presence of defendant defense in California

2017Nevertheless, relying on Dell , supra , 232 Cal.App.3d 248 , 283 Cal.Rptr. 361 , the Attorney General argues defendant could not have been prejudiced by the removal because Juror No. 4 was replaced by an alternate, who was "selected from the same source, in the same manner, with the same qualifications and ... subject to the same challenges," and who had "an equal opportunity to observe the entire proceedings and [took] the same oath as the regular jurors." ( Id . at p. 256, 283 Cal.Rptr. 361 .) However, as previously explained, Dell involved the removal of a juror where good cause for that re

2017Nevertheless, relying on Dell , supra , 232 Cal.App.3d 248 , 283 Cal.Rptr. 361 , the Attorney General argues defendant could not have been prejudiced by the removal because Juror No. 4 was replaced by an alternate, who was "selected from the same source, in the same manner, with the same qualifications and ... subject to the same challenges," and who had "an equal opportunity to observe the entire proceedings and [took] the same oath as the regular jurors." ( Id . at p. 256, 283 Cal.Rptr. 361 .) However, as previously explained, Dell involved the removal of a juror where good cause for that re

2017Unlike Rushen , supra , 464 U.S. 114 , 104 S.Ct. 453 , where there did not appear to have been any good cause for removal of the juror, and therefore the presence of defendant and defense counsel likely would not have made a difference with respect to the trial court's decision not to remove her, here, Juror No. 4 was removed from the jury without a showing of good cause and the presence of defendant's assigned counsel, or at least stand-in counsel prepared to do more than simply agree to a continuance, would likely have prevented that removal.

2017Unlike Rushen , supra , 464 U.S. 114 , 104 S.Ct. 453 , where there did not appear to have been any good cause for removal of the juror, and therefore the presence of defendant and defense counsel likely would not have made a difference with respect to the trial court's decision not to remove her, here, Juror No. 4 was removed from the jury without a showing of good cause and the presence of defendant's assigned counsel, or at least stand-in counsel prepared to do more than simply agree to a continuance, would likely have prevented that removal.

2003When proceedings resumed in the presence of defendant and defense counsel, the court said only this: `I did hear the explanations presented by the prosecutor with regard to peremptory challenges exercised against Rosalinda [R.] and Ernestina [R.], and they appear to be very valid reasons for those excuses.' As a result of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges and the trial court's rulings, no Hispanic served on the jury that returned the verdict selecting the penalty of death." ( Id. at p. 383, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 21 P.3d 769 .) On appeal, the defendant in Silva challenged the denial of his

2003When proceedings resumed in the presence of defendant and defense counsel, the court said only this: `I did hear the explanations presented by the prosecutor with regard to peremptory challenges exercised against Rosalinda [R.] and Ernestina [R.], and they appear to be very valid reasons for those excuses.' As a result of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges and the trial court's rulings, no Hispanic served on the jury that returned the verdict selecting the penalty of death." ( Id. at p. 383, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 21 P.3d 769 .) On appeal, the defendant in Silva challenged the denial of his

1997We recently said, “ ‘ “Waiver requires a voluntary act, knowingly done, with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. [Citation.] There must be actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the right to which the person is entitled. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Moore (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 22, 27 .) There must be “. . . an actual intention to relinquish it or conduct so inconsistent with the intent to enforce that right in question as to induce a reasonable belief that it has been relinquished.” (Outboard Marine Corp. v. Superior Court (1975) 52 Cal.

1997We recently said, “ ‘ “Waiver requires a voluntary act, knowingly done, with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. [Citation.] There must be actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the right to which the person is entitled. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Moore (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 22, 27 .) There must be “. . . an actual intention to relinquish it or conduct so inconsistent with the intent to enforce that right in question as to induce a reasonable belief that it has been relinquished.” (Outboard Marine Corp. v. Superior Court (1975) 52 Cal.

1997We recently said, “ ‘ “Waiver requires a voluntary act, knowingly done, with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. [Citation.] There must be actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the right to which the person is entitled. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Moore (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 22, 27 .) There must be “. . . an actual intention to relinquish it or conduct so inconsistent with the intent to enforce that right in question as to induce a reasonable belief that it has been relinquished.” (Outboard Marine Corp. v. Superior Court (1975) 52 Cal.