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5 California opinions name it 1 courts 1997–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Constructiongreen2 sentences2026Under the doctrine of ‘conclusiveness of pleadings,’ a pleader is bound by well pleaded material allegations or by failure to deny well pleaded material allegations.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 228–229.) “Because an admission in the pleadings forbids the consideration of contrary evidence, any discussion of such evidence is irrelevant and immaterial.” (Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Construction (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271 (Valerio).) Tara initially argues that the separation date alleged in the amended petition is a mixed question of fact and law to which the judicial admission doctrine does not app 2026Under the doctrine of ‘conclusiveness of pleadings,’ a pleader is bound by well pleaded material allegations or by failure to deny well pleaded material allegations.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 228–229.) “Because an admission in the pleadings forbids the consideration of contrary evidence, any discussion of such evidence is irrelevant and immaterial.” (Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Construction (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271 (Valerio).) Tara initially argues that the separation date alleged in the amended petition is a mixed question of fact and law to which the judicial admission doctrine does not app | 2 | 2 |
Barsegian v. Kessler & Kesslergreen2 sentences2026(V.S., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 229.) We are skeptical of this argument (see In re Marriage of Lee & Lin (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 698 , 702; In re Marriage of Manfer (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 925, 930 ), but need not resolve the question definitively because, even assuming the allegation is properly treated as one of fact, “not every factual allegation in a complaint automatically constitutes a judicial admission.” (Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 446, 451 (Barsegian).) 11 Here, we conclude that the circumstances did not warrant treating Tara’s allegation as a judicial admis 2026(V.S., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 229.) We are skeptical of this argument (see In re Marriage of Lee & Lin (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 698 , 702; In re Marriage of Manfer (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 925, 930 ), but need not resolve the question definitively because, even assuming the allegation is properly treated as one of fact, “not every factual allegation in a complaint automatically constitutes a judicial admission.” (Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 446, 451 (Barsegian).) 11 Here, we conclude that the circumstances did not warrant treating Tara’s allegation as a judicial admis | 2 | 2 |
Hearn Pacific Corp. v. Second Generation Roofing, Inc.green1 sentence2024(Hearn Pacific Corp., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 132, fn.7 .) It does not contradict 9 Star’s allegations for it to contend that Café 86 is a corporation. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Manfer v. Manfer
green
2 sentences2026(V.S., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 229.) We are skeptical of this argument (see In re Marriage of Lee & Lin (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 698 , 702; In re Marriage of Manfer (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 925, 930 ), but need not resolve the question definitively because, even assuming the allegation is properly treated as one of fact, “not every factual allegation in a complaint automatically constitutes a judicial admission.” (Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 446, 451 (Barsegian).) 11 Here, we conclude that the circumstances did not warrant treating Tara’s allegation as a judicial admis 2026(V.S., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 229.) We are skeptical of this argument (see In re Marriage of Lee & Lin (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 698 , 702; In re Marriage of Manfer (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 925, 930 ), but need not resolve the question definitively because, even assuming the allegation is properly treated as one of fact, “not every factual allegation in a complaint automatically constitutes a judicial admission.” (Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 446, 451 (Barsegian).) 11 Here, we conclude that the circumstances did not warrant treating Tara’s allegation as a judicial admis | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
green
1 sentence2023However, even assuming that some of the trial court’s stated reasons were erroneous, “if a judgment is correct on any theory, the appellate court will affirm it regardless of the trial court’s reasoning.” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 .) 8 V.S. complains that the testimony provided by both experts was “quite frankly, internally inconsistent and contradictory.” 13 is performed. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Mason v. Marriage & Family Center
green
1 sentence1997(Mason v. Marriage & Family Center (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 537 , 545-546 . . . [mistaken answer to interrogatory does not support summary judgment].)” (11 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1066-1067.) We conclude that neither the judicial admission doctrine nor the D’Amico principle applies herein. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.