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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Lisa R.green2 sentences1998Accordingly, a court, before receiving evidence thereof, must in each instance make a preliminary determination, as by offer of proof, that due process concepts would be offended if the particular claimant to parentage were denied an opportunity to prove his claim.” (In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636, 651, fn. 17 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 475 , 532 P.2d 123 , 90 A.L.R.3d 1017 ]; see also Michelle W. v. Ronald W. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 354, 360 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 748 , 703 P.2d 88 ].) Dawn forcefully argues that such a method of analysis runs the risk of merely substituting this court’s policy choices for those 1998Accordingly, a court, before receiving evidence thereof, must in each instance make a preliminary determination, as by offer of proof, that due process concepts would be offended if the particular claimant to parentage were denied an opportunity to prove his claim.” (In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636, 651, fn. 17 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 475 , 532 P.2d 123 , 90 A.L.R.3d 1017 ]; see also Michelle W. v. Ronald W. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 354, 360 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 748 , 703 P.2d 88 ].) Dawn forcefully argues that such a method of analysis runs the risk of merely substituting this court’s policy choices for those | 1 | 1 |
Michelle W. v. Ronald W.green2 sentences1998Accordingly, a court, before receiving evidence thereof, must in each instance make a preliminary determination, as by offer of proof, that due process concepts would be offended if the particular claimant to parentage were denied an opportunity to prove his claim.” (In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636, 651, fn. 17 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 475 , 532 P.2d 123 , 90 A.L.R.3d 1017 ]; see also Michelle W. v. Ronald W. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 354, 360 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 748 , 703 P.2d 88 ].) Dawn forcefully argues that such a method of analysis runs the risk of merely substituting this court’s policy choices for those 1998Accordingly, a court, before receiving evidence thereof, must in each instance make a preliminary determination, as by offer of proof, that due process concepts would be offended if the particular claimant to parentage were denied an opportunity to prove his claim.” (In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636, 651, fn. 17 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 475 , 532 P.2d 123 , 90 A.L.R.3d 1017 ]; see also Michelle W. v. Ronald W. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 354, 360 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 748 , 703 P.2d 88 ].) Dawn forcefully argues that such a method of analysis runs the risk of merely substituting this court’s policy choices for those | 1 | 1 |
People v. Benfordgreen2 sentences1967Here defendant has been prejudiced only if the committing magistrate’s opinion as to the fact of entrapment was correct. *852 Entrapment exists where the crime is actually planned (instigated) by the police rather than originating in the mind of the defendant and defendant is lured into the commission of the crime. “ [W] here a defendant has a preexisting criminal intent, the fact that when solicited by a decoy he commits a crime does not show entrapment. ...” (People v. Benford, 53 Cal.2d 1,10 [ 345 P.2d 928 ].) The question in the instant case is a close one. 1967Here defendant has been prejudiced only if the committing magistrate’s opinion as to the fact of entrapment was correct. *852 Entrapment exists where the crime is actually planned (instigated) by the police rather than originating in the mind of the defendant and defendant is lured into the commission of the crime. “ [W] here a defendant has a preexisting criminal intent, the fact that when solicited by a decoy he commits a crime does not show entrapment. ...” (People v. Benford, 53 Cal.2d 1,10 [ 345 P.2d 928 ].) The question in the instant case is a close one. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Hill
green
1 sentence2023(Smith v. Hill (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 374 , 385–386.) The protective policy for requiring a bond is not implicated where the adverse party has sufficient notice and a full and fair opportunity to be heard in opposition to the request. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Dolan v. City of Tigard
green
2 sentences1999If the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n (1987) 483 U.S. 825 , 107 S.Ct. 3141 , 97 L.Ed.2d 677 ( Nollan ) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 , 129 L.Ed.2d 304 ( Dolan ) apply, Santa Monica must show its ceiling on residential rents has "substantially advanced" the ordinance's legitimate aims and establish a rough proportionality between regulatory means and ends. 1999If the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n (1987) 483 U.S. 825 , 107 S.Ct. 3141 , 97 L.Ed.2d 677 ( Nollan ) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 , 129 L.Ed.2d 304 ( Dolan ) apply, Santa Monica must show its ceiling on residential rents has "substantially advanced" the ordinance's legitimate aims and establish a rough proportionality between regulatory means and ends. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
green
2 sentences1999If the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n (1987) 483 U.S. 825 , 107 S.Ct. 3141 , 97 L.Ed.2d 677 ( Nollan ) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 , 129 L.Ed.2d 304 ( Dolan ) apply, Santa Monica must show its ceiling on residential rents has "substantially advanced" the ordinance's legitimate aims and establish a rough proportionality between regulatory means and ends. 1999If the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n (1987) 483 U.S. 825 , 107 S.Ct. 3141 , 97 L.Ed.2d 677 ( Nollan ) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 , 129 L.Ed.2d 304 ( Dolan ) apply, Santa Monica must show its ceiling on residential rents has "substantially advanced" the ordinance's legitimate aims and establish a rough proportionality between regulatory means and ends. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Sacramento County Welfare Department v. Victor R.
green
1 sentence1998Accordingly, a court, before receiving evidence thereof, must in each instance make a preliminary determination, as by offer of proof, that due process concepts would be offended if the particular claimant to parentage were denied an opportunity to prove his claim.” (In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636, 651, fn. 17 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 475 , 532 P.2d 123 , 90 A.L.R.3d 1017 ]; see also Michelle W. v. Ronald W. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 354, 360 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 748 , 703 P.2d 88 ].) Dawn forcefully argues that such a method of analysis runs the risk of merely substituting this court’s policy choices for those | 1 | 1998–1998 |
William Dal Porto & Sons, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences1989Understandably, the cases upholding the make-whole remedy in the context of elections have never imposed upon the Board the unenviable duty of proving a contract would have been concluded were it not for the employer's unlawful interference in the election process." (Italics added; 191 Cal. App.3d at p. 1209 .) Dal Porto 's implication, thus, is that the employer guilty of bad faith technical refusal to bargain is entitled, no less than his surface-bargaining counterpart, to an opportunity to prove that factors other than the employer's bad faith refusal to bargain precluded agreement for high 1989Understandably, the cases upholding the make-whole remedy in the context of elections have never imposed upon the Board the unenviable duty of proving a contract would have been concluded were it not for the employer’s unlawful interference in the election process.” (Italics added; 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 1209 .) Dal Porto’s implication, thus, is that the employer guilty of bad faith technical refusal to bargain is entitled, no less than his surface-bargaining counterpart, to an opportunity to prove that factors other than the employer’s bad faith refusal to bargain precluded agreement for higher | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.