means-ends test in California

2015Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528, 540-545 [ 161 L.Ed.2d 876 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 ] (Lingle) clarified that this means-ends standard stated a due process principle, not a test for a regulatory taking.

2015Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528, 540-545 [ 161 L.Ed.2d 876 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 ] (Lingle) clarified that this means-ends standard stated a due process principle, not a test for a regulatory taking.

2015(San Remo Hotel, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 671 ; see Ehrlich, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 865–867, 870, fn. 7 (plur. opn.) [equating reasonable relationship takings standard with Nollan/Dolan scrutiny and viewing latter as derived from ― ‗substantially advance‘ ‖ test], 897 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.) [viewing reasonable relationship takings standard as closer to rational basis test than to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny, but deriving it from Agins‘s means-ends takings principle].) San Remo Hotel‘s use of a means-ends analysis to evaluate the plaintiffs‘ takings claims was appropriate in light of the then-exta

2014“The Penn Central inquiry is not a means-ends test; the question is not ‘whether a regulation of private property is effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose.’ [Citation.] Instead, the goal is to assess the ‘magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property rights’ in order to determine whether its effects are ‘functionally comparable to government appropriation or invasion of private property.’ [Citation.]” (Lockaway Storage, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 185 .) “Although the Penn Central factors do not serve as a checklist, a court may dis

2014(Shaw, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 272 .) “A ‘“reasonable investment-backed expectation”’ must be more than a ‘“unilateral expectation or an abstract need.”’ [Citation.] Also important in analyzing this factor is the ‘nature and extent of permitted development under the regulatory regime vis-à-vis the development sought by the claimant.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 273.) The school contends that the yellow tagging interfered with distinct, investment-backed expectations, arguing that it had entered into a five-year lease, had 158 students, and knew that the City was flexible about allowing busine

2008“First, there must exist an ‘essential nexus’ between the ‘ “legitimate state interest” ’ the government asserts will be furthered by the condition of a development permit and the exaction itself. [Citations.] Second, there must exist a ‘rough proportionality’ between a development restriction imposed on a landowner and the extent of the impact the state imposed development condition is supposed to mitigate.” (Action Apartment Assn. v. City of Santa Monica (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 456, 469 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 722 ].) In Lingle , the court clarified that to the extent this test for exaction cases ap

2008“First, there must exist an ‘essential nexus’ between the ‘ “legitimate state interest” ’ the government asserts will be furthered by the condition of a development permit and the exaction itself. [Citations.] Second, there must exist a ‘rough proportionality’ between a development restriction imposed on a landowner and the extent of the impact the state imposed development condition is supposed to mitigate.” (Action Apartment Assn. v. City of Santa Monica (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 456, 469 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 722 ].) In Lingle , the court clarified that to the extent this test for exaction cases ap

1999Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, 260 U.S. at p. 415 [ 43 S.Ct. at p. 160 ]), to unconstitutional predatory or rent-seeking exactions.

1999Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, 260 U.S. at p. 415 [ 43 S.Ct. at p. 160 ]), to unconstitutional predatory or rent-seeking exactions.