers enough actual knowledge to put them on inquiry notice of undisclosed information concerning the alleged impact of these restrictions on marketability, dismissal of complaint by buyers whose deeds contained these restrictions affirmed]; see also Stevenson, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 166 [affirming summary judgment where seller’s disclosure was adequate to put buyer on inquiry notice of allegedly concealed fact].) The defendants 75 resist this conclusion, arguing that the fraud or perjury exc

2020(Alfaro, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393 [where deed restrictions in deeds gave plaintiff home buyers enough actual knowledge to put them on inquiry notice of undisclosed information concerning the alleged impact of these restrictions on marketability, dismissal of complaint by buyers whose deeds contained these restrictions affirmed]; see also Stevenson, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 166 [affirming summary judgment where seller’s disclosure was adequate to put buyer on inquiry notice of allegedly concealed fact].) The defendants 75 resist this conclusion, arguing that the fraud or perjury exc

2020(Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477, 484, fn. 4 .) It is debatable whether the exception applies only to conduct classically defined as extrinsic fraud—amounting, essentially, to a violation of due process (Hughes Tool, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d at p. 7 )—or whether it also extends to “ ‘unfair conduct’ ” falling short of what might “support an action for the setting aside of a judgment[.]” (Carpenter, supra, 153 Cal. at p. 218 ; see Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 783 [noting that Carpenter has only been cited three times by the California Supreme Court in more than a century since it was decide

2020(Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477, 484, fn. 4 .) It is debatable whether the exception applies only to conduct classically defined as extrinsic fraud—amounting, essentially, to a violation of due process (Hughes Tool, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d at p. 7 )—or whether it also extends to “ ‘unfair conduct’ ” falling short of what might “support an action for the setting aside of a judgment[.]” (Carpenter, supra, 153 Cal. at p. 218 ; see Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 783 [noting that Carpenter has only been cited three times by the California Supreme Court in more than a century since it was decide

2020(Alfaro, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393 [where deed restrictions in deeds gave plaintiff home buyers enough actual knowledge to put them on inquiry notice of undisclosed information concerning the alleged impact of these restrictions on marketability, dismissal of complaint by buyers whose deeds contained these restrictions affirmed]; see also Stevenson, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 166 [affirming summary judgment where seller’s disclosure was adequate to put buyer on inquiry notice of allegedly concealed fact].) The defendants 75 resist this conclusion, arguing that the fraud or perjury exc

2020(Alfaro, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393 [where deed restrictions in deeds gave plaintiff home buyers enough actual knowledge to put them on inquiry notice of undisclosed information concerning the alleged impact of these restrictions on marketability, dismissal of complaint by buyers whose deeds contained these restrictions affirmed]; see also Stevenson, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 166 [affirming summary judgment where seller’s disclosure was adequate to put buyer on inquiry notice of allegedly concealed fact].) The defendants 75 resist this conclusion, arguing that the fraud or perjury exc

2020(Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477, 484, fn. 4 .) It is debatable whether the exception applies only to conduct classically defined as extrinsic fraud—amounting, essentially, to a violation of due process (Hughes Tool, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d at p. 7 )—or whether it also extends to “ ‘unfair conduct’ ” falling short of what might “support an action for the setting aside of a judgment[.]” (Carpenter, supra, 153 Cal. at p. 218 ; see Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 783 [noting that Carpenter has only been cited three times by the California Supreme Court in more than a century since it was decide

2020(Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477, 484, fn. 4 .) It is debatable whether the exception applies only to conduct classically defined as extrinsic fraud—amounting, essentially, to a violation of due process (Hughes Tool, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d at p. 7 )—or whether it also extends to “ ‘unfair conduct’ ” falling short of what might “support an action for the setting aside of a judgment[.]” (Carpenter, supra, 153 Cal. at p. 218 ; see Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 783 [noting that Carpenter has only been cited three times by the California Supreme Court in more than a century since it was decide

2020(Cf. Crespin v. Coye (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 700, 708 [appellate rulings on review of a preliminary injunction may become law of the case in subsequent proceedings in the same case where court of appeal decides issues of law presented on undisputed facts]; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Const. Trades Council (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 81, 87 [same].) At trial, the court must first address as a preliminary matter the applicability of the fraud or perjury exception to the interim adverse judgment rule.

2020(Cf. Crespin v. Coye (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 700, 708 [appellate rulings on review of a preliminary injunction may become law of the case in subsequent proceedings in the same case where court of appeal decides issues of law presented on undisputed facts]; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Const. Trades Council (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 81, 87 [same].) At trial, the court must first address as a preliminary matter the applicability of the fraud or perjury exception to the interim adverse judgment rule.

2020(Cf. Crespin v. Coye (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 700, 708 [appellate rulings on review of a preliminary injunction may become law of the case in subsequent proceedings in the same case where court of appeal decides issues of law presented on undisputed facts]; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Const. Trades Council (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 81, 87 [same].) At trial, the court must first address as a preliminary matter the applicability of the fraud or perjury exception to the interim adverse judgment rule.

2020(Cf. Crespin v. Coye (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 700, 708 [appellate rulings on review of a preliminary injunction may become law of the case in subsequent proceedings in the same case where court of appeal decides issues of law presented on undisputed facts]; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Const. Trades Council (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 81, 87 [same].) At trial, the court must first address as a preliminary matter the applicability of the fraud or perjury exception to the interim adverse judgment rule.

2020And we think the evidence supplies a prima facie basis for applying the exception in this case. 4 Third, in evaluating the merits of whether Roche bore his prima facie burden on lack of probable cause, must we draw all inferences for a malicious prosecution defendant seeking anti-SLAPP dismissal, contrary to the usual rule that, on review, we draw inferences for the non-movant in the “ ‘ “summary-judgment-like” ’ ” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940 (Sweetwater)) proceedings at step two of the anti-SLAPP process?

2020And we think the evidence supplies a prima facie basis for applying the exception in this case. 4 Third, in evaluating the merits of whether Roche bore his prima facie burden on lack of probable cause, must we draw all inferences for a malicious prosecution defendant seeking anti-SLAPP dismissal, contrary to the usual rule that, on review, we draw inferences for the non-movant in the “ ‘ “summary-judgment-like” ’ ” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940 (Sweetwater)) proceedings at step two of the anti-SLAPP process?