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5 California opinions name it 1 courts 2020–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
John Doe v. Westmont Coll.green2 sentences2020(Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066 (Claremont McKenna).) “ “Although a university must treat students fairly, it is not required to convert its classrooms into courtrooms.’ ” (UC San Diego, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078 .) In examining what kind of hearing comports with fair procedure, California courts have concluded a university must provide the following to the parties involved in a sexual misconduct disciplinary proceeding: notice of the charges and the university’s policies and procedures (USC I, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 241 ); compliance with those p 2020(Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066 (Claremont McKenna).) “ “Although a university must treat students fairly, it is not required to convert its classrooms into courtrooms.’ ” (UC San Diego, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078 .) In examining what kind of hearing comports with fair procedure, California courts have concluded a university must provide the following to the parties involved in a sexual misconduct disciplinary proceeding: notice of the charges and the university’s policies and procedures (USC I, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 241 ); compliance with those p | 2 | 3 |
In Re Antonio C.green2 sentences2020(See People v. Hopkins (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1699, 1702 [after mistrial objection overruled on a legal ground, defense counsel could reasonably have believed further objections would be fruitless]; In re Antonio C. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1033 [“[W]here an objection would have been futile, the claim is not waived.”].) Because we conclude Boermeester did not forfeit his right to cross-examine third-party witnesses, we likewise conclude there was no waiver of his right to an in-person hearing. 10 The dissent asserts Boermeester could have foreseen Allee because his attorney also represented 2020(See People v. Hopkins (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1699, 1702 [after mistrial objection overruled on a legal ground, defense counsel could reasonably have believed further objections would be fruitless]; In re Antonio C. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1033 [“[W]here an objection would have been futile, the claim is not waived.”].) Because we conclude Boermeester did not forfeit his right to cross-examine third-party witnesses, we likewise conclude there was no waiver of his right to an in-person hearing. 10 The dissent asserts Boermeester could have foreseen Allee because his attorney also represented | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hopkinsgreen2 sentences2020(See People v. Hopkins (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1699, 1702 [after mistrial objection overruled on a legal ground, defense counsel could reasonably have believed further objections would be fruitless]; In re Antonio C. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1033 [“[W]here an objection would have been futile, the claim is not waived.”].) Because we conclude Boermeester did not forfeit his right to cross-examine third-party witnesses, we likewise conclude there was no waiver of his right to an in-person hearing. 10 The dissent asserts Boermeester could have foreseen Allee because his attorney also represented 2020(See People v. Hopkins (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1699, 1702 [after mistrial objection overruled on a legal ground, defense counsel could reasonably have believed further objections would be fruitless]; In re Antonio C. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1033 [“[W]here an objection would have been futile, the claim is not waived.”].) Because we conclude Boermeester did not forfeit his right to cross-examine third-party witnesses, we likewise conclude there was no waiver of his right to an in-person hearing. 10 The dissent asserts Boermeester could have foreseen Allee because his attorney also represented | 2 | 2 |
People v. Brooksgreen2 sentences2020(People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 92 [“ ‘Reviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence.’ ”]; see also Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1334 [“An appellant may challenge the admission of evidence for the first time on appeal despite his or her failure to object in the trial court if the challenge is based on a change in the law that the appellant could not reasonably have been expected to foresee.”].) At the time of these discipli 2020(People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 92 [“ ‘Reviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence.’ ”]; see also Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1334 [“An appellant may challenge the admission of evidence for the first time on appeal despite his or her failure to object in the trial court if the challenge is based on a change in the law that the appellant could not reasonably have been expected to foresee.”].) At the time of these discipli | 2 | 2 |
Corenbaum v. Lampkingreen2 sentences2020(People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 92 [“ ‘Reviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence.’ ”]; see also Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1334 [“An appellant may challenge the admission of evidence for the first time on appeal despite his or her failure to object in the trial court if the challenge is based on a change in the law that the appellant could not reasonably have been expected to foresee.”].) At the time of these discipli 2020(People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 92 [“ ‘Reviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence.’ ”]; see also Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1334 [“An appellant may challenge the admission of evidence for the first time on appeal despite his or her failure to object in the trial court if the challenge is based on a change in the law that the appellant could not reasonably have been expected to foresee.”].) At the time of these discipli | 2 | 2 |
