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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1919–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Briseno v. City of Santa Anagreen1 sentence2020(Id. at p. 1381; see also id. at p. 1382.) The occupancy standard or ordinance at issue in Briseno pertained to the minimum size of the dwelling unit and the number of occupants, and it conflicted with the occupancy standards set forth in the Uniform Housing Code, as adopted by the State Housing Law. ( Briseno, supra, at pp. 1379-1380 ; see § 17922, subd. (a); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 25, § 32.) In this case, however, the NOV was based on the lack of permits and the violation of setback requirements, not occupancy standards. | 1 | 1 |
Mountain Brow Lodge No. 82 v. Toscanogreen2 sentences1983(Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary (1919) 181 Cal. 680, 682 [ 186 P. 596 , 9 A.L.R. 115 ]; Mountain Brow Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. Toscano (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 22, 25-26 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 816 ].) In general they may be enforced as equitable servitudes (Wayt v. Patee (1928) 205 Cal. 46, 51 [ 269 P. 660 ]); however, the Silvers’ claim that this occupancy requirement violates Civil Code section 53 subdivision (b). 1983(Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary (1919) 181 Cal. 680, 682 [ 186 P. 596 , 9 A.L.R. 115 ]; Mountain Brow Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. Toscano (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 22, 25-26 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 816 ].) In general they may be enforced as equitable servitudes (Wayt v. Patee (1928) 205 Cal. 46, 51 [ 269 P. 660 ]); however, the Silvers’ claim that this occupancy requirement violates Civil Code section 53 subdivision (b). | 1 | 1 |
Wayt v. Pateegreen2 sentences1983(Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary (1919) 181 Cal. 680, 682 [ 186 P. 596 , 9 A.L.R. 115 ]; Mountain Brow Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. Toscano (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 22, 25-26 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 816 ].) In general they may be enforced as equitable servitudes (Wayt v. Patee (1928) 205 Cal. 46, 51 [ 269 P. 660 ]); however, the Silvers’ claim that this occupancy requirement violates Civil Code section 53 subdivision (b). 1983(Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary (1919) 181 Cal. 680, 682 [ 186 P. 596 , 9 A.L.R. 115 ]; Mountain Brow Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. Toscano (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 22, 25-26 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 816 ].) In general they may be enforced as equitable servitudes (Wayt v. Patee (1928) 205 Cal. 46, 51 [ 269 P. 660 ]); however, the Silvers’ claim that this occupancy requirement violates Civil Code section 53 subdivision (b). | 1 | 1 |
Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Garygreen2 sentences1983(Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary (1919) 181 Cal. 680, 682 [ 186 P. 596 , 9 A.L.R. 115 ]; Mountain Brow Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. Toscano (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 22, 25-26 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 816 ].) In general they may be enforced as equitable servitudes (Wayt v. Patee (1928) 205 Cal. 46, 51 [ 269 P. 660 ]); however, the Silvers’ claim that this occupancy requirement violates Civil Code section 53 subdivision (b). 1983(Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary (1919) 181 Cal. 680, 682 [ 186 P. 596 , 9 A.L.R. 115 ]; Mountain Brow Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. Toscano (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 22, 25-26 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 816 ].) In general they may be enforced as equitable servitudes (Wayt v. Patee (1928) 205 Cal. 46, 51 [ 269 P. 660 ]); however, the Silvers’ claim that this occupancy requirement violates Civil Code section 53 subdivision (b). | 1 | 1 |
Tenhet v. Boswellgreen2 sentences1977(Tenhet v. Boswell (1976) 18 Cal.3d 150, 153-155 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 554 P.2d 330 ], and cases cited.) 2 A cross-complaint by the city against the designers and builders of the plant, as well as cross-complaints between those cross-defendants, were severed for purposes of trial and are not before us on this appeal. 3 Military and Veterans Code section 987.2 reads, in relevant part, “The contract made between the department and purchaser shall provide that the purchaser maintain the farm or home as his place of residence ....” A waiver of the occupancy requirement “for a period not to exceed f 1977(Tenhet v. Boswell (1976) 18 Cal.3d 150, 153-155 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 554 P.2d 330 ], and cases cited.) 2 A cross-complaint by the city against the designers and builders of the plant, as well as cross-complaints between those cross-defendants, were severed for purposes of trial and are not before us on this appeal. 3 Military and Veterans Code section 987.2 reads, in relevant part, “The contract made between the department and purchaser shall provide that the purchaser maintain the farm or home as his place of residence ....” A waiver of the occupancy requirement “for a period not to exceed f | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Howard
green
1 sentence2025That court resolved whether the victim had to “actually be the occupant of a vehicle.” (Id. at pp. 1565–1566.) In addressing the occupancy requirement, Lara assumed “the brandishing reasonably generated apprehension or fear of bodily harm on the part of the person threatened.” (Id. at p. 1565.) But “‘“[l]anguage used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.”’” (People v. Carroll (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1418 .) The same principle applies to People v. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Carroll
green
1 sentence2025That court resolved whether the victim had to “actually be the occupant of a vehicle.” (Id. at pp. 1565–1566.) In addressing the occupancy requirement, Lara assumed “the brandishing reasonably generated apprehension or fear of bodily harm on the part of the person threatened.” (Id. at p. 1565.) But “‘“[l]anguage used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.”’” (People v. Carroll (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1418 .) The same principle applies to People v. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Gray v. Walker
green
2 sentences1919In Gray v. Walker, 157 Cal. 381 , [ 108 Pac. 278 ], our supreme court said: "The requirement of the statute that the land be ‘usually cultivated or improved’ means that it should be cultivated or improved in the manner or to the extent usual in the case of similar property. 1919In Gray v. Walker, 157 Cal. 381 , [ 108 Pac. 278 ], our supreme court said: "The requirement of the statute that the land be ‘usually cultivated or improved’ means that it should be cultivated or improved in the manner or to the extent usual in the case of similar property. | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.