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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williamson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2002One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature." ( Williamson v. *657 United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594, 599-600 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 , 129 L.Ed.2d 476 .) Whether a statement is self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by viewing the statement in context. ( Id. at p. 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431 .) In view of these concerns, this court "long ago determined that `the hearsay exception should not apply to collateral assertions within declarations against penal interest.' [Citation.] ... [W] 2002One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature." ( Williamson v. *657 United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594, 599-600 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 , 129 L.Ed.2d 476 .) Whether a statement is self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by viewing the statement in context. ( Id. at p. 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431 .) In view of these concerns, this court "long ago determined that `the hearsay exception should not apply to collateral assertions within declarations against penal interest.' [Citation.] ... [W] | 2 | 2 |
People v. Duartegreen2 sentences2002That statute provides: "Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made th 2002That statute provides: "Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made th | 1 | 2 |
People v. Roldangreen1 sentence2014(See People v. Roldan (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 969, 980 [under Evidence Code section 240, “[u]ltimately, the burden is on the government to prove it has exercised good faith and due diligence in attempting to secure a witness’s attendance for trial”].) 9 The People do not argue that Mrs. Brown was unavailable because the marital privilege exempted or precluded her from testifying. 16 The error, however, was harmless and does not require reversal. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gonzalesgreen1 sentence2014(See People v. Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1289 [“‘“[w]ith respect to the penal interest exception, the proponent of the evidence ‘must show that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant’s penal interest when made and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character’”’”].) In the absence of a showing or a finding that Mrs. Brown was unavailable, the trial court erred by admitting Detective Fassam’s testimony about the statements Mrs. Brown made to him. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Elliotgreen2 sentences2012In any event, it is meritless. “ ‘With respect to the penal interest exception, the proponent of the evidence “must show that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant’s penal interest when made and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character.” [Citations.]’ (People v. Lawley[, supra,] 27 Cal.4th 102 ,153 .. ..)” (People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 483 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759 , 122 P.3d 968 ].) Veronica’s statements were exculpatory rather than inculpatory, and therefore were not against her penal intere 2012In any event, it is meritless. “ ‘With respect to the penal interest exception, the proponent of the evidence “must show that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant’s penal interest when made and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character.” [Citations.]’ (People v. Lawley[, supra,] 27 Cal.4th 102 ,153 .. ..)” (People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 483 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759 , 122 P.3d 968 ].) Veronica’s statements were exculpatory rather than inculpatory, and therefore were not against her penal intere | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lucasgreen2 sentences2002That statute provides: "Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made th 2002That statute provides: "Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made th | 1 | 1 |
People v. Campagreen2 sentences2002That statute provides: "Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made th 2002That statute provides: "Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made th | 1 | 1 |
People v. Friersongreen2 sentences2000(See, e.g., People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 744-746 , 280 Cal. Rptr. 440 , 808 P.2d 1197 [no abuse of discretion in rejecting defense hearsay evidence of third party's admission he committed the charged murder, where admission was made to defense investigator long after defendant was judged guilty, and likely motive was to help defendant with little personal risk].) But insofar as Morris, in police custody and facing criminal prosecution, admitted his participation in a drive-by shooting, his admissions exhibit patent indicia of reliability. [2] The jury seems at least as likely to dr 2000(See, e.g., People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 744-746 , 280 Cal. Rptr. 440 , 808 P.2d 1197 [no abuse of discretion in rejecting defense hearsay evidence of third party's admission he committed the charged murder, where admission was made to defense investigator long after defendant was judged guilty, and likely motive was to help defendant with little personal risk].) But insofar as Morris, in police custody and facing criminal prosecution, admitted his participation in a drive-by shooting, his admissions exhibit patent indicia of reliability. [2] The jury seems at least as likely to dr | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lawley
green
2 sentences2012In any event, it is meritless. “ ‘With respect to the penal interest exception, the proponent of the evidence “must show that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant’s penal interest when made and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character.” [Citations.]’ (People v. Lawley[, supra,] 27 Cal.4th 102 ,153 .. ..)” (People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 483 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759 , 122 P.3d 968 ].) Veronica’s statements were exculpatory rather than inculpatory, and therefore were not against her penal intere 2005(Evid.Code, § 1230.) "With respect to the penal interest exception, the proponent of the evidence `must show that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant's penal interest when made and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153 , 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ; see also Evid.Code, § 1230.) Even assuming that defendant's argument on this point has been properly preserved, the statements at issue here do not meet this standard. | 3 | 2002–2012 |
People v. Greenberger
green
1 sentence2002(See id. at pp. 336-341, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61 [finding hearsay statements identifying coconspirators admissible under the penal interest exception].) Nonetheless, this conclusion does not warrant reversal because defendant cannot meet the third prong of the penal interest exception: "that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character." ( People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 611, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 701 , 12 P.3d 1110 .) At oral *674 argument, defendant made a detailed presentation of the facts surrounding the excluded statements to show their reliab | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Gordon
green
2 sentences2002One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature." ( Williamson v. *657 United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594, 599-600 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 , 129 L.Ed.2d 476 .) Whether a statement is self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by viewing the statement in context. ( Id. at p. 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431 .) In view of these concerns, this court "long ago determined that `the hearsay exception should not apply to collateral assertions within declarations against penal interest.' [Citation.] ... [W] 2002One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature." ( Williamson v. *657 United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594, 599-600 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 , 129 L.Ed.2d 476 .) Whether a statement is self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by viewing the statement in context. ( Id. at p. 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431 .) In view of these concerns, this court "long ago determined that `the hearsay exception should not apply to collateral assertions within declarations against penal interest.' [Citation.] ... [W] | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Windham
green
1 sentence2002That statute provides: "Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made th | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Ohio v. Roberts
red
2 sentences2000(E.g., Lilly v. Virginia (1999) 527 U.S. 116, 124-125 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (plur.opn.) ( Lilly ); Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 .) However, I believe any error in the admission of these isolated segments was harmless by any applicable standard. 2000(E.g., Lilly v. Virginia (1999) 527 U.S. 116, 124-125 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (plur.opn.) ( Lilly ); Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 .) However, I believe any error in the admission of these isolated segments was harmless by any applicable standard. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Leach
green
2 sentences2000Minor portions of William Morris's interview in police custody, even as redacted for use at trial, may have been improperly admitted against defendant under the penal-interest exception to California's hearsay rule (Evid.Code, § 1230), because they were not "specifically disserving" to the nontestifying Morris himself and thus lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. ( People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 441 , 124 Cal.Rptr. 752 , 541 P.2d 296 ( Leach ).) If so, admission of these same fragments may also have violated the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause, because they neither fell with 2000Minor portions of William Morris's interview in police custody, even as redacted for use at trial, may have been improperly admitted against defendant under the penal-interest exception to California's hearsay rule (Evid.Code, § 1230), because they were not "specifically disserving" to the nontestifying Morris himself and thus lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. ( People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 441 , 124 Cal.Rptr. 752 , 541 P.2d 296 ( Leach ).) If so, admission of these same fragments may also have violated the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause, because they neither fell with | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Lilly v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2000(E.g., Lilly v. Virginia (1999) 527 U.S. 116, 124-125 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (plur.opn.) ( Lilly ); Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 .) However, I believe any error in the admission of these isolated segments was harmless by any applicable standard. 2000(E.g., Lilly v. Virginia (1999) 527 U.S. 116, 124-125 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (plur.opn.) ( Lilly ); Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 .) However, I believe any error in the admission of these isolated segments was harmless by any applicable standard. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.