Doe v. Claremont McKenna Coll.green2 sentences2020(Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066 (Claremont McKenna).) “ “Although a university must treat students fairly, it is not required to convert its classrooms into courtrooms.’ ” (UC San Diego, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078 .) In examining what kind of hearing comports with fair procedure, California courts have concluded a university must provide the following to the parties involved in a sexual misconduct disciplinary proceeding: notice of the charges and the university’s policies and procedures (USC I, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 241 ); compliance with those p 2020(Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066 (Claremont McKenna).) “ “Although a university must treat students fairly, it is not required to convert its classrooms into courtrooms.’ ” (UC San Diego, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078 .) In examining what kind of hearing comports with fair procedure, California courts have concluded a university must provide the following to the parties involved in a sexual misconduct disciplinary proceeding: notice of the charges and the university’s policies and procedures (USC I, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 241 ); compliance with those p | 2 | 2 |
Elkins v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2020(Univ. of Cincinnati, supra, 872 F.3d at pp. 401–402; Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1358 [“Oral testimony of witnesses given in the presence of the trier of fact is valued for its probative worth on the issue of credibility, because such testimony affords the trier of fact an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses.”]; Doe v. Baum (6th Cir. 2018) 903 F.3d 575, 586 .) USC contends the holdings in Allee and the other university sexual misconduct cases should not be extended to an intimate partner violence case on the ground those cases only apply to sexual assault or 2020(Univ. of Cincinnati, supra, 872 F.3d at pp. 401–402; Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1358 [“Oral testimony of witnesses given in the presence of the trier of fact is valued for its probative worth on the issue of credibility, because such testimony affords the trier of fact an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses.”]; Doe v. Baum (6th Cir. 2018) 903 F.3d 575, 586 .) USC contends the holdings in Allee and the other university sexual misconduct cases should not be extended to an intimate partner violence case on the ground those cases only apply to sexual assault or | 2 | 2 |
Swarthout v. Cookegreen2 sentences2022(Citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex (1979) 442 U.S. 1 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 668 ] & Swarthout v. Cooke (2011) 562 U.S. 216 [ 178 L.Ed.2d 732 ].) He believes “taken together the two cases make clear that a live hearing is the minimum process required to comply with procedural due process.” In his view, “[t]hat conclusion follows from 1) the fact that Greenholtz involved a parole procedure where inmates could appear in person and speak to the Parole Board [citation], and 2) Swarthout’s clear statement that ‘the minimum procedures adequate for due process protection’ a 2022(Citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex (1979) 442 U.S. 1 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 668 ] & Swarthout v. Cooke (2011) 562 U.S. 216 [ 178 L.Ed.2d 732 ].) He believes “taken together the two cases make clear that a live hearing is the minimum process required to comply with procedural due process.” In his view, “[t]hat conclusion follows from 1) the fact that Greenholtz involved a parole procedure where inmates could appear in person and speak to the Parole Board [citation], and 2) Swarthout’s clear statement that ‘the minimum procedures adequate for due process protection’ a | 1 | 1 |
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complexgreen2 sentences2022(Citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex (1979) 442 U.S. 1 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 668 ] & Swarthout v. Cooke (2011) 562 U.S. 216 [ 178 L.Ed.2d 732 ].) He believes “taken together the two cases make clear that a live hearing is the minimum process required to comply with procedural due process.” In his view, “[t]hat conclusion follows from 1) the fact that Greenholtz involved a parole procedure where inmates could appear in person and speak to the Parole Board [citation], and 2) Swarthout’s clear statement that ‘the minimum procedures adequate for due process protection’ a 2022(Citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex (1979) 442 U.S. 1 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 668 ] & Swarthout v. Cooke (2011) 562 U.S. 216 [ 178 L.Ed.2d 732 ].) He believes “taken together the two cases make clear that a live hearing is the minimum process required to comply with procedural due process.” In his view, “[t]hat conclusion follows from 1) the fact that Greenholtz involved a parole procedure where inmates could appear in person and speak to the Parole Board [citation], and 2) Swarthout’s clear statement that ‘the minimum procedures adequate for due process protection’ a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
John Doe v. David Baum
green
2 sentences2020(Univ. of Cincinnati, supra, 872 F.3d at pp. 401–402; Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1358 [“Oral testimony of witnesses given in the presence of the trier of fact is valued for its probative worth on the issue of credibility, because such testimony affords the trier of fact an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses.”]; Doe v. Baum (6th Cir. 2018) 903 F.3d 575, 586 .) USC contends the holdings in Allee and the other university sexual misconduct cases should not be extended to an intimate partner violence case on the ground those cases only apply to sexual assault or 2020(Univ. of Cincinnati, supra, 872 F.3d at pp. 401–402; Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1358 [“Oral testimony of witnesses given in the presence of the trier of fact is valued for its probative worth on the issue of credibility, because such testimony affords the trier of fact an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses.”]; Doe v. Baum (6th Cir. 2018) 903 F.3d 575, 586 .) USC contends the holdings in Allee and the other university sexual misconduct cases should not be extended to an intimate partner violence case on the ground those cases only apply to sexual assault or | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Warner Construction Corp. v. City of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2020Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 285 , 299–300, fn. 17 [no waiver where objection was overruled and objecting party attempted to minimize impact of admission of evidence].) To the extent USC contends Boermeester’s objection was insufficiently specific, that is, he failed to object on the ground he could not question Roe at an in-person hearing, we conclude that objection was not supported by the law at the time and would have been futile for the same reasons specified above. 