potential indemnity claim in California

2001(See, e.g., Kroll & Tract v. Paris & Paris (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1542-1545 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 78 ]; Major Clients Agency v. Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1127-1129 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 ]; Held v. Arant (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 748, 752-753 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 422 ].) “ ‘Perceiving that attorneys would be reluctant to accept cases that might result in indemnity claims, and, more significantly, that if faced with a potential indemnity claim, the attorney’s sense of self-preservation might impinge on his or her duty of undivided loyalty to the client, these cases have established an exception to

2001(See, e.g., Kroll & Tract v. Paris & Paris (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1542-1545 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 78 ]; Major Clients Agency v. Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1127-1129 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 ]; Held v. Arant (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 748, 752-753 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 422 ].) “ ‘Perceiving that attorneys would be reluctant to accept cases that might result in indemnity claims, and, more significantly, that if faced with a potential indemnity claim, the attorney’s sense of self-preservation might impinge on his or her duty of undivided loyalty to the client, these cases have established an exception to

1998Major Clients’ reliance upon the case of Parker v. Morton, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d 751 where the court took a position which deviates from the general rule, holding that a lawyer could assert a cause of action for indemnity against a successor lawyer is, accordingly, misplaced. “[T]he ordinary rules of implied equitable indemnity in tort do not apply when the claim for indemnity is made against an attorney, is based on a breach of the attorney’s duty to his or her client, and is brought by an adverse party in litigation which is the same as or related to that in which the alleged negligence took

1990This argument was accepted in Parker v. Morton (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 751, 767 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 197 ], which CSAA urges us to follow.

1990Co. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 818, 821-822 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 679 ]; Held v. Arant (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 748, 752 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 422 ]; and see 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Torts, supra, § 93, at pp. 166-167.) Perceiving that attorneys would be reluctant to accept cases that might result in indemnity claims, and, more significantly, that if faced with a potential indemnity claim, the attorney’s sense of self-preservation might impinge on his or her duty of undivided loyalty to the client, these cases have established an exception to the ordinary rule of equitable indemnity.

1990Co. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 818, 821-822 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 679 ]; Held v. Arant (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 748, 752 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 422 ]; and see 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Torts, supra, § 93, at pp. 166-167.) Perceiving that attorneys would be reluctant to accept cases that might result in indemnity claims, and, more significantly, that if faced with a potential indemnity claim, the attorney’s sense of self-preservation might impinge on his or her duty of undivided loyalty to the client, these cases have established an exception to the ordinary rule of equitable indemnity.

2001(Jaffe v. Huxley Architecture, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 1193 [developer sued by homeowners association could not seek equitable indemnity from association’s board of directors; board’s wrongful conduct would be accounted for in main action under comparative fault principles].) Similar considerations do not apply for an indemnity claim against a home inspection company retained by the purchaser of real property.

2001(See, e.g., Kroll & Tract v. Paris & Paris (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1542-1545 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 78 ]; Major Clients Agency v. Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1127-1129 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 ]; Held v. Arant (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 748, 752-753 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 422 ].) “ ‘Perceiving that attorneys would be reluctant to accept cases that might result in indemnity claims, and, more significantly, that if faced with a potential indemnity claim, the attorney’s sense of self-preservation might impinge on his or her duty of undivided loyalty to the client, these cases have established an exception to

2001(See, e.g., Kroll & Tract v. Paris & Paris (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1542-1545 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 78 ]; Major Clients Agency v. Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1127-1129 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 ]; Held v. Arant (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 748, 752-753 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 422 ].) “ ‘Perceiving that attorneys would be reluctant to accept cases that might result in indemnity claims, and, more significantly, that if faced with a potential indemnity claim, the attorney’s sense of self-preservation might impinge on his or her duty of undivided loyalty to the client, these cases have established an exception to

2001(See, e.g., Kroll & Tract v. Paris & Paris (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1542-1545 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 78 ]; Major Clients Agency v. Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1127-1129 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 ]; Held v. Arant (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 748, 752-753 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 422 ].) “ ‘Perceiving that attorneys would be reluctant to accept cases that might result in indemnity claims, and, more significantly, that if faced with a potential indemnity claim, the attorney’s sense of self-preservation might impinge on his or her duty of undivided loyalty to the client, these cases have established an exception to

2001(See, e.g., Kroll & Tract v. Paris & Paris (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1542-1545 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 78 ]; Major Clients Agency v. Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1127-1129 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 ]; Held v. Arant (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 748, 752-753 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 422 ].) “ ‘Perceiving that attorneys would be reluctant to accept cases that might result in indemnity claims, and, more significantly, that if faced with a potential indemnity claim, the attorney’s sense of self-preservation might impinge on his or her duty of undivided loyalty to the client, these cases have established an exception to

1995Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 753, 758 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 ], italics in original; see also Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 435, 439 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 520 ].) By its terms, section 877.6 governs only those settlements between a “plaintiff or claimant” and a “joint-tortfeasor or co-obligor.” 22 CMA argues its good faith settlement with Fireman’s Fund falls within section 877.6 because (1) Fireman’s Fund was a “claimant’ by retaining a potential indemnity claim (as Kelly’s subrogee) against CMA for the amounts Fireman’s Fund paid to Homeowners; and (2) CMA w

1995Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 753, 758 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 ], italics in original; see also Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 435, 439 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 520 ].) By its terms, section 877.6 governs only those settlements between a “plaintiff or claimant” and a “joint-tortfeasor or co-obligor.” 22 CMA argues its good faith settlement with Fireman’s Fund falls within section 877.6 because (1) Fireman’s Fund was a “claimant’ by retaining a potential indemnity claim (as Kelly’s subrogee) against CMA for the amounts Fireman’s Fund paid to Homeowners; and (2) CMA w

1995Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 753, 758 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 ], italics in original; see also Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 435, 439 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 520 ].) By its terms, section 877.6 governs only those settlements between a “plaintiff or claimant” and a “joint-tortfeasor or co-obligor.” 22 CMA argues its good faith settlement with Fireman’s Fund falls within section 877.6 because (1) Fireman’s Fund was a “claimant’ by retaining a potential indemnity claim (as Kelly’s subrogee) against CMA for the amounts Fireman’s Fund paid to Homeowners; and (2) CMA w

1995Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 753, 758 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 ], italics in original; see also Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 435, 439 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 520 ].) By its terms, section 877.6 governs only those settlements between a “plaintiff or claimant” and a “joint-tortfeasor or co-obligor.” 22 CMA argues its good faith settlement with Fireman’s Fund falls within section 877.6 because (1) Fireman’s Fund was a “claimant’ by retaining a potential indemnity claim (as Kelly’s subrogee) against CMA for the amounts Fireman’s Fund paid to Homeowners; and (2) CMA w