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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1955–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Browngreen2 sentences1980The court stated that a general disinheritance clause is enough to prevent pretermission: “The courts of California have held repeatedly and consistently that a testator’s declaration in his will that he has intentionally omitted to provide for his heirs is a sufficient expression of his intentional omission of provision for children.” (P. 383.) (Italics added.) The court in Estate of Brown (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 160, 161 [ 330 P.2d 232 ], declared that a no-contest clause disinheriting persons who establish their relationship to the decedent bars pretermission of four children, despite a provi 1980The court stated that a general disinheritance clause is enough to prevent pretermission: “The courts of California have held repeatedly and consistently that a testator’s declaration in his will that he has intentionally omitted to provide for his heirs is a sufficient expression of his intentional omission of provision for children.” (P. 383.) (Italics added.) The court in Estate of Brown (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 160, 161 [ 330 P.2d 232 ], declared that a no-contest clause disinheriting persons who establish their relationship to the decedent bars pretermission of four children, despite a provi | 2 | 2 |
In Re Estate of Hassellgreen2 sentences1980As to the meaning of the term, “heirs,” the court in Estate of Hassell (1914) 168 Cal. 287, 289 [ 142 P. 838 ], makes it quite clear that it means basically children although it may include others. 1980As to the meaning of the term, “heirs,” the court in Estate of Hassell (1914) 168 Cal. 287, 289 [ 142 P. 838 ], makes it quite clear that it means basically children although it may include others. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Axcelrod v. Pocker
green
2 sentences1972(Estate of Axcelrod, 23 Cal.2d 761 [ 147 P.2d 1 ].)” (44 Cal.2d at pp. 148-149.) As to the second exception, whether the testator made provision for his spouse in the will, the court states: “It being necessary for the testator to have ‘in mind’ a ‘momentous’ occasion such as marriage, it follows that merely naming or giving a legacy to a person by name . . . with no indication that she may be a prospective spouse, is not enough to prevent revocation. 1972(Estate of Axcelrod, 23 Cal.2d 761 [ 147 P.2d 1 ].)” (44 Cal.2d at pp. 148-149.) As to the second exception, whether the testator made provision for his spouse in the will, the court states: “It being necessary for the testator to have ‘in mind’ a ‘momentous’ occasion such as marriage, it follows that merely naming or giving a legacy to a person by name . . . with no indication that she may be a prospective spouse, is not enough to prevent revocation. | 2 | 1955–1972 |
Estate of Pryor
green
2 sentences2020The principles of statutory construction are well- established. “ ‘We begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.’ ” (Estate of Pryor (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1471 .) “The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387 .) “ ‘If there is no ambiguity, then we presume the law 2020The principles of statutory construction are well- established. “ ‘We begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.’ ” (Estate of Pryor (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1471 .) “The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387 .) “ ‘If there is no ambiguity, then we presume the law | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission
red
1 sentence2020The principles of statutory construction are well- established. “ ‘We begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.’ ” (Estate of Pryor (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1471 .) “The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387 .) “ ‘If there is no ambiguity, then we presume the law | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Switzer v. Wood
green
1 sentence2020The principles of statutory construction are well- established. “ ‘We begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.’ ” (Estate of Pryor (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1471 .) “The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387 .) “ ‘If there is no ambiguity, then we presume the law | 1 | 2020–2020 |