2020Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 285 , 299–300, fn. 17 [no waiver where objection was overruled and objecting party attempted to minimize impact of admission of evidence].) To the extent USC contends Boermeester’s objection was insufficiently specific, that is, he failed to object on the ground he could not question Roe at an in-person hearing, we conclude that objection was not supported by the law at the time and would have been futile for the same reasons specified above. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Doe v. University of Southern California
green
2 sentences2020(Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066 (Claremont McKenna).) “ “Although a university must treat students fairly, it is not required to convert its classrooms into courtrooms.’ ” (UC San Diego, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078 .) In examining what kind of hearing comports with fair procedure, California courts have concluded a university must provide the following to the parties involved in a sexual misconduct disciplinary proceeding: notice of the charges and the university’s policies and procedures (USC I, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 241 ); compliance with those p 2020(Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066 (Claremont McKenna).) “ “Although a university must treat students fairly, it is not required to convert its classrooms into courtrooms.’ ” (UC San Diego, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078 .) In examining what kind of hearing comports with fair procedure, California courts have concluded a university must provide the following to the parties involved in a sexual misconduct disciplinary proceeding: notice of the charges and the university’s policies and procedures (USC I, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 241 ); compliance with those p | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Doe v. Allee
green
2 sentences2020(Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066 (Claremont McKenna).) “ “Although a university must treat students fairly, it is not required to convert its classrooms into courtrooms.’ ” (UC San Diego, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078 .) In examining what kind of hearing comports with fair procedure, California courts have concluded a university must provide the following to the parties involved in a sexual misconduct disciplinary proceeding: notice of the charges and the university’s policies and procedures (USC I, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 241 ); compliance with those p 2020(Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066 (Claremont McKenna).) “ “Although a university must treat students fairly, it is not required to convert its classrooms into courtrooms.’ ” (UC San Diego, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078 .) In examining what kind of hearing comports with fair procedure, California courts have concluded a university must provide the following to the parties involved in a sexual misconduct disciplinary proceeding: notice of the charges and the university’s policies and procedures (USC I, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 241 ); compliance with those p | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Lewis v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2024As our high court observed in Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232 , “The terms ‘hear’ and ‘hearing’ are not defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In Re Marriage of Cornejo
green
1 sentence2022As explained ante, “ ‘[i]t is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.’ ” (In re Marriage of Cornejo, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 388 .) We also do not find pertinent the United States Supreme Court’s statement in Swarthout that “the minimum procedures adequate for due-process protection of [a 29 prisoner’s liberty interest in receiving parole] are those set forth in Greenholtz.” (Swarthout v. Cooke, supra, 562 U.S. at p. 221 [ 178 L.Ed.2d at p. 737 ].) When read in context with the preceding paragraph in that case and considering the facts of Greenholtz, it is clear | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Wolff v. McDonnell
green
2 sentences2022Further, as noted in Kavanaugh, “numerous lower federal courts have found the parole regulations do not violate prisoners’ procedural due process rights under the federal Constitution” and “there is federal appellate authority standing for the proposition that in-person parole hearings are not guaranteed by the federal due process clause.” (In re Kavanaugh, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 359, fn. 19.) Finally, petitioner asserts “[a]t least one other procedural due process case from the prison context strongly favors [his] position.” (Citing Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 935 2022Further, as noted in Kavanaugh, “numerous lower federal courts have found the parole regulations do not violate prisoners’ procedural due process rights under the federal Constitution” and “there is federal appellate authority standing for the proposition that in-person parole hearings are not guaranteed by the federal due process clause.” (In re Kavanaugh, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 359, fn. 19.) Finally, petitioner asserts “[a]t least one other procedural due process case from the prison context strongly favors [his] position.” (Citing Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 935 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
green
1 sentence2021(See Doe v. Regents of University of California (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 44, 57 .) There must be an in-person hearing, including testimony from the parties and witnesses. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.